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Abstract
The thesis consists of three parts. The first one presents an exhaustive study of three new
models arising in the context of the so-called optimal liquidation problem. This is the problem
faced by an investor who aims at selling a large number of stock shares within a given time
horizon and wants to maximise his expected utility of the cash resulting from the sale. Such
an investor has to take into account the impact that his selling strategy has on the underlying
stock price. The models studied in the thesis assume that market risk follows a fairly general
Le´vy process and that the investor has an exponential utility. In each of the three different
model formulations, an explicit or semi-explicit expression for the optimal liquidation strategy
is derived.
The second part of the thesis presents a study of an optimal liquidation problem embedded
in a contractual problem. In particular, a contractual relationship between an investor and
a broker is modelled on the basis of a suitable liquidation strategy and the corresponding
affected mark-to-market assert price. The analysis of the model determines the broker’s
compensation and the liquidation strategy that maximise the broker’s as well as the investor’s
expected utilities.
The third part of the thesis studies a continuous time principal-agent problem in which
the agent’s outside options depend on his past performance. In this new model, even if the
agent does not expect any compensation from the principal at all, the agent may still apply
work effort with a view to improving his outside options. Formulated as an optimal control
and stopping problem for both the agent and the principal, the optimal contract is identified.
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Introduction
This thesis consists of three themes of studies: i) the optimal liquidation problem in different
models with stock prices driven by Le´vy processes; ii) a liquidation problem involving a
contractual agreement between an investor and a broker; and iii) the principal-agent problem
taking consideration of the agent’s outside options.
I. Optimal liquidation
The optimal liquidation problem considers an investor who aims to sell a large amount of
shares within a given time. Rapid sale of shares may depress the stock price, while slicing the
big order into many smaller blocks of orders to be executed sequentially over time may take
too long to complete the liquidation hence the market volatility risk becomes large. Therefore,
the investor needs to find an optimal way to slice the big order over time so that his execution
cost get minimised.
A good modelling of the investor’s execution price is crucial for studying the optimal
liquidation problem. It is common in the literature that an execution price is assumed to have
an additive form of an unaffected price and a price impact. The unaffected price is usually
interpreted to be the mark-to-market stock price if the investor does not make any trades,
while the price impact describes the manner of how the investor’s trades can influence the stock
price. With this structure of the execution price, Almgren and Chriss (1999, 2000) assume that
the price impact is a sum of a so-called permanent price impact and a temporary price impact.
The permanent impact hits the stock price fundamentally, and this kind of influence never
disappears. The temporary impact changes the stock price only instantaneously, it disappears
immediately if the investor stops trading. In particular in Almgren and Chriss (1999, 2000),
the permanent impact is described by a linear function of the investor’s total size of orders
that have been executed, the temporary impact is a linear function of the investor’s trading
speed, and the unaffected stock price follows a Brownian motion. Formulated as a problem
of a mean-variance minimisation of the investor’s execution cost over a set of deterministic
trading strategies, the optimal liquidation strategy is derived explicitly. Almgren (2003)
generalises this model by taking the temporary impact function to be a power function. Then
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for the power-law temporary impact, Almgren et al. (2005) give out a result of calibration.
Following Almgren and Chriss (2000) but instead of the mean-variancce criterion, Schied and
Scho¨neborn (2009) study the optimal liquidation problem with a utility optimisation. In this
model, the investor’s risk aversion depends on the how many risk-neutral assets he is holding.
Schied et al. (2010) prove that in the Almgren-Chriss model, for any investor with a constant
absolutely risk aversion (CARA), the optimal liquidation strategy is deterministic.
Instead of the Almgren-Chriss type model, Obizhaeva and Wang (2013) describe the price
impact using limit order books. They assume that the price impact is determined by how
deep the investor’s orders eat into a limit order book as well as how quickly new limit orders
refill into the book. But these two factors are essentially determined by the shape of a limit
order book together with the speed of it’s resilience. With this kind of modelling, the price
impact is neither permanent nor temporary, but it is transient meaning that it decays over
time due to the new coming limit orders into the book. By considering a flat shaped limit
order book with it’s resilience following an exponential function of the difference between the
current and the unaffected statuses of the limit order book, as well as that the unaffected best
bid/ask price following a Brownian motion, Obizhaeva and Wang (2013) solve the problem of
minimising the investor’s final expect execution cost. Alfonsi et al. (2010) extend this model
by concerning a limit order book with a general continuous shape. Predoiu et al. (2011)
extend this model further by working on a discrete shaped limit order book and a general
resilience function. Based on the setting of Alfonsi et al. (2010), Løkka (2014) solves the
optimal liquidation problem for a CARA investor when the unaffected best bid/ask price
follows a Brownian motion.
Describing the unaffected stock price using a Brownian motion may allow it to become
negative. To deal with this drawback, Gatheral and Schied (2011) study an Almgren-Chriss
type model where the unaffected price process is a geometric Brownian motion. By imposing
a special optimisation criterion, they compare the geometric Brownian motion model to the
linear Brownian motion model, and conclude that the difference between the corresponding
optimal liquidation strategies is little. Instead of an additive price impact, to prevent the
execution price from being negative, Guo and Zervos (2015) study an optimal liquidation
model with multiplicative price impact, in which the unaffected stock price is driven by a
geometric Brownian motion.
All of the aforementioned models are about liquidating by submitting scheduled market
orders. This kind of strategy may be too aggressive, since in reality submitting limit orders to
take some advantage from choosing a preferred execution price is always considered in prior,
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rather than using market orders directly. The optimal liquidation problem involving using
limit orders is studied in Avellaneda and Stoikov (2008), Gue´ant et al. (2012), Bayraktar and
Ludkovski (2014), Cartea and Jaimungal (2015), etc. Moreover, Kratz and Scho¨neborn (2014,
2015) consider trading involving dark pools for the optimal liquidation problem.
In reality, liquidation can usually finish in a very short time. It is well-known that Le´vy
processes can provide rather good fits to the distributions of observed stock returns, and this
is in particular within short time horizons (see e.g. Madan and Seneta, 1990; Eberlein and
Keller, 1995, etc). This therefore motivates us to study the optimal liquidation problem with
market risk described by Le´vy processes. To reserve the mathematical tractability, we study
the liquidation problem that only allows to submit market orders, and the price impact is in
an additive form. We establish three models. Two of them are of the Almgren-Chriss type
and the rest one involves a limit order book. In all of our three models, a CARA investor is
considered.
In the first model, we study the optimal liquidation problem with infinite time horizon
in the Almgren-Chriss framework, where the unaffected stock price follows a general Le´vy
process. The temporary price impact is described by a general function satisfying some
conditions which makes the problem to be well-formulated. We suppose the investor wants to
maximise the expected utility of the cash received from the sale of his shares, and show that
this problem can be reduced to a deterministic optimisation problem which we are able to solve
explicitly. In order to compare our results to exponential Le´vy models which are supposed to
be more natural to describe stock prices, we derive the (linear) Le´vy process approximation
of such models. In particular we derive expressions for the Le´vy process approximation of the
exponential variance gamma Le´vy process, and study properties of the corresponding optimal
liquidation strategy. We find that for the power-law temporary impact function, the optimal
strategy is to liquidate so quickly that it may be infeasible in practice. This is because that
the power-law price impact doesn’t give out big enough penalisations to very large trading
speeds. We therefore try to study what kind of temporary price impact is associated with a
feasible optimal liquidation strategy in the Le´vy model. In particular, we obtain an explicit
expression for the connection between the temporary impact function for the Le´vy model
and the temporary impact function for the Brownian motion model, for which the optimal
liquidation strategies from the two models coincide.
In the second model, we consider an Almgren-Chriss type of liquidation model and aim to
maximise the expected utility of the investor’s cash position at a given finite time. The unaf-
fected stock price follows a general Le´vy process. The temporary price impact is described by
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a general function satisfying some conditions which makes the problem to be well-formulated.
We reduce the problem to a deterministic optimisation problem and we derive the optimal
liquidation strategy and the corresponding value function in closed forms. It turns out that,
if the unaffected asset price has a positive drift, then it might be optimal to wait for a while
during selling, or it might be optimal to buy back at the beginning of trading, and price ma-
nipulation in the sense of Huberman and Stanzl (2004) is allowed in the case of positive drift.
We solve the deterministic optimisation problem using the theory calculus of variations. In
particular, we characterise the optimal liquidation strategy using the Beltrami identity which
is a first order ordinary differential equation. This characterisation allows us to get a closed-
form solution.
In the last model, we consider a general bid limit order book with a general resilience
function where the unaffected price process follows a general Le´vy process. Our formulation
also allows for limit order books with discontinuous shapes which can provide reasonable
approximations for limit order books with discrete shapes in reality. It is assumed that the
unaffected bid price provides a lower bound for the best ask price and that the bid limit order
book is unaffected by the investor’s buy orders. These assumptions allow us to exclude any buy
orders in the optimal strategy, and they also exclude any price manipulations. The number of
available limit orders in the book is assumed to be finite. This limits the investor’s strategy
in the way that he cannot sell more than currently available bid orders. With an infinite time
horizon, we solve the problem of maximising the expected utility of the investor’s the finial
cash. Due to a certain structure of the market we consider, combining with the CARA utility,
we simplify the optimisation problem to be deterministic. Formulated as a two-dimensional
singular optimal control problem, we derive an explicit expression for the value function. The
optimal intervention boundary completely characterises the optimal liquidation strategy. In
particular, this problem provides an example of a solvable two-dimensional singular optimal
control problem with an optimal intervention boundary can be discontinuous.
II. Contracted liquidation
The contracted liquidation problem extends the classical optimal liquidation problem by con-
sidering additionally a contractual agreement made between an investor (she) and a broker
(he). Precisely, instead of concerning an investor is liquidating by herself, she is assumed to
be unable to access to the market, a broker is therefore hired to liquidate on behalf of the
investor under some conditions stipulated in a contract. The contract specifies a liquidation
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position, a time to complete the liquidation, how much liquidation proceeds that the broker
should deliver to the investor and how much compensation that the investor should pay to the
broker. Also, the investor can propose some liquidation strategy that the broker is expected
to (or have to) follow. The aim of this problem is to maximise both of the investor’s and the
broker’s expected utilities by finding out the optimal contract offered by the investor as well
as the associated optimal liquidation strategy implemented by the broker.
We study this problem in an Almgren-Chriss type of liquidation model (Almgren and
Chriss, 2000; Almgren, 2003) embedded in a continuous-time principal-agent model. In terms
of an optimal liquidation model, we suppose there is no permanent price impact in the market,
the temporary price impact is described by some general function, and the unaffected stock
price is driven by a Brownian motion. In addition to the price impact cost, we consider some
additional implementation cost depending on the trading speed, which is described by some
general function. In terms of a principal-agent model, in our study, the principal is identified
by a CARA investor and the agent is identified by a risk-neutral broker. We assume that
the liquidation has to finish within a finite time, and that the proceeds from the sale as well
as the compensation are paid to each other at the end of liquidation as lump-sums (see e.g.
Holmstro¨m and Milgrom, 1987; Cvitanic´ et al., 2006, 2008, 2009, etc, for continuous-time
models with lump-sum payments). Depending on whether the investor is able to observe
the liquidation strategy that the broker actually implements, we study two different types
of contracts which are respectively referred to as the first-best and the second-best (moral
hazard) in the literature of the principal-agent problem.
The first-best case assumes that the investor is able to observe which liquidation strategy
that the broker implements. The broker therefore has to follow any liquidation strategy
recommended by the investor. The optimal contact and the optimal liquidation strategy are
explicitly solved out. It shows that under the condition of the optimal contract, the risk-averse
investor recommends a trivial liquidation strategy which is usually optimal for a risk-neutral
investor in an optimal liquidation model (see e.g. Almgren and Chriss, 2000), and she transfers
all of the market volatility risk to the risk-neutral broker via the compensation so that receives
a deterministic amount of proceeds.
The second-best case assumes that the investor is unable to observe the liquidation strat-
egy that the broker actually implements. However, she does observe the stock price which
is affected by the broker’s trades. The investor requires to receive amount of proceeds com-
puted according to her recommended strategy against the observed stock price. Due to the
asymmetric information between the investor and the broker, the broker has chance to collect
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some private benefit throughout the sale, and this is done by taking the difference between
the actual proceeds he receives from the liquidation and the amount of money that have to
be delivered to the investor. The investor is supposed to seek for an optimal contract which
induces the broker to implement the recommended strategy as his optimal choice. Under this
condition, the optimal compensation and the optimal recommended liquidation strategy are
solved in closed-forms. Similar to the deterministic optimal liquidation strategy for a CARA
investor in an optimal liquidation model (see e.g. Schied and Scho¨neborn, 2009; Schied et al.,
2010; Gue´ant and Royer, 2014; Løkka, 2014) that the optimal recommended strategy also
turns out to be deterministic in our contracted liquidation model. An explicit example with
a linear temporary price impact function and a quadratic implementation cost function is
given. It shows that compare to the Almgren-Chriss optimal liquidation strategy for a CARA
investor (see e.g. Schied et al., 2010), the contractual agreement allows the investor to share
some market volatility risk with the risk-neutral broker.
The study of the continuous-time principal-agent problem is initiated by Holmstro¨m and
Milgrom (1987). They introduce a moral hazard model with a finite time horizon, where
the compensation is paid at the terminal time as a lump-sum, and both of the principal and
the agent have exponential utilities. The agent’s optimal effort of working for the principal
is derived to be deterministic. Their setting is close to the problem formulation about the
contractual agreement in our model, and our optimal implemented liquidation strategy (anal-
ogous to the optimal effort) is also deterministic. Within the category of continuous-time
moral hazard models, various extensions have been done. In particular, in contrast to the
deterministic effort in Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987), many of researches focus on dynamic
incentive contracts, e.g. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006); Biais et al. (2007); Sannikov (2008);
Cvitanic´ et al. (2008, 2009); Anderson et al. (2017), etc. Cvitanic´ and Zhang (2012) establish
general mathematical frameworks for the principal-agent problem in different contexts, char-
acterising solutions using the forward-backward stochastic differential equations. In contrary
to most principal-agent models (e.g. the aforementioned models), the output process in our
model, namely the process of liquidation proceeds, has a more meaningful financial structure,
rather than just being a general diffusion.
Compare to optimal liquidation models, the investor’s recommended strategy in our model
is usually referred to as a benchmark strategy in the literature of optimal liquidation. The
benchmark liquidation strategy usually determines directly how much the broker have to
deliver to the investor when liquidation finishes. The broker can trade against the benchmark
to gain some profit (see e.g. Gue´ant and Royer, 2014; Frei and Westray, 2015, ect). Amoung
11
them, Gue´ant and Royer (2014) do some indifference pricing for the amount of shares need
to be sold with respect to the broker’s optimal expected utility maximised over a set of
admissible liquidation strategies. This indifference price is quoted by the broker, and it serves
as a premium so that the broker agrees to liquidate for the investor. In terms of our model,
the aforementioned liquidation models involving benchmarks are equivalent to the broker’s
problem, where the investor’s utility optimisation is completely not considered.
III. Contract with outside options
The principal-agent problem studies how a principal incentivises an agent to manage a project
based on some contractual agreement. The principal receives the profit generated from the
project, meanwhile compensates the agent for his effort which impacts the profit that the
principal receives. Therefore, the aim of this problem is to find an optimal contract and the
agent’s associated optimal managerial effort.
The continuous-time principal-agent problem is first studied by Holmstro¨m and Milgrom
(1987) in the context of moral hazard, meaning that the agent can employ some hidden
action which is unobservable for the principal. In their finite time horizon model, all payoffs
are made as lump-sums at the end of time. Receiving a compensation from the principal, the
agent applies effort to maximise his expected utility. Having understood the agent’s optimal
response, the principal optimises over contracts to maximise her own expected utility. In the
context of moral hazard, DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006); Biais et al. (2007) study the optimal
structure of financing a company whose manager can employ an unobservable shirking action
to reduce the value of the company. They find the optimal contract for which the manager does
not reduce the company’s value, and implement this optimal contract using realistic financing
tools. Sannikov (2008) introduces a continuous-time model for a risk-averse agent and a risk-
neutral principal who can terminate the project inefficiently. Cvitanic´ et al. (2008) extends
the Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) model by taking the consideration that the principal is
allowed to dismiss the agent. When the agent exits, an exogenous payoff is paid to him. Based
on DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2017) study a stealing model in
which the principal and the agent have different believes about the intrinsic drift of the output
process of the project. In addition, when the agent is dismissed by the principal, he gets some
outside option whose value depends on both of their believes of the outcome’s drift.
DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006); Sannikov (2008) first connect the principal-agent problem
to the theory of optimal control. In particular, given any contract, the agent’s optimal effort
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is characterised by his optimal value process which can be taken as a state process of the prin-
cipal’s optimal control problem. The principal then chooses the optimal contract, therefore,
the agent’s optimal effort associated with this contract is induced at the same time.
In a setting similar to Sannikov (2008), we study a principal-agent problem where the
agent receives an outside option when he chooses to stop working for the principal. In contrast
to Cvitanic´ et al. (2008) and DeMarzo and Sannikov (2017), the agent can terminate the
contract when the outside option is sufficiently attractive. The value of the outside option
depends on agent’s past performance. The higher output the agent has produced, the higher
value his outside option becomes. Therefore, the agent not only works for the compensation
paid by the principal, but also to improve his perspective from the outside option. The value
of outside option is assumed to be linear in the present value of the accumulated cash flow
generated from the project. This assumption allows the outside option to be incorporated
into the agent’s running cost, which reduces the dimension of the principal’s control problem
and effectively enhances the mathematical tractability.
Mathematically, the agent’s problem is formulated as a non-Markovian stochastic control
and stopping problem. For any given compensation, using a martingale representation tech-
nique, the agent’s optimal effort and optimal stopping time are characterised by his optimal
value process. Then the principal’s problem is formulate as a stochastic control problem with
mixed classical control and singular control. Similar to Sannikov (2008), the agent’s optimal
value process is used as the state value for the principal. In contrast to DeMarzo and San-
nikov (2006) and Sannikov (2008), where the contract sensitivity is assumed to be bounded,
we first show that principal’s value function is a unique continuous viscosity solution to the
principal’s fully nonlinear Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman variational inequalities (HJBVI) without
assuming a bounded control. This result is mathematically interesting in its own right. Im-
posing an additional assumption on admissible contracts’ sensitivity, which makes sure the
principal’s HJBVI is uniformly elliptic, we upgrade the regularity of the viscosity solution to
be twice continuously differentiable. This allows us to derive the optimal contract, and hence
the agent’s associated optimal effort and optimal time to exist are induced at the same time.
It turns out that for the optimal contract, the compensation is paid with a minimum amount
such that the agent’s optimal value process remains below a certain finite level. The agent’s
optimal effort is a function of the optimal contract’s sensitivity, and the agent is optimal to
stop working once his optimal value process drops down to 0.
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IV. Structure of the thesis
Part I
Chapter 1: Section 1.1 introduces an Almgren-Chriss type of liquidation model with infi-
nite time horizon and the investor’s optimal liquidation problem; Section 1.2 simplifies the
problem; solution to the optimal liquidation problem is given in Section 1.3; Section 1.4 gives
out an approximation scheme for an liquidation model with exponential Le´vy processes, using
the model developed in previous sections; some numerical examples are given in Section 1.5;
Section 1.6 contains all of the proofs in this chapter.
Chapter 2: Section 2.1 introduces an Almgren-Chriss type of liquidation model with finite
time horizons and the investor’s optimal liquidation problem; Section 2.2 simplifies the prob-
lem; this problem is solved in Section 2.3; Section 2.4 shows that the finite time horizon
model converges to the model with infinite time horizon; all of the proofs in this chapter are
contained in Section 2.5.
Chapter 3: Section 3.1 introduces a liquidation model in the context of limit order book, and
the investor’s optimal liquidation problem is introduced; Section 3.2 simplifies the problem;
solution to this problem is derived in Section 3.3; all of the proofs in this chapter are given in
Section 3.4.
Part II
Chapter 4: Section 4.1 introduces an Almgren-Chriss type of liquidation model with a
contractual agreement between an investor and a broker; Section 4.2 studies the first-best
contract; the second-best contract is studied in Section 4.3; all of the proofs in this chapter
are contained in Section 4.4.
Part III
Chapter 5: Section 5.1 introduces a principal-agent model with agent’s outside options;
Section 5.2 formulates the agent’s and the principal’s problems, and the agent’s optimal effort
as well as the optimal time to exit are solved out for a given contract; the principal’s optimal
contract is derived in Section 5.3; Section 5.4 contains all of the proofs in this chapter.
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Part I
Optimal Liquidation
This part is based on joint works with Dr. Arne Løkka.
Chapter 1
Optimal liquidation trajectories for
the Almgren-Chriss model with Le´vy
processes
1.1 Problem formulation
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space, equipped with a filtration F = (Ft)t≥0 satisfying
the usual conditions, which supports a one dimensional, non-trivial, F-adapted Le´vy process
L. We assume that the Le´vy process L possesses the following properties.
Assumption 1.1. L1 has finite second moment. Moreover, the set
{
δ < 0 | E[eδL1] <∞} is
non-empty.
For future reference, we observe that this assumption ensures that Lt has finite first and
second moments, for all t ≥ 0. Hence, L admits the decomposition
Lt = µt+ σWt +
∫
R
x
(
N(t, dx)− tν(dx)),
where µ ∈ R and σ ≥ 0 are two constants, W is a standard Brownian motion, N is a Poisson
random measure which is independent of W with compensator tν(dx), and ν is the Le´vy
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measure associated with L (see e.g. Kyprianou, 2006). Write
δ¯ = inf
{
δ < 0 | E[eδL1] <∞} < 0. (1.1)
Assumption 1.1 also ensures that the cumulant generating function of L1 is finite on the
interval (δ¯, 0]. This property will be made extensive use of in the sequel.
We consider an investor who aims to sell a large amount of shares of a single stock in
an infinite time horizon. For t ≥ 0, we denote by Yt the investor’s position in the stock at
time t, and let y ≥ 0 be the investor’s initial stock position. We consider the following sets of
admissible liquidation strategies.
Definition 1.2. Given an initial share position y ≥ 0, the set of admissible strategies, denoted
byA(y), consists of all F-adapted, absolutely continuous, non-increasing processes Y satisfying∫ ∞
0
‖Yt‖L∞(P) dt <∞ if µ 6= 0, (1.2)
and ∫ ∞
0
‖Yt‖2L∞(P) dt <∞ if µ = 0. (1.3)
Let AD(y) be the set of all deterministic strategies in A(y).
The reason for operating with different sets of admissibility depending on the drift pa-
rameter µ is related to the asymptotic properties of the cumulant generating function of L1
around 0. If µ is 0 then the cumulant generating function is of order two around zero, while it
is of order one if µ is different from zero (the importance of the cumulant generating function
of L1 will be explained later). The integrability conditions in (1.2) and (1.3) make sure that
the investor’s finial cash position is well-defined (see Proposition 1.5), at the same time, they
also rule out some arbitrage in some weak sense (see Remark 1.6).
Let Y ∈ A(y). Then there exists an F-adapted, positive-valued process ξ such that Y
admits the representation
Yt = y −
∫ t
0
ξs ds,
i.e. −ξt is the time derivative of Y at time t. In the literature of optimal liquidation, the
function t 7→ Yt is referred to as the liquidation trajectory and the associated process ξ as the
liquidation speed (see Almgren and Chriss, 2000; Almgren, 2003, etc). They are identified by
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each other.
As it is common in the optimal liquidation literature, we refer to the unaffected stock price
process the price process observed in the market, if the investor does not trade. Throughout
this chapter, we consider that the unaffected stock price process is modelled by the process
s+ Lt, t ≥ 0,
where s > 0 is some constant which denotes the initial stock price. In reality, liquidation can
usually finish in a very short time. It is well-known that Le´vy processes can provide rather
good fits to the distributions of observed stock returns, and this is in particular within short
time horizons. Therefore, the study of liquidation problem with Le´vy processes should give
out a good result of the optimal liquidation strategy.
Following Almgren and Chriss (1999, 2000) and Almgren (2003), we split a market impact
into two components: a permanent impact and a temporary impact. We therefore assume
that the stock price at time t ≥ 0 is given by
St = s+ Lt + α(Yt − Y0)− F (ξt), (1.4)
where α ≥ 0 is a constant describing the permanent impact and F : [0,∞) → [0,∞) is a
function describing the temporary impact. It is common in the literature of optimal liquidation
that in a continuous time model, an admissible strategy is assumed to be absolutely continuous
(see Schied and Scho¨neborn, 2009; Schied et al., 2010, etc), and therefore for some t ≥ 0, the
associated liquidation speed might be undefined. As a consequence, the stock price given
by (1.4) might be undefined for some t ≥ 0 as well. However, this is fine in the context of
optimal liquidation, because for instance in our study, we only focus on the proceeds from
selling shares, which is well-defined with such definition of S (see (1.5)). We assume that F
satisfies the following assumptions.
Assumption 1.3. The temporary impact function F : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) satisfies that
(i) F ∈ C([0,∞)) ∩ C1((0,∞));
(ii) F (0) = 0;
(iii) the function x 7→ xF (x) is strictly convex on [0,∞);
(iv) the function x 7→ x2F ′(x) is strictly increasing, and it tends to infinity as x→∞.
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In the above assumption, condition (iii) serves for the convexity of the objective function
in the optimisation problem we are going to solve (see (1.13)) and hence the uniqueness
of solution holds (see Theorem 1.15); condition (iv) ensures that the value function in our
optimisation problem is solved in an explicit form (see Proposition 1.14) and the optimal
liquidation speed process can be solved in a feedback form (see Theorem 1.15). Assumption
1.3 is satisfied by a large class of functions, for example, F (x) = βxγ with β, γ > 0. Under
this assumption, we derive the following technical properties of F for future references.
Lemma 1.4. F is strictly increasing and limx→0 xF ′(x) = 0. Hence limx→0 x2F ′(x) = 0.
For t ≥ 0, let CYt denote the cash position of the investor at time t associated with some
admissible strategy Y . Denote by c ∈ R the investor’s initial cash position. Then a direct
calculation verifies that his cash position at some finite time T is given by
CYT = c−
∫ T
0
St dYt
= c− (s− αy)(YT − y)+ α
2
(
y2 − Y 2T
)− LTYT + ∫ T
0
Yt− dLt −
∫ T
0
ξtF (ξt) dt. (1.5)
The next result states that the investor’s cash position at the end of time is well-defined.
Proposition 1.5. For any Y ∈ A(y), we have
(i) LTYT → 0 in L2(P), as T →∞;
(ii)
∫∞
0 Yt− dLt is well-defined in L
1(P).
Therefore,
CY∞ = c+ sy −
1
2
αy2 +
∫ ∞
0
Yt− dLt −
∫ ∞
0
ξtF (ξt) dt, a.s., (1.6)
for any Y ∈ A(y).
From the expression of CY∞, we can make a few observations. The term c + sy can
be viewed as the initial mark-to-market wealth of the investor. His total loss due to the
permanent impact of trading is given by 12αy
2 which is deterministic and only depends on the
initial liquidation size. In particular, it does not depend on the choice of liquidation strategy.
The term
∫∞
0 ξtF (ξt) dt represents the total cost due to the temporary impact, and it does
depend on the liquidation strategy. The term
∫∞
0 Yt− dLt represents the gain or loss due to
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the market volatility. A relatively slow liquidation speed reduces the temporary impact, but
provides a substantial market volatility risk. The optimal liquidation strategy is therefore
a compromise between the loss due to the temporary impact and the market volatility risk.
We assume that the investor has a constant absolutely risk aversion (CARA), thus his utility
function U satisfies U(x) = − exp(−Ax), for some constant A > 0. Suppose the investor aims
to maximise the expected utility of his cash position at the end of time, i.e. he wants to solve
sup
Y ∈A(y)
E
[
U
(
CY∞
)]
. (1.7)
In view of (1.6), this problem takes the form of
inf
Y ∈A(y)
e−AC˜ E
[
exp
(
−
∫ ∞
0
AYt− dLt +A
∫ ∞
0
ξtF (ξt) dt
)]
, (1.8)
where
C˜ = c+ sy − 1
2
αy2.
To solve the above problem, it is sufficient to look at
inf
Y ∈A(y)
E
[
exp
(
−
∫ ∞
0
AYt− dLt +A
∫ ∞
0
ξtF (ξt) dt
)]
. (1.9)
Remark 1.6. Suppose that we do not impose integrability conditions (1.2) and (1.3) on an
admissible strategy. Then cash position at time infinity may not be well-defined. In this case,
we may consider to solve the problem
sup
Y ∈A(y)
E
[
− exp
(
−A lim sup
T→∞
CYT
)]
.
However, without (1.2) and (1.3), our model admits an arbitrage in some week sense. To see
this, we consider the Le´vy process L as a standard Brownian motion and consider some stock
price p > s. Write τp = inf{t ≥ 0 |Lt ≥ p} which is finite a.s. (see Rogers and Williams
(2000), Lemma 3.6). Suppose Y is an absolutely continuous, non-increasing strategy which
consists of a waiting until time τp and then decreases to 0 following a deterministic way, i.e.
(Yτp+t)t≥0 is a deterministic process starting from y. Such strategy is admissible. Let ξ be
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the associated speed process. We calculate that
sup
Y ∈A(y)
E
[
− exp
(
−A lim sup
T→∞
CYT
)]
≥E
[
− exp
(
−A lim sup
T→∞
CYT
)]
≥E
[
− exp
(
−ACYT+τp
)]
= − exp
(
−AC˜ +A
∫ T
0
ξt+τpF
(
ξt+τp
)
dt
)
E
[
exp
(
−
∫ T+τp
0
AYt dWt
)]
= − exp
(
−AC˜ +A
∫ T
0
ξpt+τpF
(
ξpt+τp
)
dt
)
E
[
exp
(
−AyWτp −
∫ T+τp
τp
AY pt dWt
)]
= − exp
(
−Ayp−AC˜ +A
∫ T
0
ξpt+τpF
(
ξt+τp
)
dt
)
E
[
exp
(∫ T+τp
τp
1
2
A2
(
Yt
)2
dt
)]
= − exp
(
−Ayp−AC˜ +A
∫ T
0
ξt+τpF
(
ξt+τp
)
dt+
∫ T
0
1
2
A2
(
Yt+τp
)2
dt
)
,
where C˜ = c+sy− 12αy2, and notice that the two integrals in the above line are two constants.
Taking p to +∞ gives
E
[
− exp
(
−ACYT+τp
)]
= 0.
Then Jensen’s inequality results in
lim
p→∞− exp
(
−AE[CYT+τp]) ≥ limp→∞E[− exp(−ACYT+τp)] = 0,
which implies that
lim
p→∞E
[
CYT+τp
]
=∞.
Therefore, for some large enough p, CYT+τp has a strictly positive expectation. This is an
arbitrage in the sense that the investor can receive strictly positive proceeds for sure by
repeating this strategy. However, Y clearly violates (1.2) and (1.3).
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1.2 Problem simplification
Throughout this section, we reduce problem (1.9) to be a deterministic optimisation problem.
Let’s first write δ¯A = −δ¯/A, where δ¯ is the negative number appearing in (1.1) and A is the
risk aversion parameter appearing in the utility function U . We impose further the following
assumptions.
Assumption 1.7. The initial stock position y is strictly less than δ¯A.
Assumption 1.8. The drift µ of the Le´vy process L satisfies µ ≤ 0.
Assumption 1.7 restricts the investor’s maximum initial liquidation position cannot be
too large. This assumption helps us to reduce our problem. It ensures the objective function
we are going to deal with does not explode, as intuitively market volatility risk associated
with a significantly large amount of shares can be severe, which may cause some degeneracy.
Assumption 1.8 excludes a degenerate case of our reduced problem (see the discussion after
equation (1.14)).
Define function κA : [0, δ¯A)→ R by κA(x) = κ(−Ax), where κ is the cumulant generating
function of L1. This function will play an important role in the sequel and it has the following
properties.
Lemma 1.9. The function κA possesses the following properties
(i) κA(0) = 0;
(ii) κA is strictly convex;
(iii) if µ = 0, then limx→0
κA(x)
x2
= K, for some constant K > 0;
(iv) if µ 6= 0, then limx→0 κA(x)x = −Aµ.
Lemma 1.10. Let Y be a continuous process starting form y ∈ [0, δ¯A). Then∫ ∞
0
‖Yt‖iL∞(P) dt <∞
if and only if ∫ ∞
0
κA
(‖Yu‖L∞(P)) du <∞,
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where i = 1 if µ < 0, and i = 2 if µ = 0. Moreover, with µ > 0,∫ ∞
0
‖Yt‖L∞(P) dt <∞
implies ∫ ∞
0
κA
(‖Yu‖L∞(P)) du <∞.
In order to reduce problem (1.9), we also require the following technical result.
Lemma 1.11. For any Y ∈ A(y), the process MY given by
MYt = exp
(∫ t
0
−AYu− dLu −
∫ t
0
κA(Yu) du
)
, t ≥ 0, (1.10)
is a uniformly integrable martingale.
It follows from Lemma 1.10 and Lemma 1.11 that, for any Y ∈ A(y), the process MY is a
strictly positive martingale closed by MY∞. We can therefore define a new probability measure
QY by
dQY
dP
= MY∞.
Based on the idea in Schied et al. (2010) Theorem 2.8, and with reference to (1.9) and
Lemma 1.11, we calculate that
inf
Y ∈A(y)
E
[
exp
(
−
∫ ∞
0
AYt− dLt +A
∫ ∞
0
ξtF (ξt) dt
)]
= inf
Y ∈A(y)
E
[
exp
(
−
∫ ∞
0
AYt− dLt −
∫ ∞
0
κA(Yt)dt+
∫ ∞
0
(
κA(Yt) +AξtF (ξt)
)
dt
)]
= inf
Y ∈A(y)
EQ
Y
[
exp
(∫ ∞
0
(
κA(Yt) +AξtF (ξt)
)
dt
)]
≤ inf
Y ∈AD(y)
exp
[∫ ∞
0
(
κA(Yt) +AξtF (ξt)
)
dt
]
. (1.11)
Now suppose that Y ∗ is a solution to problem (1.11), then it must also be a solution to
problem (1.9), and hence an equality holds in (1.11). This is because that otherwise there
must be some Y˜ ∈ AD(y) which coincides with some sample path of some Y ∈ A(y) such that
exp
[∫ ∞
0
(
κA(Y˜t) +AξtF (ξ˜t)
)
dt
]
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<EQ
Y
[
exp
(∫ ∞
0
(
κA(Yt) +AξtF (ξt)
)
dt
)]
< exp
[∫ ∞
0
(
κA(Y
∗
t ) +AξtF (ξ
∗
t )
)
dt
]
.
This contradicts with Y ∗ being a solution to problem (1.11). Therefore, it suffices to solve
the problem
V (y) = inf
Y ∈AD(y)
J(Y ), y ∈ [0, δ¯A) (1.12)
where V denotes the value function and J is given by
J(Y ) =
∫ ∞
0
(
κA(Yt) +AξtF (ξt)
)
dt. (1.13)
If we take Y ∈ AD(y) such that Yt =
(
t −√y)2, for t ∈ [0,√y], and Yt = 0, for t > √y,
then it can be checked that
J(Y ) =
∫ √y
0
(
κA
((
t−√y)2)+A(2√y − 2t)F (2√y − 2t)) dt <∞, (1.14)
which implies that V <∞. Lemma 1.9 implies κA ≥ 0, if µ ≤ 0. Hence we have 0 ≤ V <∞,
for all µ ≤ 0.
Assumption 1.8 excludes some degeneracy. To see this, suppose µ > 0. Then Lemma 1.9
(iv) implies that there exists some constant z > 0 such that −∞ < κA(z) < 0. Suppose that
the investor’s initial stock position is z and let’s consider the strategy Y ∈ AD(z) satisfying
Y ′t = −ξt = 0 for t ∈ [0, s] with some s > 0. Then
V (z) ≤
∫ s
0
κA(z) dt+ V (z) = sκA(z) + V (z).
This can happen only if V (z) = −∞. Let Y¯ ∈ AD(y) with y ≥ z and set tz = inf{t ≥ 0 |
Y¯t = z} <∞. Then
V (y) ≤
∫ tz
0
(
κA(Y¯t) +Aξ¯tF (ξ¯t)
)
dt+ V (z),
which implies that V (y) = −∞. As z can be chosen to be arbitrarily close to zero, it follows
that V (y) = −∞, for all y ∈ (0, δ¯A). We therefore conclude that the value function is
degenerate when µ > 0. Let y ∈ (0, δ¯A), and suppose (in order to get a contradiction) that
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there exists an optimal strategy Y ∗ ∈ AD(y). Define κ˜A to be the function which is identical
to κA with µ = 0. Then with reference to the Le´vy-Khintchine representation of L (see
(1.35)), we can write κA(x) = −Aµx + κ˜A(x). By Assumption 1.3 and Lemma 1.9, we have
that κ˜A(Y
∗
t ) +AξtF (ξ
∗
t ) is positive. Thus,
V (y) =
∫ ∞
0
(
−AµY ∗t + κ˜A(Y ∗t ) +Aξ∗t F (ξ∗t )
)
dt = −∞, µ > 0,
implies
∫∞
0 Y
∗
t dt =∞, which contradicts the definition of an admissible strategy. We conclude
that if µ > 0, then there is no optimal admissible liquidation strategy.
Before finishing this section, we give out the following two remarks. Remark 1.12 compares
the CARA utility to the mean-variance optimisation criterion for our problem, and Remark
1.13 discusses that it is not optimal to buy back during the liquidation in our setting.
Remark 1.12. It is mentioned in Schied et al. (2010) that in the Almgren-Chriss model with
Brownian motion describing the unaffected stock price, the problem of optimising the finial
cost/reward of a CARA investor over a set of adapted strategies is equivalent to the same
problem but with a mean-variance optimisation criterion and over the corresponding set of
deterministic strategies. Nevertheless, this is not the case in our model, i.e. this equivalence
does not hold if the unaffected stock price is modelled by a general Le´vy process. To see this,
as we know in our problem, the set of admissible strategies A(y) can be replaced by AD(y).
Then in view of (1.8), it suffices to consider
inf
Y ∈AD(y)
E
[
e−AC
Y∞
]
,
where
CY∞ = c+ sy −
1
2
αy2 +
∫ ∞
0
Yt− dLt −
∫ ∞
0
ξtF (ξt) dt.
Let’s try to express E
[
e−ACY∞
]
in terms of E[CY∞] and Var(CY∞). It can be calculated that
E[CY∞] = c+ sy −
1
2
αy2 + µ
∫ ∞
0
Yt dt−
∫ ∞
0
ξtF (ξt) dt
and
Var(CY∞) = σ
2
∫ ∞
0
Y 2t dt+
∫ ∞
0
(∫
R
Y 2t x
2 ν(dx)
)
dt.
24
Then,
E
[
exp
(−ACY∞)]
= exp
[
−AE[CY∞] +
1
2
A2σ2
∫ ∞
0
Y 2t dt+
∫ ∞
0
∫
R
(
e−AYtx − 1 +AYtx
)
ν(dx) dt
]
= exp
[
−AE[CY∞] +
1
2
A2Var(CY∞) +
∫ ∞
0
∫
R
(
e−AYtx − 1 +AYtx− 1
2
A2Y 2t x
2
)
ν(dx) dt
]
.
From the above expression, it is clear that the problem is equivalent to
sup
Y ∈AD(y)
E[CY∞]−
1
2
AVar(CY∞),
if ν(R) ≡ 0, i.e. the Le´vy process L has no jumps. However, for any general Le´vy process,
this equivalence does not hold.
Remark 1.13. Let’s suppose that the large investor is allowed to buy shares. In this situation,
in order to well-define the finial cash position, in addition to the conditions in Definition 1.2,
we assume that any admissible strategy Y satisfies limt→∞ t‖Yt‖L∞(P) = 0 (see Lemma 1.22
and proof of Proposition 1.5 for more details). We also suppose Y is positive-valued, Yt < δ¯A
for all t ≥ 0, and it admits Yt = y +
∫ t
0 ξu du with ξt ∈ R. Denote by A±(y) the set of all
admissible strategies, and by A±D(y) the collection of all deterministic admissible strategies.
Then the liquidation problem can be reduced in a similar way as before to be that
V (y) = inf
Y ∈A±D(y)
∫ ∞
0
(
κA(Yt) +A|ξt|F
(|ξt|)) dt.
Let Y ∈ A±D(y) be a strategy including intermediate buying. Then there exists two time
points r and s with r < s such that Yr = Ys and Yt > Yr for all t ∈ (r, s). Consider the
admissible strategy X such that Xt = Yr for t ∈ (r, s) and Xt = Yt for t ∈ [0, r]∪ [s,∞). Then
with reference to Lemma 1.9,∫ s
r
(
κA(Xu) +A|ξXu |F
(|ξXu |)) du = κA(Xr)(s− r) < ∫ s
r
(
κA(Yu) +A|ξu|F
(|ξu|)) du,
where ξX is the speed process associated with X. Therefore, J(X) < J(Y ). This shows Y is
not optimal.
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1.3 Solution to the problem
With reference to the previous section, recall that the original optimal liquidation problem
(1.7) is equivalent to solving
V (y) = inf
Y ∈AD(y)
∫ ∞
0
(
κA(Yt) +AξtF (ξt)
)
dt,
with
dYt = −ξt dt, Y0 = y ∈ [0, δ¯A).
According to the theory of optimal control, the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equa-
tion is given by
κA(y) + inf
x≥0
{
AxF (x)− xv′(y)} = 0, (1.15)
with associated boundary condition v(0) = 0. Define G : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) be the inverse func-
tion of x 7→ x2F ′(x). Assumption 1.3 and Lemma 1.4 together imply that G is a continuous,
strictly increasing function satisfying G(0) = 0. The following result gives out a classical
solution to (1.15).
Proposition 1.14. Equation (1.15) with boundary condition v(0) = 0 has a classical solution
given by
v(y) =
∫ y
0
{
κA(u)
G
(κA(u)
A
) +AF(G(κA(u)
A
))}
du, 0 ≤ y < δ¯A. (1.16)
The next theorem gives out the optimal liquidation strategy, and it identifies the value
function V with the function v in (1.16).
Theorem 1.15. Let y ∈ [0, δ¯A). Define
τ =
∫ y
0
1
G
(κA(u)
A
) du. (1.17)
Let Y ∗ satisfy ∫ y
Y ∗t
1
G
(κA(u)
A
) du = t, if t ≤ τ, and Y ∗t = 0, if t > τ. (1.18)
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Then Y ∗ ∈ AD(y), and its associated speed process ξ∗ satisfies
ξ∗t = G
(
κA(Y
∗
t )
A
)
, for all t ≥ 0. (1.19)
Moreover, V in (1.12) is equal to v in (1.16), for all y ∈ [0, δ¯A), and Y ∗ is the unique optimal
liquidation strategy for problem (1.7).
Note that because of the continuity of function G, (1.19) implies that the strategy Y ∗ in
(1.18) is continuously differentiable. Since functions κA and G are both strictly increasing,
it follows from (1.19) that with a larger stock position at time t, the associated optimal
liquidation speed at time t is larger. Moreover, it can be shown by the strict convexity of
the cumulant generating function of L1 that A 7→ κA(x)/A is strictly increasing. Hence, the
optimal liquidation speed at any time is strictly increasing in the risk aversion parameter
A. These two relations coincide with the intuition that with a larger position in stock, the
investor potentially encounters bigger risk from the market volatility, as any tiny fluctuation
of stock price can be amplified by huge number of shares held, therefore it is optimal to
liquidate faster; and that if the investor is more risk averse, then he cares more about the
volatility risk, which makes him to employ a liquidation strategy with larger speed of sale.
Observe that given an initial stock position y ∈ [0, δ¯A), the quantity τ in (1.17) indicates the
first time of the stock position getting 0, if the large investor liquidates following the optimal
strategy Y ∗. Depending on properties the temporary impact function F , τ may or may not
be finite, i.e. it happens in some cases that liquidation can optimally finish in a finite time
period, even though there is no restriction on terminal time. The next theorem gives out
some sufficient conditions of whether the optimal liquidation strategy Y ∗ has an endogenous
time of termination.
Proposition 1.16. Under the condition that y > 0
(i) suppose µ < 0 and there exist constants p < 1 and K > 0 such that limx→0 xpF ′(x) = K,
then τ <∞.
(ii) suppose µ = 0 and there exist constants p < 1 and K > 0 such that limx→0 xpF ′(x) = K.
If p ∈ [0, 1), then τ =∞. If p < 0, then τ <∞.
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1.4 Approximation for exponential Le´vy model
To model stock prices using Le´vy processes, it is more natural to consider exponential Le´vy
processes (see e.g. Madan and Seneta, 1990; Eberlein and Keller, 1995; Barndorff-Nielsen,
1997, etc). However, due to the mathematical complexity of exponential Le´vy processes, the
corresponding liquidation model is not tractable. Instead of dealing with an exponential Le´vy
model directly, we try to approximate such model using the liquidation model established
before. To this end, we are going to derive a Le´vy process which can be regarded as a linear
approximation for a corresponding exponential Le´vy process. We show that this Le´vy process
satisfies all of the assumptions of being a driving process of the unaffected stock price in
the liquidation model introduced in previous sections. Therefore, our optimal liquidation
strategy derived in the previous section can be regarded as an approximation for the result of
the corresponding exponential Le´vy model. This linear approximation argument is reasonable
since in practice liquidation can usually finish in a very short time period.
Let’s first introduce a liquidation model with exponential Le´vy processes. Consider a non-
trivial, one dimensional, F-adapted Le´vy process L˜ which admits the canonical decomposition
L˜t = µ˜t+ σ˜W˜t +
∫
|z|≥1
z N˜(t, dz) +
∫
|z|<1
z
(
N˜(t, dz)− tν˜(dz)), t ≥ 0, (1.20)
where µ˜ ∈ R and σ˜ ≥ 0 are two constants, W˜ is a standard Brownian motion, N˜ is a Poisson
random measure which is independent of W˜ with compensator tν˜(dz), and ν˜ is the Le´vy
measure associated with L˜. We assume that L˜ possesses the following properties.
Assumption 1.17. We assume that ν˜ is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue
measure, and that ∫
|z|≥1
e2z ν˜(dz) <∞. (1.21)
Suppose the unaffected stock price is described by the process S˜u satisfying
S˜ut = s˜ exp
(
L˜t
)
, t ≥ 0,
where s˜ > 0 is some constant denoting the initial stock price. Note that (1.21) ensures S˜ut
to be square integrable, for all t ≥ 0 (see e.g. Kyprianou, 2006, Theorem 3.6). Suppose the
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affected stock price at time t ≥ 0 is given by
S˜t = s˜ exp
(
L˜t
)
+ It,
where It = α(Yt − Y0) − F (ξt) is the price impact at time t appearing in the previous liqui-
dation model with function F satisfying Assumption 1.3 (Gatheral and Schied, 2011, study
a liquidation model with the affected stock price in this form with a geometric Brownian
motion). By Itoˆ’s formula, for all t ≥ 0, S˜t can be rewritten as
S˜t = s˜+
∫ t
0
S˜uu−m˜ du+
∫ t
0
S˜uu−σ˜ dW˜u +
∫ t
0
∫
R
S˜uu−
(
ez − 1) (N˜(t, dz)− tν˜(dz))+ It,
where m˜ = µ˜ + σ˜
2
2 +
∫
R(e
z − 1 − z1{|z|<1}) ν˜(dz). In order to approximate the exponential
Le´vy model, consider the process Sˆ such that
Sˆt = s˜+ s˜m˜t+ s˜σ˜W˜t +
∫
R
s˜
(
ez − 1) (N˜(t, dz)− tν˜(dz))+ It, t ≥ 0,
which can be considered as a linear approximation of S˜. Recall that the affected stock price
in the preceding model is given by
St = s+ Lt + It, t ≥ 0,
where Lt = µt + σWt +
∫
R x
(
N(t, dx) − tν(dx)). Comparing this to the expression of Sˆt, it
can be seen that if we take s = s˜ and choose L to be such that
Lt = s˜m˜t+ s˜σ˜W˜t +
∫
R
s˜
(
ez − 1) (N˜(t, dz)− tν˜(dz)), t ≥ 0, (1.22)
then it follows that
Sˆt = s˜+ Lt + It, for all t ≥ 0.
We may therefore consider Sˆ as the affected stock price process in the liquidation model
introduced in previous sections. The next proposition verifies that L with the above expression
is a Le´vy process satisfying Assumption 1.1.
Proposition 1.18. Let L be given by (1.22). Write Lˆ = L/s˜. Then Lˆ is an F-adapted Le´vy
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process whose Le´vy measure, denoted by νˆ, satisfies
νˆ(dx) =
1
x+ 1
f˜
(
ln(x+ 1)
)
dx, x > −1, x 6= 0.
Therefore, L is an F-adapted Le´vy process satisfying Assumption 1.1.
Remark 1.19. From equation (1.50) (in the proof of Proposition 1.18) we know that∫
|x|≥1
eux νˆ(dx) <∞, for all u ≤ 0.
This implies that δ¯ given by (1.1) is equal to +∞, and therefore, Assumption 1.7 is satisfied
for any initial stock position y > 0. In other words, if we consider an exponential Le´vy model
and use the approximation scheme discussed above, we do not need to concern any restriction
on the maximum volume of liquidation.
With L given by (1.22) and Lˆ defined in Proposition 1.18, in view of (1.12)-(1.13) we
consider the optimisation problem
V (y) = inf
Y ∈AD(y)
∫ ∞
0
(
κˆA˜(Yt) +AξtF (ξt)
)
dt, y ≥ 0, (1.23)
where A > 0 denotes the investor’s risk aversion, A˜ = As˜ and κˆA˜ : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) is defined
by κˆA˜(x) = κˆ(−A˜x) with κˆ being the cumulant generating function of Lˆ1.
Theorem 1.20. The unique optimal liquidation speed for problem (1.23) is given by
ξ∗t = G
(
κˆA˜(Y
∗
t )
A
)
, t ≥ 0, (1.24)
where G : [0,∞) → [0,∞) is the inverse function of x 7→ x2F ′(x) and Y ∗ is the associated
unique optimal admissible stock position process satisfying∫ y
Y ∗t
1
G
( κˆA˜(u)
A
) du = t, if t ≤ τ, and Y ∗t = 0, if t > τ,
with τ defined by
τ =
∫ y
0
1
G
(κA(u)
A
) du.
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The value function in (1.23) satisfies
V (y) =
∫ y
0
{
κˆA˜(u)
G
( κˆA˜(u)
A
) +AF(G( κˆA˜(u)A
))}
du, y ≥ 0.
1.5 Numerical examples
In this section, we give out some numerical examples following the approximation scheme
discussed in the previous section. We consider the process L˜ in (1.20) as a variance gamma
(VG) Le´vy process, which is obtained by subordinating a Brownian motion using a gamma
process. Precisely, we consider L˜ to be such that
L˜t = θτt + ρWτt , t ≥ 0,
where θ ∈ R and ρ > 0 are some constants, W is a standard Brownian motion and τ is a
gamma process such that τt ∼ Γ
(
t
η ,
1
η
)
1, for some constant η > 0. Then L˜ is a VG Le´vy
process whose Le´vy density is given by
f˜(z) =
1
η|z|e
Cz−D|z|, z ∈ R,
where
C =
θ
ρ2
and D =
√
θ2 + 2ρ
2
η
ρ2
,
and its cumulant generating function κ˜ admits the expression
κ˜(x) = −1
η
ln
(
1− x
2ρ2η
2
− θηx
)
(1.25)
(see e.g. Cont and Tankov, 2004). It can be shown that Assumption 1.17 is satisfied if
D − C > 2. We calculate according to Proposition 1.18 that the Le´vy measure νˆ of process
1Γ(a, b) denotes a gamma distribution with shape parameter a > 0 and rate parameter b > 0, for which the
probability density function is given by f(x) = b
a
Γ(a)
xa−1e−bx, for x > 0, where Γ(·) is the gamma function.
For any X ∼ Γ(a, b), E[X] = a
b
and Var[X] = a
b2
.
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Lˆ satisfies
νˆ(dx) =

−1
η ln(x+ 1)
(x+ 1)C+D−1 dx, x ∈ (−1, 0),
1
η ln(x+ 1)
(x+ 1)C−D−1 dx, x ∈ (0,∞).
Therefore, the function κˆA˜ : [0,∞) → [0,∞) in (1.23), denoting it by κˆV GA˜ in the example of
VG Le´vy process, is given by
κˆV G
A˜
(u) = −A˜m˜u+
∫ ∞
−1
(
e−A˜ux − 1 + A˜ux
)
νˆ(dx), (1.26)
where the drift parameter m˜ = κ˜(1).
The next result gives out an explicit expression of a lower bound of κˆV G
A˜
, which will be
useful for deciding the limit behaviour of price impact function later.
Proposition 1.21. For u ≥ 0, write
κˆV G
A˜
(u) = −A˜m˜u+ e
η
[
− e
A˜uA˜u
C +D + 2
(
1
A˜u
∧ 1
)C+D+2
+
eA˜u
C +D + 1
(
1
A˜u
∧ 1
)C+D+1
+
A˜u
C +D + 2
− 1 + A˜u
C +D + 1
]
,
and in particular, for u ≥ 1
A˜
,
κˆV G
A˜
(u) = −A˜m˜u+ e
η
[(
1
A˜u
)C+D+1
eA˜u
(
1
C +D + 1
− 1
C +D + 2
)
+
A˜u
C +D + 2
− 1 + A˜u
C +D + 1
]
.
Then we have κˆV G
A˜
(u) ≥ κˆV G
A˜
(u), for all u ≥ 0.
In order to get a comparison between a liquidation model with a VG Le´vy process and a
liquidation model with a Brownian motion, when L˜ is considered as a Brownian motion, we
derive that the function κˆA˜ : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) in (1.23), denoting it by κˆBMA˜ , has expression
κˆBM
A˜
(u) = −A˜
(
µ˜+
σ˜2
2
)
u+
1
2
A˜2σ˜2u2, (1.27)
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where µ˜ ∈ R and σ˜ > 0 are some constants which represent drift and volatility of L˜, respec-
tively. In the case of Brownian motion, Assumption 1.17 is always satisfied.
Throughout this section, we use the following reasonable daily data for our VG Le´vy
process. We take θ = −0.002, ρ = 0.02 and η = 0.6. For more details about empirical studies
of parameters of VG stock price model, we refer to Rathgeber et al. (2013). For parameters
in the Brownian motion case, in order to get a good comparison, we make the expectation
and the second moment of eL˜t when L˜ is considered as a Brownian motion to be the same as
when it is considered as a VG Le´vy process. Hence, µ˜ and σ˜ in (1.27) are taken to be such
that µ˜ + σ˜
2
2 = κ˜(1) and 2µ˜ + 2σ˜
2 = κ˜(2), where κ˜ is given by (1.25). Therefore, throughout
this section,
µ˜ = 2κ˜(1)− κ˜(2)
2
and σ˜2 = κ˜(2)− 2κ˜(1).
Moreover, we choose s˜ = 100 for simplicity.
1.5.1 Power-law price impact function
Consider the power-law temporary impact function, i.e. F : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) is given by
F (x) = βxγ ,
where β > 0 and γ > 0 are constants. This kind of impact function is widely believed and has
been well-studied in the literature of price impact (see e.g. Lillo et al., 2003; Almgren et al.,
2005, etc). It can be checked that F satisfies Assumption 1.3, and the function G appearing
in (1.24) is given by
G(x) =
(
x
βγ
) 1
γ+1
, x ≥ 0.
Applying Proposition 1.16, we see that if Lˆ is a strict supermartingale, then τ in (1.17) is
finite, for all γ > 0; if Lˆ is a martingale, then τ = ∞ for γ ∈ (0, 1], and τ < ∞ when γ > 1.
It follows from (1.24) that the optimal liquidation speed takes the expression
ξ∗t =
(
κˆA˜(Y
∗
t )
Aβγ
) 1
γ+1
, for all t ≥ 0. (1.28)
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We adopt the values of β and γ suggested in Almgren et al. (2005) where parameters of the
power-law temporary impact are studied empirically. Particularly, we take γ = 0.6 and choose
β = 4.7× 10−5 2.
Consider a stock with average daily volume 2× 106. Suppose the investor wants to liqui-
date a position of 2× 105 3 of this stock. Figure 1.1 gives out optimal liquidation trajectories
in both VG Le´vy process case and Brownian motion case when the risk aversion parameter
A takes values of 10−6, 10−5 and 10−4 4 . We see that when A = 10−6, optimal strategies for
two models are almost identical. As A increases, optimal speeds increase in both models, and
in particular, speeds increase much faster in VG model for big positions. In each case, liqui-
dation finishes in a short time period, which confirms that the linear approximation scheme
of exponential model is reasonable. Now we may make a conclusion that if one believes that
the unaffected stock price follows an exponential VG Le´vy process and the temporary price
impact is described by a 0.6 power-law, then optimal liquidation strategy for the Brownian
motion model is suboptimal unless A is very small.
As shown in the first graph of Figure 1.1 that when A = 10−5 and A = 10−4, at the
beginning of liquidation, stock positions drop immediately by a large proportion of its initial
value. In order to get more details about these two trajectories, we compute that when
A = 10−5, time spent on liquidating 40% of 2 × 105 shares is about 0.00018, if the investor
follows the optimal strategy for the VG case. Suppose the time parametrisation is the same
as clock time, then 0.00018 is just a few seconds. If the investor’s risk aversion takes the value
10−4, then according to the optimal strategy for VG model, he spends roughly 1.34 × 10−14
2With our notations, the temporary impact function F in Almgren et al. (2005) is given by F (x) = βxγ =
S˜0−β˜σ˜
(
x
V˜
)γ
, where V˜ denotes the daily volume of a given stock, the value of exponent γ is argued to be
0.6 (as the main result in their paper) and β˜ is a constant which is suggested to be 0.142. From the values
of parameters of the VG Le´vy process that we have chosen, it can be calculated that the volatility σ˜ in the
Brownian motion case is roughly equal to 0.02. Comparing this number to the values of volatilities and daily
volumes of stocks provided in examples in Almgren et al. (2005), we may take V˜ = 2 × 106 as a reasonable
choice. Moreover, we choose s˜ = 100 for simplicity. Then β is calculated to be 4.7× 10−5.
Note that the empirical study in Almgren et al. (2005) is based on a model parametrised by the volume time
which is defined as fractions of a daily volume. Therefore, any results of number regarding time derived from
a model with power-law impact function in this section should be interpreted as volume time.
3Since the study of parameters of impacts in Almgren et al. (2005) is based on liquidating the amount of
shares that weighted as 10% of daily volume, in order to keep consistent with the values of parameters of the
temporary impact function that we have chosen, we let the initial stock position to be 2× 105 which is 10% of
the daily volume that we have chosen as explained before.
4It seems that these values of A may be too small, however, they are reasonable in a liquidation model, and
can be understood as that the investor is not sensitive to any large costs which are insignificant comparing to
his total wealth. We refer to Almgren and Chriss (2000) and Almgren (2003) for more details about the risk
aversion parameter for the Almgren-Chirss liquidation model.
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Figure 1.1: Optimal liquidation trajectories for variance gamma Le´vy process model and Brownian motion
model with 0.6 power-law temporary impact function. Thin curves are for A = 10−6, dashed curves are when
A = 10−5 and thick curves are for A = 10−4.
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amount of time to liquidate 90% of his initial position.
With a large stock position, due to the nature of jumps of VG Le´vy process, as we expect
that the investor should liquidate much faster compare to using the optimal strategy from
the Brownian motion model. However, as the above examples show that with the 0.6 power-
law temporary impact function, in the VG case, optimal liquidation speeds can be too large
so that the strategies are infeasible in practice, while speeds in the Brownian motion model
stay in a reasonable range. Intuitively, an unreasonably high optimal liquidation speed is
due to that price impact for a large trading speed is sub-estimated. In other words, cost
resulted from large speeds is too small. This argument can be confirmed by the expression of
the optimal liquidation speed in (1.24) that if the temporary impact function F has a small
growth rate, then growth rate of function G is large, and therefore optimal speed can be very
high, when stock position is large. It is mentioned in Ros¸u (2009); Gatheral (2010), etc that
impact function should be concave for small trading speeds, and for large speeds it is convex.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no suggestions in price impact literature
about what exact kind of function is suitable to describe price impact caused by executing
large block orders. Therefore, we next try to explore a mode of growth of the price impact
function for which the optimal liquidation speed for the Le´vy model is reasonable.
1.5.2 An equivalent relation
We derive a connection between a temporary impact function for the Le´vy liquidation model
and a temporary impact function for the Brownian motion liquidation model such that the
optimal strategy for each model coincide with each other. From this connection, a suitable
increasing rate of impact function for the Le´vy model is indicated.
Let FL : [0,∞) → [0,∞) and FBM : [0,∞) → [0,∞) be temporary impact functions,
satisfying Assumption 1.3, considered in a Le´vy model and a Brownian motion model, re-
spectively. Write GL : [0,∞) → [0,∞) and GBM : [0,∞) → [0,∞) as the inverse functions
of x 7→ x2(FL)′(x) and x 7→ x2(FBM )′(x), respectively. Then in view of (1.24), the optimal
liquidation speed at time t for each model, denoted by ξLt and ξ
BM
t , are given by
ξLt = G
L
(
κˆL
A˜
(Y Lt )
A
)
and ξBMt = G
BM
(
κˆBM
A˜
(Y BMt )
A
)
,
where κˆL
A˜
and κˆBM
A˜
are different versions for of κˆA˜, and Y
L and Y BM are corresponding
36
optimal liquidation strategies in each model. Suppose for all t ≥ 0, Y ∗t = Y Lt = Y BMt , then
GL
(
κˆL
A˜
(Y ∗t )
A
)
= GBM
(
κˆBM
A˜
(Y ∗t )
A
)
, t ≥ 0. (1.29)
Write z = GBM
(
κˆBM
A˜
(Y ∗t )
A
)
. So by (1.27) we have
Y ∗t =
u˜+
√
u˜2 + 2Aσ˜2z2(FBM )′(z)
A˜σ˜2
,
where u˜ = µ˜+ σ˜
2
2 . Then we obtain from (1.29) that
(FL)′(z) =
1
Az2
κˆL
A˜
(
u˜+
√
u˜2 + 2Aσ˜2z2(FBM )′(z)
A˜σ˜2
)
,
which is equivalent to
FL(x) =
∫ x
0
1
Az2
κˆL
A˜
(
u˜+
√
u˜2 + 2Aσ˜2z2(FBM )′(z)
A˜σ˜2
)
dz. (1.30)
It can be shown that Assumption 1.3 is satisfied by the above expression. We can therefore
conclude that if FL and FBM satisfy (1.30), then Y L = Y BM , provided that the initial stock
positions in both Le´vy and Brownian motion models are the same; but if (1.30) does not hold,
then the Brownian motion model gives out a suboptimal strategy compare to the solution for
the Le´vy model.
Suppose FBM in (1.30) follows a power-law such that the optimal speed in Brownian
motion case is practically reasonable (this kind of model is indeed used in practice), then
the relation in (1.30) tells that for optimal speed in VG case being practically reasonable, the
function FL needs to increase to infinity faster than any power functions. This is because that
with VG Le´vy process, the lower bound of function κˆV G
A˜
given in Proposition 1.21 tends to
infinity faster than any power functions. Moreover, (1.30) also indicates that there might be
a relationship between the distribution of stock returns and the temporary impact function.
We will investigate this in our future study.
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1.6 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.4. For λ ∈ (0, 1) and x ∈ (0,∞), Assumption 1.3 (ii) and (iii) imply
that F (λx) < λF (x) < F (x), which shows that F is strictly increasing.
The derivative of x 7→ xF (x), together with the convexity of this function, implies that
limx→0 xF ′(x) exists. As F ′(x) > 0, for all x > 0, it follows that limx→0 xF ′(x) ≥ 0. Suppose
limx→0 xF ′(x) > 0. Then there exist constants x¯ > 0 and c > 0, such that for all x ∈ (0, x¯),
F ′(x) >
c
x
.
But then,
F (x¯) = lim
x→0
∫ x¯
x
F ′(u) du ≥ lim
x→0
∫ x¯
x
c
u
du =∞,
which contradicts the continuity of F . Hence, limx→0 xF ′(x) = 0, and therefore it follows
that limx→0 x2F ′(x) = 0.
The next lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 1.5.
Lemma 1.22. Let Z be a positive-valued, decreasing process satisfying
∫∞
0 Ztdt < ∞. Then
tZt → 0, as t→∞.
Proof. Suppose lim inft→∞ tZt > 0, then there exists some constant c such that
lim inf
t→∞ tZt > c > 0.
This implies that we can find some s ≥ 0 such that for all t ≥ s,
Zt >
c
t
.
It follows therefore ∫ ∞
s
Zt dt ≥
∫ ∞
s
c
t
dt =∞,
which contradicts with
∫∞
0 Zt dt <∞. Thus, we have shown that
lim inf
t→∞ tZt = 0. (1.31)
We know that Z is a decreasing process, which is of finite variation. By Itoˆ’s formula we
38
calculate that
tZt =
∫ t
0
u dZu +
∫ t
0
Zu du.
It can be observed that t 7→ ∫ t0 udZu is negative and decreasing while t 7→ ∫ t0 Zudu is positive
and increasing. Then,
0 ≤ sup
t≥r
tZt ≤ sup
t≥r
∫ t
0
u dZu + sup
t≥r
∫ t
0
Zu du =
∫ r
0
u dZu +
∫ ∞
0
Zu du. (1.32)
Also,
inf
t≥r
tZt ≥ inf
t≥r
∫ t
0
u dZu + inf
t≥r
∫ t
0
Zu du =
∫ ∞
0
u dZu +
∫ r
0
Zu du. (1.33)
Taking r to infinity in (1.33) and (1.32), and by (1.31) we have
0 ≤ lim sup
t→∞
tZt = lim
r→∞ supt≥r
tZt ≤
∫ ∞
0
u dZu +
∫ ∞
0
Zu du,
0 = lim inf
t→∞ tZt = limr→∞ inft≥r
tZt ≥
∫ ∞
0
u dZu +
∫ ∞
0
Zu du.
Therefore, we conclude that limt→∞ tZt = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.5.
(i) Let f be the characteristic function of Lt, so
f(u) = E[eiuLt ] = etψ(u),
where ψ(u) is given by the Le´vy-Khintchine representation of L. By Assumption 1.1 we
know that f , hence ψ, are twice differentiable at 0. Hence, we calculate that f ′(0) =
iE[Lt] = tψ′(0) and f ′′(0) = −E[L2t ], and therefore,
E[L2t ] = (µt)2 − ψ′′(0)t.
Then,
E
[
(LtYt)
2
] ≤ E[L2t ]‖Yt‖2L∞(P) = µ2(t‖Yt‖L∞(P))2 − ψ′′(0)t‖Yt‖2L∞(P). (1.34)
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If µ 6= 0, then for any Y ∈ A(y), (‖Yt‖L∞(P))t≥0 and (‖Yt‖2L∞(P))t≥0 are con-
tinuous, positive and decreasing. The integrability condition in (1.2) implies that∫∞
0 ‖Yt‖2L∞(P) dt <∞. Therefore, according to Lemma 1.22 we have
lim
t→∞ t‖Yt‖L∞(P) = 0 and limt→∞ t‖Yt‖
2
L∞(P) = 0.
Hence, by (1.34) and the finiteness of µ and ψ′′(0) we conclude that
lim
T→∞
E
[
(LtYt)
2
]
= 0.
When µ = 0, we get
∫∞
0 ‖Yt‖2L∞(P) dt <∞ directly as a condition of admissible strategies.
Therefore, the same result follows.
(ii) Using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and Itoˆ isometry we obtain
E
[ ∣∣∣∣ ∫ T
0
Yt− dLt
∣∣∣∣ ]
≤ |µ|E
[ ∣∣∣∣ ∫ T
0
Yt− dt
∣∣∣∣ ]+ E[ ∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
Yt−d
(
σWt +
∫
R
x
(
N(t, dx)− tν(dx)
))∣∣∣∣ ]
≤ |µ|
∫ T
0
‖Yt‖L∞(P) dt+ E
[ ∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
Yt−d
(
σWt +
∫
R
x
(
N(t, dx)− tν(dx)
))∣∣∣∣2 ] 12
= |µ|
∫ T
0
‖Yt‖L∞(P) dt+
(
σ2 +
∫
R\{0}
x2ν(dx)
) 1
2
E
[∫ T
0
Y 2t dt
] 1
2
≤ |µ|
∫ T
0
‖Yt‖L∞(P) dt+
(
σ2 +
∫
R\{0}
x2ν(dx)
) 1
2
E
[∫ T
0
‖Yt‖2L∞(P) dt
] 1
2
From the existence of first and second moments of L1, we know that µ, σ and∫
R\{0} x
2ν(dx) are all finite. Then, result follows from the integrability conditions in
(1.2) and (1.3) of an admissible strategy.
Proof of Lemma 1.9.
(i) Let ψ(u) be given by the Le´vy-Khintchine representation of L. Then for all u ∈ [0, δ¯A),
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we have
κA(u) = ψ(iAu) = −Aµu+ 1
2
A2u2σ2 +
∫
R
(
e−Aux − 1 +Aux
)
ν(dx). (1.35)
Therefore, κA(0) = 0 follows directly.
(ii) Observe that −Aµu, 12A2u2σ2 and e−Aux−1+Aux are all convex in u, and in particular
that 12A
2u2σ2 and e−Aux − 1 + Aux are strictly convex in u. Thus, with reference to
(1.35), the strict convexity of κA can be concluded from the assumption that L is non-
trivial.
(iii) Let µ = 0. In view of (1.35), in order to proof limx→0
κA(x)
x2
= K > 0, it suffices to show
that
lim
u→0
∫
R
(
e−Aux − 1 +Aux
A2u2
)
ν(dx) = K ′,
for some constant K ′ > 0. Let 0 < Au¯ < δ¯A. It can be checked that for all u ∈ (0, u¯),∣∣∣∣e−Aux − 1 +AuxA2u2
∣∣∣∣ < x22 , if x > 0,
and ∣∣∣∣e−Aux − 1 +AuxA2u2
∣∣∣∣ < e−Au¯x − 1 +Au¯xA2u¯2 , if x < 0.
Because of the finite second moment of L1 and the fact that κA(u¯) < ∞, both x22 and
e−Au¯x−1+Au¯x
A2u¯2
are ν-integrable. Thus, by the dominated convergence theorem, it follows
that
lim
u→0
∫
R
(
e−Aux − 1 +Aux
A2u2
)
ν(dx) =
∫
R
x2
2
ν(dx) = K ′,
where K ′ is some strictly positive constant.
(iv) Let µ 6= 0. Then limx→0 κA(x)x = −Aµ follows from (1.35) as well as (iii).
Proof of Lemma 1.10. Let µ = 0. Then Lemma 1.9 (iii) implies that there exists strictly
positive constants x¯, C1 and C2 such that C1x
2 < κA(x) < C2x
2, for all x ∈ (0, x¯). Suppose
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that
∫∞
0 ‖Yt‖2L∞(P) dt < ∞. Then Yt tends to zero as t tends to infinity. Hence, there exists
s > 0, such that ‖Yt‖L∞(P) ∈ (0, x¯), for all t > s. Then
C1
∫ ∞
s
‖Yt‖2L∞(P) dt <
∫ ∞
s
κA
(‖Yt‖L∞(P)) dt < C2 ∫ ∞
s
‖Yt‖2L∞(P) dt, (1.36)
from which it follows that
∫∞
s κA
(‖Yu‖L∞(P)) du < ∞. Since ‖Yt‖L∞(P) is bounded for t ∈
[0, s], we have
∫ s
0 κA
(‖Yu‖L∞(P)) du < ∞. A similar argument together with the inequality
(1.36) also establishes the reverse implication. The proofs regarding the cases of µ < 0 and
µ > 0 are similar to above.
Proof of Lemma 1.11. By Itoˆ’s formula and using the expression of κA in (1.35) we cal-
culate that
MYt =1−
∫ t
0
MYu−AYu−
((
µ−
∫
R
x ν(dx)
)
du+ σ dWu
)
−
∫ t
0
MYu−
(
κA
(
Yu−
)− 1
2
A2Y 2u−σ
2
)
du
+
∫ t
0
∫
R
MYu−
(
e−AYu−x − 1
)((
N(du, dx)− ν(dx)du)+ ν(dx)du)
=1−
∫ t
0
MYu−AYu−σ dWu +
∫ t
0
∫
R
Mu−
(
e−AYu−x − 1
) (
N(du, dx)− ν(dx)du),
which shows M is a local martingale. Define
Xt =
∫ t
0
−AYu− dL˜u and K(θ)t =
∫ t
0
κ˜A(θYu) du,
where θ ∈ [0, 1], Y ∈ A(y) with y ∈ [0, δ¯A), L˜ is the martingale part of L and κ˜A is equal to
κA with µ = 0. It can be checked that the process M
Y in (1.10) can be rewritten as
MY = exp
(
X −K(1)).
With reference to Definition 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 in Kallsen and Shiryaev (2002), in order to
show MY is a uniformly integrable martingale, it suffices to check that for δ ∈ (0, 1),
lim
δ↓0
sup
t∈R+
δ log
(
E
[
exp
(
1
δ
(
(1− δ)K(1)t −K(1− δ)t
))])
= 0. (1.37)
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Observe that
lim
δ↓0
sup
t∈R+
δ log
(
E
[
exp
(
1
δ
(
(1− δ)K(1)t −K(1− δ)t
))])
≤ lim
δ↓0
sup
t∈R+
δ log
(
exp
(∥∥∥∥1δ((1− δ)K(1)t −K(1− δ)t)
∥∥∥∥
L∞(P)
))
= lim
δ↓0
sup
t∈R+
∥∥∥(1− δ)K(1)t −K(1− δ)t∥∥∥
L∞(P)
= lim
δ↓0
sup
t∈R+
∥∥∥∥(1− δ) ∫ t
0
κ˜A(Yu) du−
∫ t
0
κ˜A
(
(1− δ)Yu
)
du
∥∥∥∥
L∞(P)
≤ lim
δ↓0
sup
t∈R+
∫ t
0
∥∥∥(1− δ)κ˜A(Yu)− κ˜A((1− δ)Yu)∥∥∥
L∞(P)
du
≤ lim
δ↓0
∫ ∞
0
∥∥∥(1− δ)κ˜A(Yu)− κ˜A((1− δ)Yu)∥∥∥
L∞(P)
du. (1.38)
For δ ∈ (0, 1), we have that
∥∥(1− δ)κ˜A(Yu)− κ˜A((1− δ)Yu)∥∥L∞(P)
≤∥∥(1− δ)κ˜A(Yu)∥∥L∞(P) + ∥∥κ˜A((1− δ)Yu)∥∥L∞(P)
= (1− δ)κ˜A
(‖Yu‖L∞(P))+ κ˜A((1− δ)‖Yu‖L∞(P))
≤ 2κ˜A
(‖Yu‖L∞(P)).
The last two steps are because κ˜A(x) is positive and non-decreasing for x ≥ 0, which follow
from Lemma 1.9 (i), (ii) and (iii). According to (1.2) or (1.3) as well as Lemma 1.10, we have∫ ∞
0
κ˜A
(‖Yt‖L∞(P))dt <∞.
Then, by the dominated convergence theorem, (1.38) gives
lim
δ↓0
sup
t∈R+
δ log
(
E
[
exp
(
1
δ
(
(1− δ)K(1)t −K(1− δ)t
))])
≤
∫ ∞
0
lim
δ↓0
∥∥∥(1− δ)κ˜A(Yu)− κ˜A((1− δ)Yu)∥∥∥
L∞(P)
du
= 0.
(1.39)
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On the other hand, the convexity of κ˜A(x) and κ˜A(0) = 0 imply
(1− δ)κ˜A(x) ≥ κ˜A
(
(1− δ)x), for δ ∈ (0, 1),
hence,
(1− δ)K(1)t −K(1− δ)t ≥ 0.
Combining this with (1.39), we get (1.37).
The next lemma is used in the proofs of Proposition 1.14 and Theorem 1.15.
Lemma 1.23. Let function F satisfy Assumption 1.3. Then x 7→ xG(x) is continuous on
[0,∞), where G : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) is the inverse function of x 7→ x2F ′(x).
Proof. Assumption 1.3 and Lemma 1.4 imply that G is continuous and G(0) = 0. Therefore, it
suffices to check that limx→0 xG(x) <∞. Let x = u2F ′(u). Then it follows that xG(x) = uF ′(u).
Hence, the result follows from the fact that u → 0, as x → 0, and limu→0 uF ′(u) = 0 (see
Lemma 1.4).
Proof of Proposition 1.14. We first show that the function v given by (1.16) is continu-
ously differentiable. But it suffices to show that v′(y) = κA(y)
G
(
κA(y)
A
) + AF (G(κA(y)A )) is contin-
uous on [0, δ¯A), and in particular, it suffices to check the continuity of x 7→ xG(x) , for x ≥ 0.
But this is demonstrated by Lemma 1.23.
Recall that the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation in our problem is
κA(y) + inf
x≥0
{
AxF (x)− xv′(y)} = 0.
In order to prove that v in (1.16) is a solution to this equation, because AxF (x) − xv′(y) is
strictly convex in x, it suffices to show that for all y ∈ [0, δ¯A), there exists x∗ ≥ 0 such that
Ax∗F ′(x∗) +AF (x∗)− v′(y) = 0 (1.40)
and
κA(y) +Ax
∗F (x∗)− x∗v′(y) = 0, (1.41)
where the equality in (1.40) comes from the first-order condition of optimality of the expression
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AxF (x) − xv′(y). But with v′(y) = κA(y)
G
(
κA(y)
A
) + AF (G(κA(y)A )), it can be checked that x∗ =
G
(κA(y)
A
)
satisfies both (1.40) and (1.41). The boundary condition v(0) = 0 is a consequence
of the expression of v(y) and the continuity of v(y) at y = 0.
Proof of Theorem 1.15. We show the required expression of ξ∗t in (1.19). We know that
when t ≤ τ , ∫ y
Y ∗t
1
G
(κA(u)
A
) du = t,
from which it follows that
ξ∗t = −
dY ∗t
dt
= G
(
κA(Y
∗
t )
A
)
, t ≤ τ.
On the other hand, when t > τ , Y ∗t = 0. Hence,
ξ∗t = 0 = G
(
κA(Y
∗
t )
A
)
, t > τ.
We next prove that Y ∗ ∈ AD(y). It is clear that Y ∗ is deterministic and absolutely
continuous. The non-negativity of G implies that Y ∗ is non-increasing. It remains to show
that if µ < 0, then
∫∞
0 Y
∗
t dt < ∞; and if µ = 0, then
∫∞
0
(
Y ∗t
)2
dt < ∞. However, with
reference to Lemma 1.10, it suffices to check that∫ ∞
0
κA
(
Y ∗t
)
dt =
∫ τ
0
κA
(
Y ∗t
)
dt <∞.
By a change of variable, we have that∫ τ
0
κA
(
Y ∗t
)
dt =
∫ 0
y
− κA
(
Y ∗t
)
G
(
κA(Y
∗
t )
A
) dY ∗t <∞,
where the finiteness is because of continuity of the integrand on the compact interval [0, y],
which is implied by Lemma 1.23.
With reference to (1.40) and (1.41), the function v in (1.16) satisfies
κA(y) +AξF (ξ)− ξv′(y) ≥ 0, for all ξ ≥ 0, (1.42)
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and an equality holds only when ξ = G
(κA(y)
A
)
. Let Y ∈ AD(y). Observe that
v(YT ) = v(y)−
∫ T
0
v′(Yt)ξt dt.
Taking T to infinity and using the boundary condition v(0) = 0, it follows that
v(y) =
∫ ∞
0
v′(Yt)ξt dt.
Then by (1.42) we have
v(y) ≤
∫ ∞
0
(
κA(Yt) +AξtF (ξt)
)
dt. (1.43)
Now consider the strategy Y ∗ in (1.18), which has a speed process ξ∗ satisfying ξ∗t =
G
(κA(Y ∗t )
A
)
, for all t ≥ 0. Then,
κA
(
Y ∗t
)
+Aξ∗t F
(
ξ∗t
)− ξ∗t v′(Y ∗t ) = 0, t ≥ 0,
hence,
v(y) =
∫ ∞
0
(
κA
(
Y ∗t
)
+AξtF
(
ξ∗t
))
dt.
This together with (1.43) implies that V (y) = v(y), for all y ∈ [0, δ¯A). Therefore, with
reference to the analysis after equation (1.11), we get that Y ∗ is the unique optimal strategy
to problem (1.7).
Proof of Proposition 1.16.
(i) Suppose µ < 0. Let p < 1 such that limx→0 xpF ′(x) = K with K being some strictly
positive constant. Write u = x2F ′(x). Then we have
u
1
2−p
G(u)
=
(
xpF ′(x)
) 1
2−p .
Taking x to 0, so u tends to 0 as well, and it follows that
lim
u→0
u
1
2−p
G(u)
= K
1
2−p . (1.44)
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Lemma 1.9 (iv) together with (1.44) gives
lim
x→0
x
1
2−p
G
(κA(x)
A
) = K ′,
for some other constant K ′ > 0. Therefore, there exist strictly positive constants K1,
K2 and x¯ such that for all x ∈ (0, x¯),
K1
x
1
2−p
<
1
G
(κA(x)
A
) < K2
x
1
2−p
.
Integrating and taking limit on each term gives
lim
x→0
∫ x¯
x
K1
u
1
2−p
du ≤ lim
x→0
∫ x¯
x
1
G
(κA(u)
A
) du ≤ lim
x→0
∫ x¯
x
K2
u
1
2−p
du.
Observe that p < 1 implies 12−p < 1, and therefore
∫ x¯
0
1
u
1
2−p
du <∞. Hence,
lim
x→0
∫ x¯
x
1
G
(κA(u)
A
) du <∞.
Then the required result follows from (1.17) and the fact that
∫ y
x¯
1
G
(
κA(u)
A
) du < ∞, if
the initial stock position y > x¯.
(ii) Suppose µ = 0. Observe that (1.44) implies
lim
x→0
x
2
2−p
G(x2)
= C,
for some constant C > 0. Combining this with Lemma 1.9 (iii), we obtain
lim
x→0
x
2
2−p
G
(κA(x)
A
) = C ′,
for some other constant C ′ > 0. Then there exist strictly positive constants C1, C2 and
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x¯ such that for all x ∈ (0, x¯),
C1
x
2
2−p
<
1
G
(κA(x)
A
) < C2
x
2
2−p
.
Therefore,
lim
x→0
∫ x¯
x
C1
u
2
2−p
du ≤ lim
x→0
∫ x¯
x
1
G
(κA(u)
A
) du ≤ lim
x→0
∫ x¯
x
C2
u
2
2−p
du.
If p < 0, then 22−p < 1. Hence τ <∞ is obtained by the same argument as in (i) of this
proof. If p ∈ [0, 1), then 22−p ≥ 1. It follows that
∫ x¯
0
1
G
(
κA(u)
A
) du = ∞, and therefore
τ =∞.
Proof of Proposition 1.18. We show that Lˆ given by
Lˆt = m˜t+ σ˜W˜t +
∫ t
0
∫
R
(
ez − 1) (N˜(dt, dz)− ν˜(dz)dt), t ≥ 0, (1.45)
is a Le´vy process. Define a random measure Nˆ : Ω× B([0,∞))⊗ B(R)→ Z+ and a measure
νˆ : B(R)→ Z+ to be such that if B ∈ B(R) and B ∩ (−1,∞) 6= ∅, then
Nˆ(ω,A,B) = N˜
(
A , ln
(
B ∩ (−1,∞) + 1))(ω),
νˆ(B) = ν˜
(
ln
(
B ∩ (−1,∞) + 1)); (1.46)
otherwise, they are both equal 0, where Z+ is the set of all positive integers and ln(B ∩
(−1,∞) + 1) = {ln(x + 1) |x ∈ B ∩ (−1,∞)} ( we have for all A ∈ B([0,∞)) and ω ∈ Ω,
N˜(A, {0})(ω) = ν˜({0}) = 0 ). Write Nˆ(·, ·) = Nˆ(ω, ·, ·). Then by writing x = ez−1, it follows
from (1.45) that
Lˆt = m˜t+ σ˜W˜t +
∫ t
0
∫
R
x
(
Nˆ(dt, dx)− νˆ(dx)dt), t ≥ 0. (1.47)
With reference to Kallenberg (2001) Corollary 15.7, to prove Lˆ is a Le´vy process, it suffices to
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show that for any B ∈ B(R), (Nˆ(t, B))
t≥0 is a Poisson process with intensity νˆ(B) satisfying∫
R
(
x2 ∧ 1) νˆ(dx) <∞. (1.48)
But from the definition of Nˆ , it is clear that
(
Nˆ(t, B)
)
t≥0 is a Poisson process. Observe that
E[Nˆ(t, B)] = E
[
N˜
(
t, ln(B ∩ (−1,∞) + 1))] = tν˜(ln(B ∩ (−1,∞) + 1)) = tνˆ(B),
which proves that νˆ(B) is the intensity of
(
Nˆ(t, B)
)
t≥0. From Taylor’s expansion of (e
z−1)2,
it can be shown that there exist constants z¯ > 0 and C > 0 such that for all z ∈ (−z¯, z¯),
(
ez − 1)2 ≤ Cz2.
For  ∈ (0, 1), consider interval S = ( ln(1 − ) , ln( + 1) ). Then using (1.46) we calculate
that for  close enough to 0 so that S ⊆ (−z¯, z¯), we have∫
(−,)
x2 νˆ(dx) =
∫
S
(
ez − 1)2 ν˜(dz) ≤ C ∫
S
z2 ν˜(dz) ≤ C
∫
(−z¯,z¯)
z2 ν˜(dz) <∞, (1.49)
where the finiteness is because of property of Le´vy measure ν˜. Again by (1.46), we obtain∫
R\(− , )
νˆ(dx) =
∫
R\S
ν˜(dz) <∞,
where the finiteness follows from the property of the Le´vy measure ν˜. This implies that
νˆ
(
R \ (−1, 1)) < ∞ and νˆ((−1,−] ∪ [, 1)) < ∞. Since x2 is bounded on (−1,−] ∪ [, 1),
together with (1.49), we get ∫
(−1,1)
x2 νˆ(dx) <∞.
Combining this with νˆ
(
R \ (−1, 1)) < ∞, we get (1.48). We therefore conclude that Nˆ
and νˆ are Poisson random measure and Le´vy measure associated with the Le´vy process Lˆ,
respectively. Moreover, we calculate from (1.46) that for x > −1 and x 6= 0,
νˆ(dx) = ν˜
(
d
(
ln(x+ 1)
) )
= f˜
(
ln(x+ 1)
)
d
(
ln(x+ 1)
)
=
1
x+ 1
f˜
(
ln(x+ 1)
)
dx.
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The relation L = s˜Lˆ shows that L is also a Le´vy process. The expression of L in (1.22)
shows the adaptedness. Now we check Assumption 1.1 is satisfied by L, but it suffices to
check for Lˆ. According to Assumption 1.17, we know
∫
|z|≥1 e
2z ν˜(dz) <∞, and since for any
 > 0, ν˜
(
R \ (−, )) < ∞, it follows that on [ln 2,∞), e2z and ez are both ν˜-integrable and
ν˜
(
[ln 2,∞)) <∞. Therefore,∫
|x|≥1
x2 νˆ(dx) =
∫
[ln 2,∞)
(
ez − 1)2 ν˜(dz) <∞,
which implies that Lˆ1 has finite second moment (see e.g. Kyprianou, 2006, Theorem 3.8).
Observe that when u ≤ 0, we have
exp
(
u(ez − 1)) ≤ 1, for all z ≥ 0.
Hence, ∫
|x|≥1
eux νˆ(dx) =
∫
[ln 2,∞)
exp
(
u(ez − 1)) ν˜(dz) <∞, (1.50)
from which it follows that E[euLˆ1 ] <∞, for all u ≤ 0.
Proof of Theorem 1.20. This is a direct consequence of Theorem 1.15.
Proof of Proposition 1.21. For u ≥ 0, we calculate that∫ 0
−1
(
e−A˜ux − 1 + A˜ux
)
νˆ(dx)
=
∫ 0
−1
(
e−A˜ux − 1 + A˜ux
) −1
η ln(x+ 1)
(x+ 1)C+D−1 dx
≥ e
η
∫ 0
−1
(
e−A˜ux − 1 + A˜ux
)
(x+ 1)C+D dx
=
e
η
∫ 1
0
(
e−A˜u(x−1)xC+D
)
dx+
e
η
∫ 1
0
(
A˜uxC+D+1
)
dx+
e
η
∫ 1
0
(
−(1 + A˜u)xC+D
)
dx
(1.51)
where the first inequality is because that −1(x+1) ln(x+1) ≥ e, for all −1 < x < 0, since (x +
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1) ln(x+ 1) is convex with minimum value −e−1. Observe that∫ 1
0
(
e−A˜u(x−1)xC+D
)
dx
≥ eA˜u
∫ 1
A˜u
∧1
0
((−A˜ux+ 1)xC+D) dx
= − A˜ue
A˜u
C +D + 2
(
1
A˜u
∧ 1
)C+D+2
+
eA˜u
C +D + 1
(
1
A˜u
∧ 1
)C+D+1
(1.52)
and ∫ 1
0
(
A˜uxC+D+1
)
dx+
∫ 1
0
(
−(1 + A˜u)xC+D
)
dx =
A˜u
C +D + 2
− 1 + A˜u
C +D + 1
, (1.53)
where we have C + D > 0 and the inequality is because that e−A˜ux ≥ −A˜ux + 1 on interval[
0, 1
A˜u
∧ 1]. Therefore, the required result follows from (1.51)-(1.53) and the expression of
κˆV G
A˜
in (1.26) as well as the fact that e−A˜ux − 1 + A˜ux and νˆ are positive for all u ≥ 0 and
x ∈ R.
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Chapter 2
Optimal liquidation in an Almgren-
Chriss type model with Le´vy
processes and finite time horizons
2.1 Problem formulation
We study a finite time horizon version of the liquidation model established in Section 1.1.
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space with a filtration F = (Ft)t≥0 satisfying the
usual conditions, which supports a one dimensional, non-trivial, F-adapted Le´vy process L.
We assume that the Le´vy process L satisfies Assumption 1.1 and therefore it admits the
decomposition
Lt = µt+ σWt +
∫
R
x N˜(t, dx),
where µ ∈ R and σ ≥ 0 are two constants, W is a standard Brownian motion, N˜ is a
compensated Poisson random measure which is independent of W . Let ν denote the Le´vy
measure associated with L. Recall that the cumulant generating function of L1, denoted by
κ, is finite on the interval (δ¯, 0], where δ¯ is given in (1.1). Recall further that the function
κA : [0, δ¯A) → R defined in Section 1.2 is given by κA(x) = κ(−Ax), where A > 0 will be
referred to as the investor’s risk aversion, and δ¯A = −Aδ¯. The function κA satisfies Lemma 1.9.
Using the expression in (1.35) of κA , one can also check that it is continuously differentiable.
Let’s denote
κ = minκA(x), and y = arg minκA(x).
We see that if µ ≤ 0, then κ = y = 0; and if µ > 0, then −∞ < κ < 0 and 0 < y < ∞.
Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 (see end of this chapter) give out illustrations of κA
with different signs of µ.
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We consider an investor who aims to sell a large amount of shares of a single stock before
a finite time. We denote by Yt the investor’s position in the stock at time t, and by y ≥ 0
the investor’s initial stock position. We define the set of admissible liquidation strategy as
follows.
Definition 2.1. Given an initial stock position y ≥ 0 and a time horizon T ∈ (0,∞), the
set A(T, y) of admissible strategies consists of F-adapted, absolutely continuous and positive-
valued processes Y with YT = 0 and Yt < δ¯A, for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Let AD(T, y) denote the set
of all deterministic strategies in A(T, y).
Let Y ∈ A(T, y), then there exists an F-adapted process ξ such that Y admits the
representation
Yt = y +
∫ t
0
ξs ds.
The process ξ is called the liquidation speed process associated with strategy Y , and they can
be identified by each other. Notice that ξ is R-valued. Same as in Section 1.1, the unaffected
stock price is modelled by the process s + L, where s > 0 is some constant which denotes
the stock price at the initial time. Following Almgren and Chriss (2000), Almgren (2003), we
assume that the affected stock price at time t ≥ 0 is given by
St = s+ Lt + α(Yt − Y0) + F (ξt), (2.1)
where α ≥ 0 is a constant describing the permanent impact and F : R → R is a function
describing the temporary impact. We assume that F satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 2.2. The temporary impact function F : R→ R satisfies
(i) F is continuous, and it is twice-continuously differentiable on R \ {0};
(ii) F (0) = 0;
(iii) the function x 7→ xF (x) is strictly convex on R;
(iv) there exist constants K > 0 and p < 1 such that limx→0 |x|pF ′(x) = K;
(v) the function x 7→ x2F ′(x) is strictly increasing (resp. strictly decreasing) for x ≥ 0
(resp. x ≤ 0), and limx→±∞ x2F ′(x) =∞.
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In the above assumption, condition (iii) serves for the convexity of the objective function
in the optimisation problem we are going to solve and hence the uniqueness of solution holds;
condition (iv) is used to well-define the optimal strategy when buying back is involved (see
the proof of Lemma 2.6); condition (v) ensures that the value function in our optimisation
problem is solved in a closed form and the optimal liquidation speed process can be solved
in a feedback form. Similar to Lemma 1.4, it can be derived as consequences of Assumption
2.2 that F (x) is strictly increasing and limx→0 xF ′(x) = 0. Therefore, limx→0 x2F ′(x) = 0.
Assumption 2.2 is satisfied by a large class of functions, for example,
F (x) = β sgn(x)|x|γ , β, γ > 0,
where sgn(x) denotes the sign of x. We refer to Almgren (2003), Almgren et al. (2005) and
Lillo et al. (2003) for both theoretical and empirical studies when the temporary impact
function takes the above form. As mentioned in Schied et al. (2010) and Gue´ant and Royer
(2014) that another popular form of the temporary impact function in application would be
F (x) = β1 sgn(x)|x|γ1 + β2 sgn(x)|x|γ2 ,
where β1, β2, γ1, γ2 > 0.
Let CY be the process describing the investor’s cash position associated with some Y ∈
A(T, y). Let c ∈ R be the initial cash position. Then,
CYT = c+ sy −
1
2
αy2 +
∫ T
0
Yt− dLt −
∫ T
0
ξtF (ξt) dt. (2.2)
We assume the investor has a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), so his prefer-
ence between risk and reward/cost is modelled by the utility function U satisfying U(x) =
− exp(−Ax), for some constant A > 0. Suppose the investor wants to maximise the expected
utility of his cash position at the end of time, i.e. his problem is
sup
Y ∈A(T,y)
E
[
U
(
CYT
)]
. (2.3)
In view of (2.2), this problem takes the form of
inf
Y ∈A(T,y)
e−AC˜ E
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
AYt− dLt +A
∫ T
0
ξtF (ξt) dt
)]
, (2.4)
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where
C˜ = c+ sy − 1
2
αy2.
It then suffices to look at
inf
Y ∈A(y)
E
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
AYt− dLt +A
∫ T
0
ξtF (ξt) dt
)]
. (2.5)
2.2 Problem simplification
Similar to Section 1.2, we reduce problem (2.5) to be deterministic by a change of measure
technique. To this end, for any Y ∈ A(T, y), we define the process MY to be
MYt = exp
(∫ t
0
−AYu− dLu −
∫ t
0
κA(Yu) du
)
, t ∈ [0, T ].
By the same proof of Lemma 1.11, it can be shown that MY defines a strictly positive
uniformly integrable martingale, and hence a new probability measure QY can be defined via
dQY
dP
= MYT .
With reference to (2.5) and the calculation in (1.11), we obtain that
inf
Y ∈A(T,y)
E
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
AYt− dLt +A
∫ T
0
ξtF (ξt) dt
)]
≤ inf
Y ∈AD(T,y)
exp
[∫ T
0
(
κA(Yt) +AξtF (ξt)
)
dt
]
.
Following the same analysis after (1.11), it suffices to solve the problem
V (T, y) = inf
Y ∈AD(T,y)
JT (Y ), (2.6)
where V denotes the value function with T > 0 and y ∈ [0, δ¯A), and JT is given by
JT (Y ) =
∫ T
0
(
κA(Yt) +AξtF (ξt)
)
dt. (2.7)
It can be checked that κT ≤ V (T, y) <∞, for all (T, y) ∈ (0,∞)× [0, δ¯A).
The problem in (2.6)-(2.7) might be solved by a dynamic programming approach for which
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the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is given by
−vt(t, y) + κA(y) + inf
x∈R
{AxF (x) + xvy(t, y)} = 0
with the boundary condition v(t, 0) = 0 and the singular initial condition
lim
t→0
v(t, y) =
0, if y = 0,∞, otherwise.
However, this non-linear partial differential equation is difficult to be solved. (The solutions in
different cases to this Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation are given in closed-forms in Section
5.3. From those expressions, we can see that it can be indeed very difficult to solve this partial
differential equation directly.) This optimisation problem might also be solved by considering
the corresponding Hamiltonian system
dY
dt
(t) = Hp
(
Y (t), p(t)
)
,
dp
dt
(t) = −Hy
(
Y (t), p(t)
)
,
with initial conditions Y (0) = y and dYdt (0) = Hp
(
y, p(0)
)
, where H(y, p) = supx{xp −
κA(y) − AxF (x)}. However, this system of first order ordinary differential equations is also
not easy to be solved. In the case of Brownian motion, Theorem 2.14 in Schied et al. (2010)
characterises the solution to problem (2.6)-(2.7) using this Hamiltonian system. Instead of
these aforementioned approaches, we are going to follow some ideas from the theory of calculus
of variations.
2.3 Solution to the problem
Since the objective functional JT (·) is time-homogeneous, according to the theory of calculus
of variations, it suffices to use the Beltrami identity to characterise the optimal strategy (see
i.e. Gelfand and Fomin, 2000, Section 4.2). In our problem the corresponding Beltrami
identity is
KT,y + κA
(
Yˆt
)
= A
(
ξˆt
)2
F ′
(
ξˆt
)
, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], (2.8)
56
where Yˆ is the candidate of the admissible optimal liquidation strategy, ξˆ is the associated
speed process, and KT,y is some constant which is determined by Yˆ0 = y and YˆT = 0.
Recall that y = arg minκA(x), and we have y = 0 if µ ≤ 0, and y > 0 if µ > 0. We
then separate the problem into two cases by concerning either y ≥ y or y < y. The optimal
liquidation strategy in each case will be constructed according to (2.8) (graphs of illustrations
of optimal strategies in different cases are given at the end of this chapter), and the value
function in each case will be given in a closed form.
2.3.1 Optimal strategy, case 1 (y ≥ y)
Before going into details of the optimal strategy, we make the following primary observation.
Lemma 2.3. Given an initial stock position y ≥ y, any admissible strategy containing an
intermediate buying is not optimal.
In order to prepare for the construction of an optimal strategy, let’s define the continuous
function G− : [0,∞) → (−∞, 0] to be the inverse of x 7→ x2F ′(x) restricted on the interval
(−∞, 0]. This inverse is well-defined due to Assumption 2.2, and we have that G− is strictly
decreasing and G−(0) = 0. Lemma 2.3 suggests to look for a decreasing strategy. According
to (2.8), we seek for a constant KT,y such that
dYˆt
dt
= ξˆt = G
−
(
KT,y + κA
(
Yˆt
)
A
)
. (2.9)
This requires that KT,y ≥ −mint∈[0,T ] κA
(
Yˆt
)
= −κ, where κ = minκA(x). Equation (2.9)
yields (if there is no waiting contained in Yˆ )
∫ Yˆt
0
−1
G−
(
KT,y+κA(u)
A
) du = T − t, (2.10)
and in particular for y 6= 0, we look at∫ y
0
−1
G−
(
KT,y+κA(u)
A
) du = T. (2.11)
Given y ∈ [y, δ¯A), y 6= 0 and any constant K > −κ, there is a unique constant TK > 0
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satisfying ∫ y
0
−1
G−
(
K+κA(u)
A
) du = TK .
Moreover, since G− is strictly decreasing and continuous, the mapping K 7→ TK is strictly
decreasing and continuous on (−κ,∞), hence invertible. Write
T y =
∫ y
0
−1
G−
(−κ+κA(u)
A
) du, for y ∈ [y, δ¯A), y 6= 0, (2.12)
which may or may not be finite. Then, when K decreases to −κ, TK increases to T y.
Therefore, given any (T, y) ∈ (0, T y]× [y, δ¯A) with y 6= 0, we are able to find a unique KT,y ≥
−κ satisfying (2.11) with the corresponding strategy described by (2.10). This strategy is
strictly decreasing.
However, if T > T y, (2.11) is impossible to be satisfied by any KT,y ≥ −κ. In this
situation, it seems that the given time period for liquidation is too long, so we may integrate
a period of waiting into the strategy. The expression of JT (·) indicates that it suffices to
consider a waiting when Yˆt = y. Taking ξˆt = 0 and Yˆt = y in (2.9) results in K
T,y = −κ.
So if T > T y, µ ≤ 0 and y ≥ 0, we have KT,y = 0. In this case, we sell until the stock
position becomes 0, then keep the stock position to be constantly 0 afterwards. In order to
well describe the strategy when T > T y, µ > 0 and y ≥ y, we need to introduce two more
quantities of time. For µ > 0, write
T y =
∫ y
0
−1
G−
(−κ+κA(u)
A
) du (2.13)
and
T yy =
∫ y
y
−1
G−
(−κ+κA(u)
A
) du, y ≥ y. (2.14)
Thus when T > T y, µ > 0 and y ≥ y, the strategy stays at y from time T yy until T − T y, and
it is strictly decreasing satisfying (2.9) at any other time.
Let’s formally state the definition of the candidate of the optimal admissible strategy.
Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 illustrate the strategy in different cases.
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Definition 2.4. For any µ ∈ R, let (T, y) ∈ (0,∞)× [y, δ¯A), and T y, T y and T yy be given by
(2.12)-(2.14). If y ∈ [y, δ¯A) and y 6= 0, define the constant KT,y to satisfy∫ y
0
−1
G−
(
KT,y+κA(u)
A
) du = T ∧ T y;
if y = 0, let KT,y = −κ for all T ∈ (0,∞). We call Yˆ a candidate of an optimal admissible
strategy in Case 1, if it satisfies the following descriptions. Suppose y = 0, then there is
nothing to liquidate, i.e. we wait until time T . Suppose y > 0,
(i) if T < T y, then let Yˆt be given by (2.10) for all t ∈ [0, T ];
(ii) if T ≥ T y and µ ≤ 0, then let Yˆt be given by∫ Yˆt
0
−1
G−
(
KT,y+κA(u)
A
) du = T y − t, for t ∈ [0, T y],
and define Yˆt = 0 for t ∈ (T y, T ];
(iii) if T ≥ T y and µ > 0, then let Yˆt satisfy∫ Yˆt
y
−1
G−
(
KT,y+κA(u)
A
) du = T yy − t, for t ∈ [0, T yy ],
define Yˆt = y for t ∈ (T yy , T − T y], and let Yˆt satisfy (2.10) for t ∈ (T − T y, T ].
Note that the integrals appearing in (ii) and (iii) in the above definition can never explode,
this is because that they are in the context of T y < T <∞. The next theorem shows that the
candidate strategy given by the above definition is the unique admissible optimal strategy for
our liquidation problem.
Theorem 2.5. For any time horizon T ∈ (0,∞) and initial stock position y ∈ [y, δ¯A), let the
strategy Yˆ be given by Definition 2.4. Then Yˆ is the unique optimal admissible liquidation
strategy for problem (2.3).
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2.3.2 Optimal strategy, case 2 (y < y)
Note that in this subsection, we only need to consider µ > 0, since for µ ≤ 0, we have y = 0 but
y ≥ 0. In the situation that there is no buying or waiting in the optimial strategy, using the
same argument as in Case 1, we are able to find a unique constant KT,y ≥ −κA(y) satisfying
(2.11), and we let the corresponding candidate strategy to be given by (2.10). The inequality
KT,y ≥ −κA(y) is because KT,y ≥ −mint∈[0,T ] κA
(
Yˆt
)
is required, and −mint∈[0,T ] κA
(
Yˆt
)
=
−κA(y) when µ > 0 with y < y.
Given any y ∈ [0, y), the largest value of time horizon satisfying the situation of no buying
or waiting is
τy =
∫ y
0
−1
G−
(−κA(y)+κA(u)
A
) du. (2.15)
Therefore if T > τy, we may concern to buy back during liquidation. In order to describe
positive trading speeds, analogous to G−, we introduce the continuous function G+ : [0,∞)→
[0,∞) which is defined as the inverse of x 7→ x2F ′(x) when it is restricted on [0,∞). So G+
is strictly increasing and G+(0) = 0. We have the following properties of G+ and G−.
Lemma 2.6. For 0 ≤ z < y < y,∫ y
z
1
G+
(−κA(y)+κA(u)
A
) du <∞ and ∫ y
z
−1
G−
(−κA(y)+κA(u)
A
) du <∞.
These two integrals both tend to 0, as y → z.
This lemma implies that τy <∞ and τ0 = 0. The following lemma will help us to identify
the optimal strategy with buying.
Lemma 2.7. Given an initial position y < y, it is never optimal to buy back after a period
of sale, and it is not optimal to have the stock position being larger than y at any time.
According to the above lemma, if buying back is in the optimal strategy, then it can only
happen at the beginning. Then motivated by (2.8), we seek for a constant KT,y such that
dYˆt
dt
= ξˆt = G
+
(
KT,y + κA
(
Yˆt
)
A
)
1[0,θ)(t) +G
−
(
KT,y + κA
(
Yˆt
)
A
)
1[θ,T ](t), (2.16)
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where θ ∈ [0, T ) and is defined by θ = inf{t ≥ 0 | Yˆt = κ−1A (−KT,y)} with κ−1A being the
inverse of κA when it is restricted on [0, y]. Here we must have κ
−1
A (−KT,y) ≥ y, which is
implied by the requirement that KT,y ≥ −κA(y). Also notice that Lemma 2.7 and KT,y ≥
−mint∈[0,T ] κA
(
Yˆt
)
implies κ−1A (−KT,y) ≤ y, which is equivalent to KT,y ≤ −κ.
Lemma 2.8. Given y ∈ [0, y), the function T (·; y) : (−κA(y),−κ )→ (0,∞) defined by
T (K; y) =
∫ κ−1A (−K)
y
1
G+
(
K+κA(u)
A
) du+ ∫ κ−1A (−K)
0
−1
G−
(
K+κA(u)
A
) du
is continuous and strictly increasing.
Write
τ
y
y =
∫ y
y
1
G+
(−κ+κA(u)
A
) du. (2.17)
Then,
lim
K↑−κ
T (K; y) = τ
y
y + T
y,
and because of Lemma 2.6, it follows that
lim
K↓−κA(y)
T (K; y) = τy.
Therefore, Lemma 2.8 implies that for any T ∈ (τy, τyy + T y], the associated constant KT,y is
uniquely determined via T (K; y) = T . In this situation we buy until time θ with the strategy
satisfying
∫ κ−1A (−KT,y)
Yˆt
1
G+
(
KT,y+κA(u)
A
) du = θ − t, (2.18)
and after time θ, it satisfies (2.10).
Suppose T > τ
y
y + T
y, we include a period of waiting into the discussed strategy with
buying, and this waiting happens when Yˆt = y, which is motivated by the expression of JT (·).
Let’s state the formal definition of the candidate strategy in Case 2, for which Figure 2.3
gives out an illustration.
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Definition 2.9. Suppose (T, y) ∈ (0,∞)× [0, y). Let T y, τy and τyy be given by (2.13), (2.15)
and (2.17) respectively. For T ≤ τy, define the constant KT,y to satisfy (2.11) and write
θ = 0. When T > τy, let KT,y satisfy
∫ κ−1A (−KT,y)
y
1
G+
(
KT,y+κA(u)
A
) du+ ∫ κ−1A (−KT,y)
0
−1
G−
(
KT,y+κA(u)
A
) du = T ∧ (τyy + T y)
and write
θ =
∫ κ−1A (−KT,y)
y
1
G+
(
KT,y+κA(u)
A
) du.
We call Yˆ a candidate of an optimal admissible strategy in Case 2, if it satisfies the following
descriptions.
(i) If T < τ
y
y + T
y, then let Yˆt be given by (2.18) when t ∈ [0, θ), and let it satisfy (2.10)
for t ∈ [θ, T ].
(ii) If T ≥ τyy + T y, then let Yˆt be given by (2.18) when t ∈ [0, τyy ), define Yˆt = y for
t ∈ [τyy , T − T y), and let it satisfy (2.10) for t ∈ [T − T y, T ].
The following theorem verifies that the candidate strategy given by Definition 2.9 is the
unique admissible optimal strategy.
Theorem 2.10. For any time horizon T ∈ (0,∞) and initial stock position y ∈ [0, y), let
strategy Yˆ be given by Definition 2.9. Then Yˆ is the unique optimal admissible liquidation
strategy for problem (1.7).
Remark 2.11. Because τ0 = 0, we see that even when the initial stock position y = 0,
the strategy defined by Definition 2.9 contains a intermediate buying back, given a strictly
positive time horizon. We know that Definition 2.9 gives out the unique optimal strategy,
therefore in particular when y = 0 and T > 0, it is strictly optimal to follow a round-trip
strategy. 5 This indicates that when µ > 0, our model allows for the price manipulation
in the sense of Huberman and Stanzl (2004), meaning that there exits a round-trip strategy
which gives out strictly positive proceeds in average. To see this, let’s consider µ, T > 0, and
suppose the initial cash position c and the initial stock position y are both equal to 0. Denote
5By round-trip strategy we mean any strategy starting and ending at the same position.
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by Y 0 the liquidation strategy of doing nothing, and by Yˆ the corresponding optimal strategy.
Then,
− exp(−Ac) = E
[
− exp(−ACY 0T )] < E[− exp(−AC YˆT )] ≤ − exp(−AE[C YˆT ]).
Therefore, 0 = c < E
[
C YˆT
]
.
2.3.3 Value functions
With expressions of optimal liquidation strategies, we are able to write down corresponding
value functions in different cases. To see this, we simply take an optimal strategy into the
performance function (2.7). For µ ≤ 0, we obtain
JT
(
Yˆ
)
=
∫ T
0
(
κA
(
Yˆt
)
+AξˆtF
(
ξˆt
))
dt
=
∫ 0
y
{
κA
(
Yˆt
)
G−
(
KT,y+κA(Yˆt)
A
) +AF(G−(KT,y + κA(Yˆt)
A
))}
dYˆt.
Therefore, when µ ≤ 0, the value function V : (0,∞)× [0, δ¯A)→ R admits the expression
V (T, y) =
∫ y
0
{
−κA(u)
G−
(
KT,y+κA(u)
A
) −AF(G−(KT,y + κA(u)
A
))}
du, (2.19)
where KT,y is given by Definition 2.4. If µ > 0, then the value function takes different forms
in different situations. Let’s first suppose (T, y) ∈ (0,∞) × [y, δ¯A) or (T, y) ∈ (0, τy] × [0, y).
Then there is a waiting period if (T, y) ∈ (T y,∞)× [y, δ¯A), and it happens between time T yy
and T − T y. Taking the optimal strategy into the performance function gives
JT
(
Yˆ
)
=
∫ 0
y
{
κA
(
Yˆt
)
G−
(
KT,y+κA(Yˆt)
A
) +AF(G−(KT,y + κA(Yˆt)
A
))}
dYˆt
+
(
T − T y − T yy
)
κA(y) 1(T y ,∞)×[y,δ¯A)(T, y).
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When (T, y) ∈ (τy,∞) × [0, y), buying back exists, and the strategy possibly has a waiting
part between time τ
y
y and T − T y. Thus, it follows that
JT
(
Yˆ
)
=
∫ κ−1A (−KT,y)
y
{
κA
(
Yˆt
)
G+
(
KT,y+κA(Yˆt)
A
) +AF(G+(KT,y + κA(Yˆt)
A
))}
dYˆt
+
∫ 0
κ−1A (−KT,y)
{
κA
(
Yˆt
)
G−
(
KT,y+κA(Yˆt)
A
) +AF(G−(KT,y + κA(Yˆt)
A
))}
dYˆt
+
(
T − T y − τyy
)
κA(y) 1(τyy+T y ,∞)(T ).
Therefore, when µ > 0, the value function V : (0,∞) × [0, δ¯A) → R satisfies that if (T, y) ∈
(0,∞)× [y, δ¯A) or (T, y) ∈ (0, τy]× [0, y),
V (T, y) =
∫ y
0
{
−κA(u)
G−
(
KT,y+κA(u)
A
) −AF(G−(KT,y + κA(u)
A
))}
du
+
(
T − T y − T yy
)
κA(y) 1(T y ,∞)×[y,δ¯A)(T, y);
and if (T, y) ∈ (τy,∞)× [0, y), then
V (T, y) =
∫ y
κ−1A (−KT,y)
{
−κA(u)
G+
(
KT,y+κA(u)
A
) −AF(G+(KT,y + κA(u)
A
))}
du
+
∫ κ−1A (−KT,y)
0
{
−κA(u)
G−
(
KT,y+κA(u)
A
) −AF(G−(KT,y + κA(u)
A
))}
du
+
(
T − T y − τyy
)
κA(y) 1(τyy+T y ,∞)(T ).
where KT,y is given by either Definition 2.4 or Definition 2.9.
2.4 Connection to the infinite time horizon problem
With out loss of generality, define the optimal liquidation strategy to be 0 for t > T . Let’s
examine the limiting behaviour of the liquidation model as time horizon T tends to infinite.
With reference to Chapter 1, for the infinite time horizon problem to be well-defined, we have
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to employ some more conditions on admissible strategies, e.g.∫ ∞
0
‖Yt‖L∞(P) dt <∞ if µ 6= 0, (2.20)
∫ ∞
0
‖Yt‖2L∞(P) dt <∞ if µ = 0, (2.21)
and
lim
t→∞ t‖Yt‖L∞(P) = 0.
If µ > 0, then the optimal strategy in the limit as T tends to infinity never reaches
position 0. This kind of strategy gives out a degenerate value function in the limit, which
coincides with the situation of µ > 0 discussed in Chapter 1. Now suppose µ ≤ 0. Denote by
Yˆ T the optimal liquidation strategy for time horizon T <∞, and by ξˆT the associated speed
process. From Definition 2.4, we get limT→∞KT,y = 0. Therefore, the optimal liquidation
strategy in the limit satisfies∫ y
limT→∞ Yˆ Tt
−1
G−
(κA(u)
A
) du = t, if t ≤ T y,
and
lim
T→∞
Yˆ Tt = 0, if t > T
y.
Moreover, from (2.19), the dominated convergence theorem gives that
lim
T→∞
V (T, y) =
∫ y
0
{
−κA(u)
G−
(
κA(u)
A
) −AF(G−(κA(u)
A
))}
du, y ∈ [0, δ¯A).
Write Yˆ∞, ξˆ∞ and V (∞, y) to be the optimal strategy, the optimal speed process and the value
function for the infinite time horizon version of our liquidation problem when µ ≤ 0. Then
with reference to Chapter 1 and above results, we have limT→∞ Yˆ Tt = Yˆ∞t , limT→∞ ξˆTt = ξˆ∞t
as well as limT→∞ V (T, y) = V (∞, y). Write C Yˆ∞ and C Yˆ T to be the corresponding processes
of cash positions. It follows that C Yˆ
T
∞ converges to C Yˆ
∞
∞ in L2(P), as T increases to infinity.
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To see this, we calculate that
E
[(
C Yˆ
T
∞ − C Yˆ
∞
∞
)2]
≤ 2µ2
[∫ ∞
0
(
Yˆ Tt − Yˆ∞t
)
dt
]2
+ 2
[∫ ∞
0
(
ξˆtF
(
ξˆt
)− ξˆ∞t F (ξˆ∞t )) dt]2
+
(
σ2 +
∫
R\{0}
x2ν(dx)
)∫ ∞
0
(
Yˆ Tt − Yˆ∞t
)2
dt
= 2µ2
[∫ ∞
0
(
Yˆ Tt − Yˆ∞t
)
dt
]2
+ 2
[∫ 0
y
{
F
(
G−
(
KT,y + κA(u)
A
))
− F
(
G−
(
κA(u)
A
))}
du
]2
+
(
σ2 +
∫
R\{0}
x2ν(dx)
)∫ ∞
0
(
Yˆ Tt − Yˆ∞t
)2
dt, (2.22)
where the first inequality is due to that (a+ b)2 ≤ 2(a2 + b2) for all a, b ∈ R, and Itoˆ isometry
is used. Since when T increases to infinity, KT,y decreases to 0, and hence Yˆ Tt increases to
Yˆ∞t , combining (2.20), (2.21) and (2.22), the dominated convergence theorem gives the result.
We can therefore regard the infinite time horizon problem as the limit of the finite time
horizon problem when T tends to infinity. The Almgren-Chriss liquidation model has a certain
robustness.
2.5 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.3. Suppose y ≥ y and Y ∈ AD(T, y) is any strategy including some
intermediate buying. Then we can either find two time points r and s with 0 ≤ r < s ≤ T
such that Yr = Ys ≥ y and Yt > Yr for all t ∈ (r, s), or there exist p and q with 0 < p < q ≤ T
such that Yp = Yq < y and Yt < Yp for all t ∈ (p, q). In the first case, consider the admissible
strategy X which consists of a waiting from time r to s, and it is equal to Y at any other
time. Then,
κA(Xr)(s− r) <
∫ s
r
(
κA(Yu) +AξuF
(
ξu
))
du,
and therefore, JT,y(X) < JT,y(Y ). This shows that Y is not an optimal strategy. For the
other case, similarly that the admissible strategy which consists of a waiting from time p to
q and being equal to Y at any other time will lead to a desired conclusion.
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Proof of Theorem 2.5. The admissibility conditions given by Definition 2.1 are trivially
satisfied by the strategy described by Definition 2.4. Define the function φ by φ(y, ξ) =
κA(y) +AξF (ξ). We claim that the Euler-Lagrange equation
d
dt
φξ(Yˆt, ξˆt) = φy(Yˆt, ξˆt) (2.23)
holds for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], which requires to show
d
dt
φξ(Yˆt, ξˆt) = κ
′
A(Yˆt), for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.24)
For ξˆt 6= 0, we calculate that
φξ(Yˆt, ξˆt) = AF
(
ξˆt
)
+AξˆtF
′(ξˆt)
= AF
(
G−
(
KT,y + κA
(
Yˆt
)
A
))
+
KT,y + κA
(
Yˆt
)
G−
(
KT,y+κA(Yˆt)
A
) .
Therefore, a direct differentiation yields (2.24). Consider some time interval where waiting
occurs. Then on this interval ξˆt = 0 and hence φξ(Yˆt, ξˆt) is a constant. But according to
Definition 2.4, on this interval Yˆt = y, which is a minimum value of κA. Hence on this
interval, κ′A(Yˆt) = 0 =
d
dtφξ(Yˆt, ξˆt).
Consider any admissible Y 6= Yˆ , using the strict convexity of κA and x 7→ xF (x), we
compute that∫ T
0
φ(Yt, ξt) dt−
∫ T
0
φ(Yˆt, ξˆt) dt >
∫ T
0
(
φy(Yˆt, ξˆt)(Yt − Yˆ ) + φξ(Yˆt, ξˆt)(ξt − ξˆ)
)
dt
=
∫ T
0
(
d
dt
[
φξ(Yˆt, ξˆt)
]
(Yt − Yˆ ) + φξ(Yˆt, ξˆt)(ξt − ξˆ)
)
dt
=
∫ T
0
d
dt
[
φξ(Yˆt, ξˆt)(Yt − Yˆ )
]
dt
= 0,
where the last equality is because that Y and Yˆ have the same starting and ending values.
This combining with the analysis after equation (1.11) shows that Yˆ is the unique optimal
admissible liquidation strategy to problem (2.3).
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Proof of Lemma 2.6. Observe that by the convexity of κA, we have that for all u ∈ [z, y]
and some constant C > 0,
C(y − u) ≤ −κA(y) + κA(u)
A
.
Therefore, ∫ y
z
1
G+
(−κA(y)+κA(u)
A
) du ≤ ∫ y
z
1
G+
(
C(y − u)) du. (2.25)
Assumption 2.2 states that there exist constant p < 1 and K > 0 such that limx→0 |x|pF ′(x) =
K. Write u = x2F ′(x). Then we have
u
1
2−p
G+(u)
=
(|x|pF ′(x)) 12−p .
Taking x to 0, so u tends to 0 as well, and it follows that
lim
u→0
u
1
2−p
G+(u)
= K
1
2−p .
This and (2.25) together with p < 1 imply that
0 ≤
∫ y
z
1
G+
(−κA(y)+κA(u)
A
) du ≤ ∫ y
z
C ′
(y − u) 12−p
du =
C ′(2− p)
1− p (y − z)
1−p
2−p <∞, C ′ > 0.
Hence, we have
∫ y
z
1
G+
(−κA(y)+κA(u)
A
) du→ 0, as y → z. Same proof for G−.
Proof of Lemma 2.7. For it is not optimal to buy after sale, the proof is exactly the same
as the second case in the proof of Lemma 2.3. Consider any Y ∈ AD(T, y) with y < y, and
whose largest value is greater than y. Then (Yt ∧ y)t∈[0,T ] is a better admissible strategy.
Proof of Lemma 2.8. Note that Lemma 2.6 ensures that T (·; y) is well-defined, and in
particular, it is real-valued. Let δ ∈ C∞(R) be a positive-valued function with support [0, 1],
satisfying
∫ 1
0 δ(x) dx = 1. For n ∈ N, write
δn(u) = nδ(nu), for u ≥ 0.
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Define
G+n (x) =
∫ 1
0
G+(x+ u)δn(u) du.
Thus, G+n ∈ C1([0,∞)), and for all n ∈ N, G+n is a strictly increasing function with G+n (0) > 0.
Since G+ is continuous and strictly increasing, we have that G+n decreases to G
+ uniformly
on compact intervals, as n tends to infinity (see e.g. Folland, 1984). Let’s denote
T+(K; y) =
∫ κ−1A (−K)
y
1
G+
(K+κA(u)
A
) du, K ∈ (−κA(y),−κ ).
Therefore, by the monotone convergence theorem,
lim
n→∞
∫ κ−1A (−K)
y
1
G+n
(
K+κA(u)
A
) du = T+(K; y). (2.26)
We calculate that
d
dK
[∫ κ−1A (−K)
y
1
G+n
(
K+κA(u)
A
) du]
=
−(κ−1A )′(−K)
G+n (0)
+
∫ κ−1A (−K)
y
−(G+n )′
(
K+κA(u)
A
)
κ′A(u)
A(G+n )2
(
K+κA(u)
A
) 1
κ′A(u)
du. (2.27)
Observe that for u ∈ [y, κ−1A (−K)],
1
κ′A
(
κ−1A (−K)
) ≤ 1
κ′A(u)
≤ 1
κ′A(y)
< 0.
Then we compute from (2.27) that for K ∈ (−κA(y),−κ
)
,
d
dK
[∫ κ−1A (−K)
y
1
G+n
(
K+κA(u)
A
) du]
≥ −(κ
−1
A )
′(−K)
G+n (0)
+
1
κ′A
(
κ−1A (−K)
) ∫ κ−1A (−K)
y
−(G+n )′
(
K+κA(u)
A
)
κ′A(u)
A(G+n )2
(
K+κA(u)
A
) du
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=
−1
G+n
(
K+κA(y)
A
)
κ′A
(
κ−1A (−K)
)
> 0.
But −1
G+n
(
K+κA(y)
A
)
κ′A(κ
−1
A (−K))
is uniformly bounded away from 0 with respect to both n andK ∈
(−κA(y),−κ
)
. This together with (2.26) implies that K 7→ T+(K; y) is strictly increasing.
Now we prove the continuity of T+(·; y), and we first show that it is left continuous. For
a fixed K and some  > 0, consider the interval
(
T+(K; y) − , T+(K; y)). We claim that
there exist some δ¯ > 0 such that for all δ ∈ (0, δ¯), T y+(K − δ) ∈
(
T+(K; y)− , T+(; yK)). To
see this, we take δ¯ to be such that
∫ κ−1A (−K+δ¯)
y
1
G+
(
K+κA(u)
A
) du = T+(K; y)− .
Then it is clear that
T+(K; y)−  < T+(K − δ¯; y) < T+(K − δ; y) < T+(K; y).
This shows the left continuity of T+(·; y). For the right continuity, observe that for some
δ > 0,
∣∣T+(K + δ; y)− T+(K; y)∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ κ−1A (−K−δ)
y
1
G+
(
K+δ+κA(u)
A
) du− ∫ κ−1A (−K)
y
1
G+
(
K+δ+κA(u)
A
) du∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ κ−1A (−K)
y
1
G+
(
K+δ+κA(u)
A
) du− ∫ κ−1A (−K)
y
1
G+
(
K+κA(u)
A
) du∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ κ−1A (−K−δ)
κ−1A (−K)
1
G+
(
K+δ+κA(u)
A
) du∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ κ−1A (−K)
y
{
1
G+
(
K+δ+κA(u)
A
) − 1
G+
(
K+κA(u)
A
)} du∣∣∣∣∣.
As δ goes to 0, due to Lemma 2.6, the first term in the above line converges to 0, and the
second term also tends to 0 by the dominated convergence theorem.
A similar proof verifies the properties of the integral regarding the function G−, and
therefore we make the conclusion that T (·; y) is continuous and strictly increasing.
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Proof of Theorem 2.10. This proof follows exactly the same argument as of the proof of
Theorem 2.5 with taking the additional consideration of that for ξˆt 6= 0,
d
dt
φξ(Yˆt, ξˆt) =
d
dt
[
AF
(
ξˆt
)
+AξˆtF
′(ξˆt)]
=
d
dt
[
AF
(
G+
(
KT,y + κA
(
Yˆt
)
A
))
+
KT,y + κA
(
Yˆt
)
G+
(
KT,y+κA(Yˆt)
A
)]
= κ′A(Yˆt).
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Figure 2.1: An illustration of optimal liquidation trajectories with an initial liquidation position y
and different time horizons T1 and T2 such that T1 > T
y > T2.
Figure 2.2: An illustration of optimal liquidation trajectories with an initial liquidation position y
and different time horizons T1 and T2 such that T1 > T
y > T2.
Figure 2.3: An illustration of optimal liquidation trajectories with an initial liquidation position y
and different time horizons T1, T2 and T3 such that T1 > τ
y
y + T
y > T2 > τ
y > T3.
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Chapter 3
Optimal liquidation in a general
one-sided limit order book for a risk
averse investor
3.1 Problem formulation
Let
(
Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P
)
be a complete filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions
and supporting a one-dimensional non-trivial Le´vy process L.
Assumption 3.1. We assume that L is an (Ft)t≥0-martingale, and that there exists some
δ > 0 such that E
[
eθL1
]
<∞, for |θ| < δ.
Let κ denote the cumulant generating function of L1, i.e.
κ(θ) = ln
(
E
[
eθL1
])
, θ ∈ R.
Assumption 3.1 guarantees that the cumulant generating function κ is continuously differen-
tiable on a neighbourhood of 0. With reference to Assumption 3.1 , we notice that the Le´vy
process L is square integrable, hence admits the representation
Lt = σWt +
∫
R\{0}
z
(
N(t, dz)− tν(dz)), t ≥ 0,
where W is a standard Brownian motion, N is a Poisson random measure which is independent
of W with compensator pi(t, dz) = tν(dz), ν denotes the Le´vy measure associated with L ((see
e.g. Kyprianou, 2006)). The cumulant generating function κ can then be expressed as
κ(θ) =
1
2
σ2θ2 +
∫
R\{0}
(
eθz − 1− θz
)
ν(dz), |θ| < δ. (3.1)
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In particular,
κ′(0) = 0, and κ′′(0) = σ2 +
∫
R\{0}
z2ν(dz).
Moreover, κ is lower semi-continuous (see Ganesh et al., 2004, Lemma 2.3). With reference
to (3.1), one can check that κ is strictly convex and continuously differentiable on its effective
domain, and it satisfies κ(0) = 0 . Therefore, κ(θ) is strictly decreasing for θ < 0 and strictly
increasing for θ > 0. Set
R+ = [0,∞) and R− = (−∞, 0].
For any given A > 0 define the function κA : R+ → [0,∞] by
κA(y) = κ(−Ay), y ≥ 0,
and set
y¯A = sup
{
y ≥ 0 | κA(y) <∞
}
.
Then κA is strictly increasing, strictly convex, lower semi-continuous and continuously differ-
entiable on [0, y¯A] with κA(0) = 0. Using (3.1), one can deduce that
C1y
2 ≤ κA(y) ≤ C2y2, 0 ≤ y ≤ , (3.2)
where , C1, C2 > 0. The function κA will play a predominant role in the sequel, where the
number A will be a parameter describing the large investor’s risk aversion.
We consider an investor who aims to sell a large amount of shares of a single stock in an
infinite time horizon. Let Yt denote the number of shares held by the investor at time t. The
process Y is called a liquidation strategy, if it converges to 0 a.s., as t goes to infinity. We
consider the following set of admissible liquidation strategies.
Definition 3.2. For y ∈ R+, let A(y) denote the set of all (Ft)t≥0-adapted, predictable,
decreasing, ca`dla`g processes Y , satisfying Y0− = y and∫ ∞
0
κA
(‖Yt‖L∞(P)) dt <∞. (3.3)
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Moreover, let AD(y) denote the set of all deterministic strategies in A(y).
To describe the investor’s execution price, we explicitly model a bid limit order book.
We assume that the unaffected bid price process B0, which is the process describing best bid
prices in the market if the investor does not act, is given by
B0t = b+ Lt, t ≥ 0,
where b > 0 is the best bid price at the initial time. The Bachelier price model may seem
simplistic, but this kind of modelling of unaffected price is widely used in the optimal liqui-
dation literature (see e.g. Almgren and Chriss, 2000; Kissell and Malamut, 2005; Schied and
Scho¨neborn, 2009; Gatheral, 2010, etc). There are studies show that a liquidation model with
linear price processes can provide a good approximation for a model with exponential price
processes (see e.g. Gatheral and Schied, 2011, and the references there in). In our model, the
unaffected bid price is assumed to provide a lower bound for the best ask price and that the
best bid price as well as all bid prices are unaffected by the large investor’s buy orders (if he
is allowed to buy back). These assumptions are satisfied throughout the whole chapter, and
they allow us to exclude any buy orders in the optimal trading strategy (see Remark 3.6),
and they also exclude price manipulation in our model (see Remark 3.5).
In order to describe the bid limit order book, we consider a measure µ defined on the
Borel σ-algebra on R−, denoted by B(R−). If S ∈ B(R−), then µ(S) represents the number
of bid orders with prices in the set B0t + S = {B0t + s | s ∈ S}, provided that the investor
didn’t act before time t. Notice that the undisturbed bid order book described by µ is relative
to unaffected bid prices, it shifts together with the movement of the unaffected market price.
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 give out illustrations. We impose the following assumption on µ.
Assumption 3.3. We assume that
(i) there exists some x¯ ∈ (−∞, 0) such that µ((x¯, 0]) = µ(R−) <∞;
(ii) µ is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, and is non-zero on any
interval properly containing the origin;
(iii) µ((x, 0]) is concave in x.
The first assumption means that there are finitely may bid orders available in the order
book and the finite number x¯ is equal to the smallest bid price in the book. We know from (ii)
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Figure 3.2: An illustration of an undisturbed bid limit order book at time t.
Figure 3.1: An illustration of an undisturbed bid limit order book at time 0.
that the right end of the bid order book coincides with the best bid price in the undisturbed
bid order book; in other words, one can always sell some amount of shares at the unaffected
bid price in an undisturbed bid order book. The concavity of µ((x, 0]) tells that if we look at
the undisturbed bid order book, there are less bid orders placed at a price which is farther
away from the best bid price. Our model captures limit order books with discontinuous
shapes which can be used to reasonably approximate discrete shaped limit order books in
reality. Compare to models with continuous shaped limit order books (see e.g. Alfonsi et al.,
2010; Løkka, 2014, etc), a discontinuous shape is much easier to be calibrated.
Write z¯ = −µ(R−). We introduce functions φ : [−∞, 0]→ R− and ψ : R− → [−∞, 0] by
φ(x) = −µ((x, 0]) and ψ(z) = φ−1(z),
where φ(ψ(z)) = z, for all z ∈ [z¯, 0], and ψ(z) = −∞, for all z < z¯. As direct consequences
of Assumption 3.3, φ is convex, ψ is concave, and they are both continuous and strictly
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Figure 3.3: An illustration of a disturbed bid limit order book at time t associated
with a strategy Y .
increasing when they are finite. They also have the following properties that
φ(0) = ψ(0) = 0; (3.4)
∫ z¯
0
ψ(u) du <∞ and ψ(z¯) > −∞. (3.5)
The state of the limit order book changes during trading. The book recovers itself by
means that new limit orders allocated at larger bid prices or smaller ask prices. In order
to model the dynamic of our bid order book during trading, we need to introduce one more
process. For a given strategy Y , let ZY be an R−-valued process such that −ZYt represents
the volume spread at time t that is −ZYt is equal to the total number of bid orders which
have already been executed subtracted by the total amount of which have refilled in up to
time t. We call ZY the state process of the bid limit order book associated with a trading
strategy Y . Let ZY0− = z, where z ≥ z¯ is the initial state of our bid order book. Therefore,
we have ψ(ZYt ) = B
Y
t − B0t , where BYt is the best bid price at time t corresponding to Y ,
and ψ(ZYt ) can be understood as the extra price spread at time t, caused by the investor who
implements strategy Y (see Figure 3.3). Note that we have defined ψ(z) = −∞, for all z < z¯.
This implies that the best bid price drops down to −∞, if one sells more than available bids.
This in particular will exclude the possibility that the investor making sale while there is no
available bid orders. The rate of bid orders refilled into the order book is described by a
resilience function h : R− → R− which satisfies the following.
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Assumption 3.4. We assume the resilience function h : R− → R− is increasing and locally
Lipschitz continuous. It satisfies h(0) = 0 and h(x) < 0, for all x < 0. We also assume that
1/h is a concave function.
Then, we consider the state process ZY following the dynamic
dZYt = −h
(
ZYt−
)
dt+ dYt, Z
Y
0− = z ∈ R−. (3.6)
For any admissible strategy Y , we refer to Predoiu et al. (2011) Appendix A, for the existence
and uniqueness of a negative, ca`dla`g and adapted solution to this dynamic. Combining
Assumption 3.4 and equation (3.6), we see that the farther the best bid price is away from
the unaffected bid price, the larger the resilience speed of the best bid price is. If the investor
doesn’t trade from time t1 to t2, then
(
ZYt
)
t1<t<t2
satisfies
dZYt = −h(ZYt ) dt. (3.7)
Now define a strictly decreasing function H : R− → R ∪ {−∞} by
H(x) =
∫ x
−1
1
h(u)
du. (3.8)
Let H−1 denote the inverse of H, satisfying H−1
(
H(x)
)
= x for all x ≤ 0 and H−1(u) = 0
for u ∈ (−∞ , limx→0−H(x)]. Then, it can be checked that the process Z given by
Zt = H
−1(H(Z0)− t) (3.9)
has dynamic (3.7). Hence, for any t between time t1 and t2, Z
Y
t = H
−1(H(ZYt1)− t+ t1); and
if ZYt2 < 0, then
t2 − t1 = H(ZYt1 )−H
(
ZYt2
)
. (3.10)
Suppose the investor’s initial cash position is c and that he implements a strategy Y ∈
A(y). Then his cash position at time T > 0 is
CT (Y ) = c−
∫ T
0
BYt− dY
c
t −
∑
0≤t≤T
∫ 4Yt
0
{
B0t− + ψ
(
ZYt− + x
)}
dx, (3.11)
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which corresponds to the best bids offered at all times being executed first so as to match
the investor’s sell orders, where the first integral is the cost from the continuous component
of the liquidation strategy and the sum of integrals gives out total cost due to all block sales.
We also suppose the investor has a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). With initial cash
position c, an initial share position y and infinite-time horizon, he wants to maximise the
expected utility of his cash position at the final time. Mathematically, the investor’s optimal
liquidation problem is
sup
Y ∈A(y)
E
[
U
(
C∞(Y )
)]
, (3.12)
where the utility function U is given by
U(c) = −e−Ac, A > 0.
This can be seen as a generalisation of the problem considered in Løkka (2014), a risk-
averse formulation of the problem considered by Predoiu et al. (2011), and a limit order book
equivalent formulation of the optimal liquidation problem studied in Chapter 1.
If ZYt < z¯, then B
Y
t = B
0
t + ψ(Z
Y
t ) = −∞. The negative infinity value of best bid price
would be unfavoured to the investor. Indeed, (3.11) shows that this brings the investor an
infinite cost. Due to this consideration, from now on we restrict ourselves to those admissible
strategies Y with ZYt ≥ z¯, for all t ≥ 0.
3.2 Problem simplification
In this section, we show that the utility maximisation problem in (3.12) can be reduced to a
deterministic optimization problem. This reduction was first explored in Schied et al. (2010),
who proved that with a certain market structure and a CARA investor, the optimal liquidation
strategy is deterministic. Some results of no price manipulation strategies in our model will
also be given in this section.
Let Y ∈ A(y). Then it follows from (3.11) that
CT (Y ) = c+ by − (b+ LT )YT +
∫ T
0
Yt− dLt +
∑
0≤t≤T
4Lt4Yt − FT (Y ),
79
where FT is given by
FT (Y ) =
∫ T
0
ψ
(
ZYt−
)
dY ct +
∑
0≤t≤T
∫ 4Yt
0
ψ
(
ZYt− + x
)
dx. (3.13)
It follows from Lemma 1.22 that for any admissible strategy Y ∈ A(y), the condition in (3.3)
implies
lim
T→∞
T κA
(‖YT ‖L∞(P)) = 0,
and with reference to (3.2),
lim
T→∞
E
[|LTYT |2] ≤ lim
T→∞
κ′′(0)T‖YT ‖2L∞(P) ≤ lim
T→∞
κ′′(0)C−11 TκA
(‖YT ‖L∞(P)) = 0.
We conclude that B0TYT tends to 0 in L
2(P) as T →∞. Set
t = inf
{
t ≥ 0 | ‖Yt‖L∞(P) ≤ 
}
.
From (3.2) and (3.3), it follows that
E
[(∫ ∞
0
Yt− dLt
)2]
≤ κ′′(0)
(
y2‖t‖L∞(P) +
∫ ∞
t
‖Yt‖2L∞(P) dt
)
≤ κ′′(0)
(
y2‖t‖L∞(P) + C−11
∫ ∞
t
κA
(‖Yt‖L∞(P)) dt) <∞.
Hence,
∫∞
0 Yt− dLt is well-defined in L
2(P). Due to the predictability of Y , we also have that
E
[(∑
0≤t
4Lt4Yt
)2]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
(4Yt)2 dt](∫
R\{0}
z2ν(dz)
)
= 0,
which shows the quadratic covariation of jumps of L and Y is almost surely 0, when T goes to
infinity. Moreover, note that FT (Y ) ≥ 0 is an increasing function of T , therefore, F∞ is a well
defined function from the set of ca`dla`g non-increasing functions into the extended positive
real numbers. The final cash position is hence given by
C∞(Y ) = c+ by +
∫ ∞
0
Yt− dLt − F∞(Y ), (3.14)
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where c + by gives out the mark-to-market value of the total wealth of the large investor at
the beginning of liquidation,
∫∞
0 Yt− dLt represents the cost due to the market volatility risk,
and the cost from the price impact resulted from the limited liquidity is described by F∞(Y ).
Remark 3.5. Suppose we allow for intermediate purchase. Consider any ca`dla`g adapted
strategy which can be decomposed into a pure buy strategy X and a pure sell strategy Y .
We assume X + Y satisfies (3.3), limt→∞ tκA(||Xt + Yt||L∞(P)) = 0 and 0 ≤ Xt + Yt < y¯A, for
all t ≥ 0. Then the cash position associated with strategy X + Y at time infinity, denoted by
C∞(X,Y ), is well-defined in an analogues way of (3.14). We therefore have that
C∞(X,Y ) ≤ lim
T→∞
CT (Y )−
∫ T
0
B0t− dXt (3.15)
= c+ by +
∫ ∞
0
(
Xt− + Yt−
)
dLt − F∞(Y )
≤ c+ by +
∫ ∞
0
(
Xt− + Yt−
)
dLt, (3.16)
where the first inequality is due to the assumption that the unaffected bid price is an lower
bound of any best ask price. Taking y = 0 shows that the expected cost associated with any
round-trip strategy is always positive. Hence, our model doesn’t allow for price manipulation
in the sense of Huberman and Stanzl (2004).
Note that (3.16) can be derived without concerning any mode of decay of the price impact.
The only property of order book which contributes to the absence of price manipulation is
that we assume the best ask price gives an upper bounded to the best bid price and the bid
limit order book is not affected by the large investor’s buy trades. We refer to Alfonsi et al.
(2012) and Gatheral et al. (2012) for different model settings which do require conditions on
decay of price impact in order to avoid price manipulations.
Let Y ∈ A(y) and define the process MY by
MYt = exp
(
−A
∫ t
0
Ys− dLs −
∫ t
0
κA
(
Ys−
)
ds
)
, t ≥ 0.
Proposition 1.11 shows that MY is a uniformly integrable martingale. We can therefore define
a probability measure P˜ = PY by
dP˜
dP
= MY∞.
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Based on the idea of Theorem 2.8 in Schied et al. (2010), we calculate that
sup
Y ∈A(y)
E
[
U
(
C∞(Y )
)]
= −e−A(c+by) inf
Y ∈A(y)
E
[
exp
(
−A
∫ ∞
0
Yt− dLt +AF∞(Y )
)]
= −e−A(c+by) inf
Y ∈A(y)
E
[
M∞ exp
(∫ ∞
0
κA
(
Yt−
)
dt+AF∞(Y )
)]
= −e−A(c+by) inf
Y ∈A(y)
E˜
[
exp
(∫ ∞
0
κA
(
Yt−
)
dt+AF∞(Y )
)]
≤ −e−A(c+by) inf
Y ∈AD(y)
E˜
[
exp
(∫ ∞
0
κA
(
Yt−
)
dt+AF∞(Y )
)]
= −e−A(c+by) exp
(
inf
Y ∈AD(y)
{∫ ∞
0
κA
(
Yt−
)
dt+AF∞(Y )
})
. (3.17)
Then with reference to the analysis after (1.11), it suffices to solve the problem in (3.17).
Remark 3.6. Suppose we allow for intermediate buy trades. Consider a pair of strategies
(Y i, Y d) which are ca`dla`g and (Ft)-adapted, and they satisfy Y i0− = 0, Y d0− = y and Y i∞ =
−Y d∞. Moreover, we assume Y i is increasing and Y d is decreasing, and Y i + Y d is positive-
valued and satisfies (3.3). We also suppose that the cash position at time infinity is well-defined
(this requires for instance, limt→∞ tκA
(‖Y it + Y dt ‖L∞(P)) = 0). Consider a non-increasing
ca`dla`g process ξ satisfying ξ0− = 0. Then with reference to (3.6), for all t ≥ 0, we have ξt ≤ 0
and
ZY
d+ξ
t − ZY
d
t = −
∫ t
0
(
h
(
ZY
d+ξ
u−
)− h(ZY du−)) du+ ξt.
Suppose there exists t ≥ 0 such that ZY d+ξt > ZY
d
t . Let s = inf
{
t ≥ 0 | ZY d+ξt > ZY
d
t
}
, and
let δ > 0 be such that for all t ∈ (s, s+ δ], ZY d+ξt > ZY
d
t . This δ exists, since Z
Y d+ξ and ZY
d
are ca`dla`g . Note that although ZY
d+ξ and ZY
d
have jumps, we can only have ZY
d+ξ
s = ZY
d
s .
This is because jumps of both ZY
d+ξ and ZY
d
are negative, and at each time, the jump size
of ZY
d+ξ is always more negative than or equal to that of ZY
d
. Therefore, it follows that
ξs+δ ≤ ξs =
∫ s
0
(
h
(
ZY
d+ξ
u−
)− h(ZY du−)) du,
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and
ξs+δ >
∫ s
0
(
h
(
ZY
d+ξ
u−
)− h(ZY du−)) du+ ∫ s+δ
s
(
h
(
ZY
d+ξ
u−
)− h(ZY du−)) du.
However, because h is increasing, the second integral in the above expression is positive.
Hence, we get a contradiction, and conclude that for all t ≥ 0, ZY d+ξt ≤ ZY
d
t . This together
with the proof of Lemma 3.1 in Løkka (2014) gives out F∞(Y d) ≤ F∞(Y d + ξ). This implies
that for any pair (Y˜ i, Y˜ d) satisfying the same conditions as the aforementioned (Y i, Y d), we
have F∞(Y˜ d ∧ 0) ≤ F∞(Y˜ d). Moreover, since κA is increasing, it follows that∫ ∞
0
κA
(
Y˜ it− + Y˜
d
t−
)
dt ≥
∫ ∞
0
κA
(
Y˜ dt− ∧ 0
)
dt.
If we ignore any impact cost from buying, then it can be shown that our optimal liquidation
problem in the case of allowing buying back can be simplified to
−e−A(c+by) exp
(
inf
(Y i,Y d)
{∫ ∞
0
κA
(
Y it− + Y
d
t−
)
dt+AF∞(Y d)
})
,
from which it is clear that (0, Y˜ d ∧ 0) is a better pair of strategies compared with (Y˜ i, Y˜ d).
According to the above analysis, we can make a conclusion that it is not optimal to buy shares
during liquidation in our model.
Lemma 3.7. Let F be given by (3.13). Then for every Y ∈ AD(y) and z ∈ [z¯, 0],
F∞(Y ) =
∫ 0
z
ψ(s) ds+
∫ ∞
0
h
(
ZYt−
)
ψ
(
ZYt−
)
dt. (3.18)
Following the above lemma as well (3.17), we solve the problem
V (y, z) = inf
Y ∈AD(y)
∫ ∞
0
(
κA
(
Yt−
)
+Ah(ZYt−)ψ(Z
Y
t−)
)
dt, (3.19)
with y = Y0− and z = ZY0−. Since h and ψ are both negative-valued and κA ≥ 0, we have
V ≥ 0. Suppose y > y¯A, which is the smallest upper bound making κA to be finite (y¯A
might be +∞). In such case, the investor will make a block sale so that Y0 ≤ y¯A, otherwise
Y doesn’t satisfy (3.3) and V (y, z) = ∞. However, he cannot sell more than z − z¯ amount
of shares, otherwise V (y, z) will be infinite as well. We shall therefore specify the solvency
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region to be
D = { (y, z) ∈ R+ × [z¯, 0] ∣∣ z > y − y¯A + z¯ }.
For technical reasons, we don’t consider z = y − y¯A + z¯, as the value function may explode
along this line.
3.3 Solution to the problem
Our next aim is to derive a solution to the problem in (3.19). The derivation will be based
on applying a time-change, and the principle of dynamic programming. With reference to
the results in Løkka (2014) and the general theory of optimal control (see e.g. Fleming and
Soner, 2006), it is natural to think that there exists a decreasing 6 ca`gla`d function β = β∗ :
R+ → [z¯, 0] which separates the (y, z) domain into two different regions; a region where the
large investor makes immediate sale and another where he waits. Let β∗ denote the ca`dla`g
version of β∗, and set
Sβ = {(y, z) ∈ D | z ≥ β∗(y)}
Wβ = {(y, z) ∈ D | z ≤ β∗(y)} ∪ {(y, z) | y = 0}
Gβ = Sβ ∩Wβ.
Sβ represents the region for immediate sale, Wβ is the waiting region, and Gβ is the region
of making continuous sale. For y > 0, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation corresponding
to V given by (3.19) takes the form
D−y v(y, z) + vz(y, z) = 0, for (y, z) ∈ Sβ, (3.20)
h(z)vz(y, z)− κA(y)−Ah(z)ψ(z) ≤ 0, for (y, z) ∈ Sβ \ Gβ, (3.21)
and
h(z)vz(y, z)− κA(y)−Ah(z)ψ(z) = 0, for (y, z) ∈ Wβ, (3.22)
6Intuitively, when the volume spread is small but the stock position is large, it might be optimal to sell
rapidly; on the other hand, if the volume spread is large but the stock position is small, then it might be
optimal to wait for a while. This motivates us to make a guess of a decreasing free boundary on the (y, z)
domain.
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D−y v(y, z) + vz(y, z) ≤ 0, for (y, z) ∈ Wβ \ Gβ, (3.23)
with associated boundary condition v(0, z) = A
∫ z
0 ψ(u) du for all z ∈ [z¯, 0], where
D−y v(y, z) = lim
→0−
1

(
v(y + , z)− v(y, z)
)
.
7 The equations (3.20)–(3.23) can be motivated as follows. When the large investor is trying
to optimise over deterministic strategies, he can either sell a certain number 4 > 0 of shares
or wait. Given a state (y, z), it may or may not be optimal to sell 4 amount of shares, thus
v(y, z) ≤ v(y −4, z −4),
because the share position is decreased from y to y −4 due to 4 number of shares is sold,
and at the same time the state of bid order book changes from z to z −4. This inequality
should hold for all 0 < 4 ≤ y, therefore,
max
0<4≤y
{
v(y, z)− v(y −4, z −4)} ≤ 0. (3.24)
On the other hand, during a period of time 4t > 0, it may or may not be optimal to wait,
hence
v(y, z) ≤ v(y, Z4t)+ ∫ 4t
0
(
κA(y) +Ah(Zu−)ψ
(
Zu−
))
du
= v(y, z)
+
∫ 4t
0
(
κA(y) +Ah(Zu−)
(
Zu−
)− vz(y, Zu−)h(Zu−)) du,
where dZu = −h(Zu) du, for 0 ≤ u ≤ 4t. Multiplying the above inequality by (4t)−1 and
sending 4t to 0, we obtain
h(z)vz(y, z)− κA(y)−Ah(z)ψ(z) ≤ 0. (3.25)
7It will turn out that the value function is continuously differentiable in z, but it is only continuous and
admits a one-sided derivative in y (see Proposition 3.12).
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Since it is optimal to either sell immediately a certain number of shares or to wait, an equality
must hold in either (3.24) or (3.25). We have therefore
max
{
max
0<4≤y
{
v(y, z)− v(y −4, z −4)} , h(z)vz(y, z)− κA(y)−Ah(z)ψ(z)} = 0,
and (3.20)–(3.23) follow from this.
We define the liquidation strategy Y β corresponding to an intervention boundary β as
the ca`dla`g function with the following properties:
(i) If (y, z) ∈ Sβ, then the investor initially makes a block trade of size 4 such that
(Y β0 , Z
Y β
0 ) = (y −4, z −4) ∈ Gβ, and set tw = 0.
(ii) If (y, z) ∈ Wβ, then wait until time tw = inf
{
t ≥ 0 | ZY βt = β(y)
}
, where
ZY
β
t = z −
∫ t
0
h
(
ZY
β
u
)
du, 0 ≤ t ≤ tw.
(iii) For t ≥ tw, continuously sell shares in such a way that (Y βt , ZY
β
t ) ∈ Gβ, where
ZY
β
t = Z
Y β
tw −
∫ t
tw
h
(
ZY
β
u
)
du+ Y βt − Y βtw , t ≥ tw.
(iv) Stop once Y βt = 0.
Figure 3.4 gives out an illustration of such a strategy. We will later characterise an optimal
intervention boundary, and prove that the strategy corresponding to such an optimal boundary
exists, and is admissible and optimal.
Let us examine in more details about the strategy corresponding to any given intervention
boundary function β. We first need to specify what kind of boundary we are concerning
about. We consider any intervention boundary β : R+ → [z¯, 0] which is decreasing, ca`gla`d
and satisfies β(y) < 0, for all y > 0. We also require that limy→∞ β(y) = z¯ and β(0) = 0. It
will be shown later that there exists such an optimal intervention boundary which completely
characterises the solution to the investor’s optimisation problem, and the properties that the
optimal boundary may be discontinuous (there might be countably many discontinuities) and
not invertible will complicate our analysis quite a lot. Given any intervention boundary β, one
may ask whether the corresponding liquidation strategy Y β exists and is unique. In order to
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Figure 3.4: An illustration of the strategy Y β corresponding to a boundary β.
answer this, we need to introduce the following functions relate to β, which will bring benefits
to our analysis:
γβ(y) = β(y)− y, for y ∈ R+; (3.26)
ρβ(z) = z − β−1(z), for z ∈ [z¯, 0]; (3.27)
β−1(z) = inf
{
y ∈ R+ ∣∣β(y) ≤ z}, for z ∈ [z¯, 0]; (3.28)
γ−1β (x) = inf
{
y ∈ R+ ∣∣ γβ(y) ≤ x}, for x ∈ R−; (3.29)
ρ−1β (x) = inf
{
z ∈ [z¯, 0] ∣∣ ρβ(z) ≥ x}, for x ∈ R−. (3.30)
8 Note that β and γβ are ca`gla`d , β
−1 and ρβ are ca`dla`g , and γ−1β as well as ρ
−1
β are both
continuous. Moreover, β, β−1 and γ−1β are decreasing, γβ is strictly decreasing, ρβ is strictly
increasing, and ρ−1β is increasing. Furthermore, it follows directly from the definitions of β
−1,
8It can be checked that for any x ∈ R−, γ−1β (x) and ρ−1β (x) give out the y-coordinate and the z-coordinate
of the intersection of the line z = y + x and Gβ , respectively.
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γβ, γ
−1
β , ρβ and ρ
−1
β that the following three identities hold:
ρ−1β (x) = x+ γ
−1
β (x), for all x ∈ R−; (3.31)
γ−1β
(
ρβ(z)
)
= β−1(z), for all z ∈ [z¯, 0]; (3.32)
ρ−1β
(
γβ(y)
)
= β(y), for all y ∈ R+. (3.33)
Also, by the definitions of Gβ, β and β−1, we see that the set Gβ is the union of the graphs of
functions β and β−1, restricted in D.
Observe that if z > β(y) , then the strategy Y β corresponding to the intervention bound-
ary described by β consists of an initial sale of 4 number of shares so that (y −4, z −4) is
in Gβ (see Figure 3.4). Let Y β0− = y and Y β0 = y−4. Suppose (y−4, z−4) is on the graph
of β. Then (y −4, z −4) = (y −4, β(y −4)) and this equality is equivalent to
γβ
(
Y β0
)
= β(Y β0 )− Y β0 = z − y,
from which it follows that Y β0 = γ
−1
β (z−y) and4 = y−γ−1β (z−y). Now suppose (y−4, z−4)
is on the graph of β−1, and let ZY β0− = z and ZY
β
0 = z − 4. Then (y − 4, z − 4) =
(β−1(z −4), z −4), which is equivalent to
ρβ
(
ZY
β
0
)
= ZY
β
0 − β−1(ZY
β
0 ) = z − y,
and it follows that ZY
β
0 = ρ
−1
β (z − y) and 4 = z − ρ−1β (z − y). According (3.31), the number
4 of shares in both of the aforementioned two cases can be expressed by
4 = y − γ−1β (z − y) = z − ρ−1β (z − y).
On the other hand, if z ≤ β(y), then the strategy Y β consists of an initial waiting until(
Y βt , Z
Y β
t
)
being on the graph of β (see Figure 3.4). When there is no action taken, we have
Y βt = y, and with reference to (3.9) and (3.10), we obtain Z
Y β
t = H
−1(H(z) − t). The first
time tw that the state process is on the graph of β is given by
tw = H(z)−H
(
β(y)
)
. (3.34)
Once the state process (Y β, ZY
β
) is in the set Gβ, the strategy Y β consists of taking minimal
actions such that the state process remains in Gβ (see Figure 3.4). Therefore, (Y βt , ZY βt ) =
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(
Y βt , β(Y
β
t )
)
whenever β
(
Y βt +
)
= β
(
Y βt
)
. With reference to (3.6), this implies that Y βt should
solve
dβ
(
Y βt
)
= −h(β(Y βt )) dt+ dY βt ,
which is equivalent to
dγβ
(
Y βt
)
= −h(β(Y βt )) dt.
If β−1
(
ZY
β
t
)
= β−1
(
ZY
β
t −
)
, then
(
Y βt , Z
Y β
t
)
=
(
β−1(ZY βt ), ZY
β
t
)
. According to (3.6) and the
definition of β−1, ZY β should solve
dZY
β
t = −h
(
ZY
β
t−
)
dt.
Set
tw =
0, if z > β(y),H(z)−H(β(y)), if z ≤ β(y), (3.35)
and
t¯ = inf{t ≥ 0 | Y βt = 0}. (3.36)
Denote by {yn}n∈I the set of discontinuous points of β. Then I is countable since β is ca`gla`d.
Define {tn}n∈I by
tn = inf
{
t ≥ tw | Y βt = yn
}
, (3.37)
and {sn}n∈I by
sn = inf
{
t ≥ tw | Y βt < yn
}
. (3.38)
If {t ≥ tw | Y βt = yn
}
= ∅, write tn =∞; and write sn =∞, if {t ≥ tw | Y βt < yn
}
= ∅. The
following result establishes the existence and uniqueness of such a strategy Y β corresponding
to a given intervention boundary β.
Lemma 3.8. Let (y, z) ∈ D and β be a function of intervention boundary. Suppose h is a
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resilience function satisfying Assumption 3.4, and H, β−1, γβ, γ−1β , tw, t¯, yn, tn and sn are
given by (3.8), (3.28), (3.26), (3.29) and (3.35)–(3.38) respectively. Let
(
Y βt
)
t≥0 =
(
Y β
t∧t¯
)
t≥0,
with Y β0− = y, which denotes the decreasing ca`dla`g liquidation strategy corresponding to β, and
let
(
ZY
β
t
)
t≥0, with Z
Y β
0− = z, be the state process of the bid order book associated with Y β.
Suppose Y β satisfies the following description:
(i) If y = 0, then liquidation is completed immediately; otherwise,
(ii) If z > β(y),
(a) when y ∈ ∪n∈I
(
z − β(yn) + yn , z − β(yn+) + yn
]
, immediately sell y − γ−1β (z − y)
number of shares. This block trade ensures Y β0 = β
−1(ZY β0 ).
(b) when y ∈ (z,∞) \ ∪n∈I(z − β(yn) + yn , z − β(yn+) + yn], immediately sell y −
γ−1β (z − y) number of shares. This block trade ensures ZY
β
0 = β
(
Y β0
)
.
Then continuously sell shares so that
(
Y βt , Z
Y β
t
) ∈ Gβ for all t ∈ [ tw, t¯ ].
(iii) If z ≤ β(y), then wait until time tw. The time tw has the property that ZY βtw = β(y).
Continuously sell shares so that
(
Y βt , Z
Y β
t
) ∈ Gβ for all t ∈ [ tw, t¯ ].
Such strategy Y β exists and is unique, and it is continuous for all t > 0. In particular,
Y βt = yn for t ∈ [ tw, t¯ ] ∩ ∪n∈I[tn, sn), (3.39)
with corresponding ZY
β
t being the unique solution to
dZY
β
t = −h
(
ZY
β
t
)
dt, (3.40)
where
ZY
β
tw = ρ
−1
β (z − y) if z > β(y), and ZY
β
tn = β
(
Y βtn−
)
for tn > tw. (3.41)
Moreover,
ZY
β
t = β
(
Y βt
)
, for t ∈ [ tw, t¯ ] \ ∪n∈I[tn, sn), (3.42)
where Y β is the unique solution to
dγβ
(
Y βt
)
= −h(β(Y βt )) dt, (3.43)
90
with
Y βtw = y if z ≤ β(y), Y βtw = γ−1β (z − y) if z > β(y), and Y βsn = yn for sn > tw. (3.44)
If tw > 0, then Y
β
t = y and Z
Y β
t = H
−1(H(z)− t), for 0 ≤ t ≤ tw.
We can also describe ZY
β
t for t ∈ [t¯,∞) that it satisfies (3.40) with initial condition
ZY
β
t¯ =

ZY
β
tw , if t¯ = tw,
z, if t¯ < tw,
β(0+), if t¯ > tw.
(3.45)
The value of β(0+) could determine the finiteness of liquidation period. Precisely, we have
that β(0+) < 0 implies t¯ <∞. To see this, it is enough to consider
γβ
(
Y β
t¯
)− γβ(Y βt ) = ∫ t¯
t
−h(β(Y βu )) du
which follows from (3.43), where there is no waiting period between time t and t¯. To get a
contradiction, let’s suppose t¯ = ∞. Then it is clear that ∫ t¯t −h(β(Y βu )) du = ∞, as β(Y βu )
is bounded away from 0 on the interval (t, t¯). However, γβ
(
Y β
t¯
) − γβ(Y βt ) is finite. The
dynamic of ZY
β
t gives out that Z
Y β is ca`dla`g and increasing to 0. Moreover, we notice from
the continuity of Y βt for t > 0 that Z
Y β is also continuous for all t > 0.
We now progress by deriving an explicit expression for the performance function associated
with the strategy Y β described by Lemma 3.8 for an arbitrary intervention boundary β. As
a consequence, an explicit expression for the value function of our problem will be deduced
then. For the strategy Y β with associated state process ZY
β
, given an initial state (y, z), and
with reference to (3.19), we define the performance function Jβ by
Jβ(y, z) =
∫ ∞
0
(
κA
(
Y βt
)
+Ah(ZY
β
t )ψ
(
ZY
β
t
))
dt, (3.46)
where Y β0− = y, Z
Y β
0− = z and (y, z) ∈ D. Since κA(0) = 0, it follows that
∫ ∞
t¯
(
κA
(
Y βt
)
+Ah(ZY
β
t )ψ
(
ZY
β
t
))
dt = A
∫ ZY β
t¯
0
ψ(u) du. (3.47)
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Therefore, in cases (i) of Lemma 3.8,
Jβ(y, z) = A
∫ z
0
ψ(u) du. (3.48)
Lemma 3.9. Let β, Y β, ZY
β
, tw and t¯ be defined as the same as in Lemma 3.8. If tw < t¯,
then ∫ ∞
tw
(
κA
(
Y βt
)
+Ah
(
ZY
β
t
)
ψ
(
ZY
β
t
))
dt
=
∫ ZY βtw −Y βtw
β(0+)
(
κA
(
γ−1β (u)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (u)
) +Aψ(ρ−1β (u))) du+A∫ β(0+)
0
ψ(u) du,
where γ−1β and ρ
−1
β are defined by (3.29) and (3.30), respectively.
In case (ii) (a) of Lemma 3.8, the strategy Y β consists of an initial sale of y−γ−1β (z−y) =
z− ρ−1β (z− y) number of shares. The state after the block sale is
(
Y β0 , Z
Y β
0
)
=
(
β−1
(
ρ−1β (z−
y)
)
, ρ−1β (z − y)
)
, Hence, according to (3.46) and Lemma 3.9,
Jβ(y, z) = Jβ
(
β−1
(
ρ−1β (z − y)
)
, ρ−1β (z − y)
)
=
∫ ρβ(ρ−1β (z−y))
β(0+)
(
κA
(
γ−1β (u)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (u)
) +Aψ(ρ−1β (u))) du+A∫ β(0+)
0
ψ(u) du
=
∫ z−y
β(0+)
(
κA
(
γ−1β (u)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (u)
) +Aψ(ρ−1β (u))) du+A∫ β(0+)
0
ψ(u) du.
In case (ii) (b), we immediately sell y − γ−1β (z − y) number of shares at the beginning. The
state after the block sale is
(
Y β0 , Z
Y β
0
)
=
(
γ−1β (z − y), β
(
γ−1β (z − y)
))
. Hence, similar to the
above calculation, we have
Jβ(y, z) = Jβ
(
γ−1β (z − y), β
(
γ−1β (z − y)
))
=
∫ z−y
β(0+)
(
κA
(
γ−1β (u)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (u)
) +Aψ(ρ−1β (u))) du+A∫ β(0+)
0
ψ(u) du.
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Therefore, we conclude that in case (ii) of Lemma 3.8,
Jβ(y, z) =
∫ z−y
β(0+)
(
κA
(
γ−1β (u)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (u)
) +Aψ(ρ−1β (u))) du+A∫ β(0+)
0
ψ(u) du. (3.49)
Moreover, in case (iii), z ≤ β(y). So we need to wait until time tw > 0 at which ZY βtw =
β(y). With reference to (3.8) and (3.34), we have
tw = H(z)−H
(
β(y)
)
=
∫ z
β(y)
1
h(u)
du.
Also, observe that∫ tw
0
h
(
ZY
β
t
)
ψ
(
ZY
β
t
)
dt = −
∫ tw
0
ψ
(
ZY
β
t
)
dZY
β
t = −
∫ β(y)
z
ψ(u) du.
Hence in case (iii), the performance function is given by
Jβ(y, z) =
∫ tw
0
(
κA(y) +Ah
(
ZY
β
t
)
ψ
(
ZY
β
t
))
dt+ Jβ
(
y, β(y)
)
= κA(y)
∫ z
β(y)
1
h(u)
du−A
∫ β(y)
z
ψ(u) du
+
∫ γβ(y)
β(0+)
(
κA
(
γ−1β (u)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (u)
) +Aψ(ρ−1β (u))) du+A∫ β(0+)
0
ψ(u) du. (3.50)
Although this provides an explicit expression for Jβ(y, z), it is not obvious to see the informa-
tion about continuity and differentiability of Jβ(y, z) in y, since β is only a ca`gla`d function.
However, we can calculate further that
∫ γβ(y)
β(0+)
(
κA
(
γ−1β (u)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (u)
) +Aψ(ρ−1β (u))) du = ∫ y
0
(
κA(u)
h
(
β(u)
) +Aψ(β(u))) dγcβ(u)
+
∑
0<u<y
κA(u)
∫ β(u+)
β(u)
1
h(x)
dx
+A
∑
0<u<y
∫ β(u+)
β(u)
ψ(s) ds,
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From this expression, as well as∫ β(y)
β(0+)
ψ(u) du =
∫ y
0
ψ
(
β(u)
)
dβc(u) +
∑
0<u<y
∫ β(u+)
β(u)
ψ(s) ds,
and
κA(y)H
(
β(y)
)
= κA(0)H
(
β(0+)
)
+
∫ y
0
κ′A(u)H
(
β(u)
)
du+
∫ y
0
κA(u)
h
(
β(u)
) dβc(u)
+
∑
0<u<y
κA(u)
∫ β(u+)
β(u)
1
h(x)
dx,
it follows from (3.50) that the performance functionJβ(y, z) in case (iii) of Lemma 3.8 admits
the expression
Jβ(y, z) = κA(y)H(z) +A
∫ z
0
ψ(u) du−
∫ y
0
(
κA(u)
h
(
β(u)
) +Aψ(β(u))+ κ′A(u)H(β(u)))du.
(3.51)
In above calculations, we have assumed the existence and finiteness of limu→0+
κA(u)
h(β(u))
and limu→0+ κ′A(u)H
(
β(u)
)
. We have also used that limu→y− κA(u) < ∞ as well as
limu→y− κ′A(u) < ∞. The finiteness of limu→0+ κ′A(u)H
(
β(u)
)
together with (3.2) implies
that κA(0)H
(
β(0+)
)
= 0. For an optimal intervention boundary β, all of these properties
will be demonstrated below by Lemma 3.11.
Suppose β is an intervention boundary such that Y β is optimal. Then according to the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation as well as (3.51), we have
D−y v(y, z) + vz(y, z) = Γ(z; y)− Γ
(
β(y); y
) ≤ 0, for all (y, z) ∈ D,
where
Γ(x; y) = Aψ(x) +
κA(y)
h(x)
+ κ′A(y)H(x).
Therefore, for any given y, β(y) is sufficiently a maximiser of Γ(x; y). The next lemma helps
us to characterise an intervention boundary β whose value maximises Γ(x; y) for a given y,
and it will be shown latter that such β is an optimal intervention boundary in our problem.
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Lemma 3.10. For y ∈ (0, y¯A), define the function Γ(·; y) : [z¯, 0]→ R by
Γ(x; y) = Aψ(x) +
κA(y)
h(x)
+ κ′A(y)H(x), for x ∈ (z¯, 0), (3.52)
and
Γ(0; y) = lim
x→0+
Γ(x; y), Γ(z¯; y) = lim
x→z¯ Γ(x; y).
Let β∗ = β∗(y) and β∗ = β∗(y) denote the functions defined as the largest and smallest
β ∈ [z¯, 0] satisfying
max
x∈[z¯,0]
Γ(x; y) = Γ
(
β; y
)
, (3.53)
respectively. Then for all y ∈ (0, y¯A), we have z¯ ≤ β∗(y) ≤ β∗(y) < 0. Furthermore, if
y¯A <∞, write β∗(y) = β∗(y) = z¯, for all y > y¯A. Set
β∗(0) = 0, β∗(0) = lim
y→0+
β∗(y),
and
β∗(y¯A) = lim
y→y¯A−
β∗(y), β∗(y¯A) = lim
y→y¯A+
β∗(y).
This defines two unique decreasing functions β∗, β∗ : R+ → [z¯, 0] which are ca`gla`d and ca`dla`g,
respectively, and they are left and right-continuous versions of each other.
Lemma 3.11. Let β∗ be given by Lemma 3.10, it follows that if limx→y− κA(x) = ∞ or
limx→y− κ′A(x) =∞, then limx→y− β∗(x) = z¯. Furthermore, we have
lim
y→0+
κA(y)
h
(
β∗(y)
) = 0 and lim
y→0+
κ′A(y)H
(
β∗(y)
)
= 0. (3.54)
Clearly, the function β∗ given in Lemma 3.10 satisfies all of the properties of an inter-
vention boundary that we were concerning. With this intervention boundary, the proposition
below provides an explicit expression for the value function which solves (3.20)–(3.23) with
associated boundary condition v(0, z) = A
∫ z
0 ψ(u) du, for all z ∈ [z¯, 0], Then as a conse-
quence, we will show that this intervention boundary characterises the optimal liquidation
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strategy. Before proceeding, we make a few comments on the optimal intervention boundary
and the associated optimal liquidation strategy. First of all, the non-increasing property of
the boundary essentially means that when the investor makes continuous sale, it is never
optimal to implement a trading speed which makes the current best bid price to be decreased.
In other words, the sell speed should be at most as large as the current speed of resilience.
Therefore, the possible constant parts in the intervention boundary represent the situation
that the current volatility risk 9 is too large so that it is optimal to sell as quick as possible in
order to reduce the stock position and hence the volatility risk. Moreover, jump parts in the
intervention boundary correspond to waiting in the optimal strategy. This can be interpreted
as that the current illiquidity cost 10 is relatively large, comparing to the volatility, thus it is
optimal to wait so that the best bid price increases to a level which is more preferred by the
investor.
Proposition 3.12. Let β = β∗ denote the largest solution to (3.53), and let γ−1β and ρ
−1
β be
the corresponding functions defined by (3.29) and (3.30). Then the function v : D → R given
by that for z > β(y),
v(y, z) =
∫ z−y
β(0+)
(
κA
(
γ−1β (u)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (u)
) +Aψ(ρ−1β (u))) du+A∫ β(0+)
0
ψ(u) du, (3.55)
and for z ≤ β(y),
v(y, z) = κA(y)H(z) +A
∫ z
0
ψ(u) du−
∫ y
0
(
κA(u)
h
(
β(u)
) +Aψ(β(u))+ κ′A(u)H(β(u))) du,
(3.56)
is a C0,1(D) solution to (3.20)–(3.23) with the boundary condition v(0, z) = A ∫ z0 ψ(u) du, for
all z ∈ [z¯, 0]. Moreover, D−y v(y, z) is ca`gla`d in y and continuous in z.
Note that (3.55)-(3.56) agree with (3.48) when y = 0. The following theorem verifies that
the function v given by (3.55)-(3.56) is equal to the value function V given by (3.19), and that
the strategy Y β corresponding to β characterised by (3.53) is an optimal liquidation strategy.
Hence, such a Y β provides a solution to the utility maximization problem in (3.12).
9With reference to (3.14),
∫∞
0
Yt− dLt represents the risk due to market volatility, and this integral corre-
sponds to the term
∫∞
0
κA(Yt) dt in the simplified optimisation problem (3.19).
10The illiquidity cost, or the price impact cost is described by F∞(Y ) in (3.14), and it corresponds to the
term
∫∞
0
h(ZYt )ψ(Z
Y
t ) dt in the simplified problem (3.19).
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Theorem 3.13. Denote the investor’s risk aversion by A, the initial unaffected price by b,
and by c the initial cash position. We take β as the largest solution to (3.53) and v to be
given by (3.55) and (3.56). Moreover, let V be given by (3.19). Then v = V on D and
sup
Y ∈A(y)
E
[
U
(
C∞(Y )
)]
= − exp
(
−A(c+ by) +A
∫ z−y
z
ψ(s) ds
)
exp
(
v(y, z)
)
,
where z = ZY0− is the initial state of the bid order book and y is the initial share position. The
optimal strategy Y ∗ is equal to Y β ∈ AD(y), where Y β is the strategy described in Lemma 3.8
corresponding to β with Y β0− = y.
3.4 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.7. With reference to the dynamic of ZY , we calculate that for z ≥ z¯,∫ ZYT
0
ψ(u) du =
∫ z
0
ψ(u) du+
∫ T
0
ψ(ZYt−) dY
c
t
−
∫ T
0
h(ZYt−)ψ(Z
Y
t−) dt+
∑
0≤t≤T
∫ ZYt−+4Yt
ZYt−
ψ(u) du
=
∫ z
0
ψ(u) du+
∫ T
0
ψ(ZYt−) dY
c
t
−
∫ T
0
h(ZYt−)ψ(Z
Y
t−) dt+
∑
0≤t≤T
∫ 4Yt
0
ψ
(
ZYt− + u
)
du.
Then,
FT (Y ) =
∫ T
0
ψ
(
ZYt−
)
dY ct +
∑
0≤t≤T
∫ 4Yt
0
ψ
(
ZYt− + x
)
dx
=
∫ ZYT
0
ψ(u) du−
∫ z
0
ψ(u) du+
∫ T
0
h(ZYt−)ψ(Z
Y
t−) dt
=
∫ ZYT
z
ψ(u) du+
∫ T
0
h(ZYt−)ψ(Z
Y
t−) dt.
Notice that for any admissible liquidation strategy Y , we have either Y and ZY get 0 at the
same time, or Y becomes 0 at some time s while ZYs < 0. In the second case, for all t > s,
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ZY satisfies
dZYt = −h(ZYt ) dt.
According to (3.9), we know that the solution to the above dynamic tends to 0, as t → ∞.
Therefore, ZYt → 0, as t → ∞ in any case. Then it follows from the above expression of
FT (Y ) that
F∞(Y ) =
∫ 0
z
ψ(u) du+
∫ ∞
0
h(ZYt−)ψ(Z
Y
t−) dt.
Proof of Lemma 3.8. We first prove that on any time interval I contained in [ tw, t¯ ] \
∪n∈I[tn, sn), there exists a unique solution to the dynamic (3.43). But on such I, the process
Y β does not cross any jump of β. Thus, in terms of the function β, we shall only focus on
those parts without jumps. Also, it is sufficient to consider Y starting from time 0 (rather
than starting at any time in [ tw, t¯ ] \ ∪n∈I[tn, sn)). Write Y 0t = Y0 > 0 and
Y k+1t = γ
−1
β
({
γβ(Y0)−
∫ t
0
h
(
β(Y ku )
)
du
}
∧ β(0+)
)
. (3.57)
Let T ∈ [0,∞). Then
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣β(Y k+1t )− β(Y kt ) ∣∣
= sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣{γβ(Y0)− ∫ t
0
h
(
β(Y ku )
)
du
}
∧ β(0+)−
{
γβ(Y0)−
∫ t
0
h
(
β(Y k−1u )
)
du
}
∧ β(0+)
+ γ−1β
({
γβ(Y0)−
∫ t
0
h
(
β(Y ku )
)
du
}
∧ β(0+)
)
− γ−1β
({
γβ(Y0)−
∫ t
0
h
(
β(Y k−1u )
)
du
}
∧ β(0+)
)∣∣∣∣
≤ 2 sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣ {γβ(Y0)− ∫ t
0
h
(
β(Y ku )
)
du
}
∧ β(0+)−
{
γβ(Y0)−
∫ t
0
h
(
β(Y k−1u )
)
du
}
∧ β(0+)
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2 sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
h
(
β(Y ku )
)− h(β(Y k−1u )) du ∣∣∣∣
≤ 2L
∫ T
0
∣∣∣β(Y ku )− β(Y k−1u ) ∣∣∣ du
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≤ 2L
∫ T
0
sup
0≤t≤u
∣∣∣β(Y kt )− β(Y k−1t ) ∣∣∣ du, (3.58)
where the first equality is because that when β has no jumps we have β
(
γ−1β (x)
)
= x+γ−1β (x),
the first inequality is due the triangle inequality and |γ−1β (x) − γ−1β (y)| ≤ |x − y|, and the
third inequality is followed from the boundedness of processes β(Y k) and β(Y k−1) and the
locally Lipschitz continuity of h with a Lipschitz constant L. By induction and with reference
to (3.58), it can be shown that
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣β(Y k+1t )− β(Y kt ) ∣∣ ≤ (2LT )kk! 2∣∣β(Y0)∣∣.
Taking k to infinity, we have that β(Y kt ) converges uniformly on [0, T ]. Define βt =
limk→∞ β(Y kt ), for t ∈ [0, T ]. Since T ∈ [0,∞) is arbitrary, it follows that βt = limk→∞ β(Y kt )
for all t ∈ [0,∞). With reference to (3.57), the dominated convergence theorem gives out that
for every t ∈ [0,∞), (Y kt )∞k=0 is convergent. We define Y βt = limk→∞ Y kt . It can be checked
that Y β decreases to 0. Then since β is continuous, we obtain βt = β(Y
β
t ), for all t ∈ [0,∞).
Therefore, by sending k to infinity in (3.57), since we only consider Y βt before time t¯, we have
that
Y βt = γ
−1
β
(
γβ(Y
β
0 )−
∫ t
0
h
(
β(Y βu )
)
du
)
, for t ≤ t¯.
This shows the existence of solution to the dynamic (3.43) on any time interval contained in
[ tw, t¯ ] \ ∪n∈I[tn, sn). For uniqueness, let’s assume that Y (1) and Y (2) satisfy (3.43), where
Y
(1)
t = Y
(2)
t for 0 ≤ t ≤ t1, and Y (1)t < Y (2)t for t1 < t < t2. Then for t1 < t < t2,
Y
(1)
t = γ
−1
β
(
γβ(Y
(1)
0 )−
∫ t
0
h
(
β(Y (1)u )
)
du
)
≥ γ−1β
(
γβ(Y
(2)
0 )−
∫ t
0
h
(
β(Y (2)u )
)
du
)
= Y
(2)
t ,
which contradicts the assumption that Y
(1)
t < Y
(2)
t for t1 < t < t2. So the uniqueness
holds. The existence and uniqueness of solution to the dynamic in (3.40) on any time interval
contained in [ tw, t¯ ] ∩ ∪n∈I[tn, sn) follow from the locally Lipschitz continuity of function h.
Now let Y β and ZY
β
be processes satisfying (3.39)–(3.45) with
(
Y β0−, Z
Y β
0−
)
= (y, z) ∈ D.
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Note that
(
Y βt , Z
Y β
t
) ∈ Gβ for all t ∈ [ tw, t¯ ]. We need to show (3.6) is satisfied. We first focus
on the case when t ≤ tw. Suppose z > β(y), i.e. tw = 0. Then in case (ii) (a),
Y β0 − Y β0− = β−1
(
ρ−1β (z − y)
)− y
= γ−1β (z − y)− y
=
(
z − y + γ−1β (z − y)
)− z
= ZY
β
0 − ZY
β
0− ,
where we have used the identity β−1
(
ρ−1β (z− y)
)
= γ−1β (z− y) which follows from (3.32) and
is valid under the condition of (ii) (a). In case (ii) (b), we obtain
ZY
β
0 − ZY
β
0− = β
(
γ−1β (z − y)
)− z
= z − y + γ−1β (z − y)− z
= γ−1β (z − y)− y
= Y β0 − Y β0−,
where β
(
γ−1β (z− y)
)
= ρ−1β (z− y) was used. Suppose z ≤ β(y), i.e. tw > 0. It can be checked
that ZY
β
t = H
−1(H(z)−t) has dynamic (3.40). Because Y βt is now constant, (3.6) is satisfied.
In the case when t > tw, Y
β
t and Z
Y β
t follow (3.39)–(3.45), which satisfy (3.6).
We next prove Y β is ca`dla`g and decreasing. Note that by the definitions of tn, sn, tw
and t¯ and (3.40), (3.43) and the first part of the proof, we have Y βt and Z
Y β
t are continuous
when (Y βt , Z
Y β
t ) is in each continuous part of the graph of β or β
−1, for t > 0. Also, each
initial condition associated with dynamics (3.40) and (3.43) is chosen to make Y βt and Z
Y β
t
to be continuous at tn, sn and tw when tw > 0. It can also be seen that Y
β and ZY
β
are
right continuous at t = 0. These together with the well-defined Y β0− and Z
Y β
0− imply that Y β
and ZY
β
are continuous for t > 0 and they are right-continuous with left-limit at t = 0. Y β
decreases to 0 follows from (3.39), (3.40), (3.43), and the first part of this proof.
Finally, ZY
β
t = H
−1(H(z)− t), for 0 ≤ t ≤ tw follows from (3.9).
Proof of Lemma 3.9. Let {yn}n∈I be the set of all points at which the intervention bound-
ary β is discontinuous. Consider a time interval [t, s] ⊆ [tn, sn) for some n ∈ I, where tn and
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sn are given by (3.37) and (3.38). With reference to (3.6), we note that formally,
dt = −dρβ
(
ZY
β
t
)
h
(
ZY
β
t
) ∀ t ∈ [tn, sn),
and hence, ∫ s
t
(
κA
(
Y βr
)
+Ah
(
ZY
β
r
)
ψ
(
ZY
β
r
))
dr
=
∫ t
s
(
κA
(
β−1(ZY βr )
)
h(ZY βr )
+Aψ
(
ZY
β
r
))
dρβ
(
ZY
β
r
)
=
∫ ρβ(ZY βt )
ρβ(ZY
β
s )
(
κA
(
γ−1β (u)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (u)
) +Aψ(ρ−1β (u))) du
=
∫ ZY βt −Y βtn
ZY
β
s −Y βsn
(
κA
(
γ−1β (u)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (u)
) +Aψ(ρ−1β (u))) du, (3.59)
where we have used the identity in (3.32). Similarly, since
dt = − dγβ
(
Y βt
)
h
(
β(Y βt )
) ∀ t ∈ [ tw, t¯ ] \ ∪n∈I[tn, sn),
applying (3.33), it can be calculated that on some time interval [s, t] ⊂ [ tw, t¯ ] \ ∪n∈I[tn, sn),
for some n ∈ I, ∫ t
s
(
κA
(
Y βr
)
+Ah
(
ZY
β
r
)
ψ
(
ZY
β
r
))
dr
=
∫ ZY βs −Y βs
ZY
β
t −Y βt
(
κA
(
γ−1β (u)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (u)
) +Aψ(ρ−1β (u))) du, (3.60)
Let tw < t¯. Suppose the number of tn and sn in the interval [ tw, t¯ ] is equal to m < ∞
(possibly m = 0). Consider r0 ≤ r1 < ... < rm < rm+1, where r0 = tw, rm+1 = t¯ and for
k = 1, ...,m, rk are equal to those tn, sn ∈ [ tw, t¯ ]. We assume r1, ..., rm are in an ascending
order. Then it follows from (3.59), (3.60) and the continuity of Y βt and Z
Y β
t when t > 0 that∫ t¯
tw
(
κA
(
Y βt
)
+Ah
(
ZY
β
t
)
ψ
(
ZY
β
t
))
dt
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=m∑
k=0
∫ rk+1
rk
(
κA
(
Y βt
)
+Ah
(
ZY
β
t
)
ψ
(
ZY
β
t
))
dt
=
∫ ZY βtw −Y βtw
ZY
β
t¯
(
κA
(
γ−1β (u)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (u)
) +Aψ(ρ−1β (u))) du.
Suppose there are infinitely many tn and sn in the interval [ tw, t¯ ]. Let r ∈ [ tw, t¯ ] be an
accumulative point of the sequence {tn}n∈I. Then with out loss of generality, consider a
subsequence {tnk}∞k=1 ⊂ [ tw, t¯ ] increases to r. Consider some time interval [t, s] in which r is
the only accumulative point of {tn}n∈I. Then, it follows that∫ s
t
(
κA
(
Y βt
)
+Ah
(
ZY
β
t
)
ψ
(
ZY
β
t
))
dt
= lim
n→∞
∫ tn
t
(
κA
(
Y βt
)
+Ah
(
ZY
β
t
)
ψ
(
ZY
β
t
))
dt+
∫ s
r
(
κA
(
Y βt
)
+Ah
(
ZY
β
t
)
ψ
(
ZY
β
t
))
dt
= lim
n→∞
∫ ZY βt −Y βt
ZY
β
tn
−Y βtn
(
κA
(
γ−1β (u)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (u)
) +Aψ(ρ−1β (u))) du
+
∫ ZY βr −Y βr
ZY
β
s −Y βs
(
κA
(
γ−1β (u)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (u)
) +Aψ(ρ−1β (u))) du,
=
∫ ZY βt −Y βt
ZY
β
s −Y βs
(
κA
(
γ−1β (u)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (u)
) +Aψ(ρ−1β (u))) du.
This implies that ∫ t¯
tw
(
κA
(
Y βt
)
+Ah
(
ZY
β
t
)
ψ
(
ZY
β
t
))
dt
=
∫ ZY βtw −Y βtw
ZY
β
t¯
(
κA
(
γ−1β (u)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (u)
) +Aψ(ρ−1β (u))) du.
Therefore the result follows from the above equality as well as (3.45) and (3.47).
Proof of Lemma 3.10. First notice that for any y ∈ (0, y¯A), Γ(x, y) is concave in x and
this concavity may not be strict. Observe that for y ∈ (0, y¯A),
lim
x→0−
Γ(x; y) = −∞.
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Also, Γ(x; y) ∈ R, for x ∈ [z¯, 0). These imply that z¯ ≤ β∗(y) ≤ β∗(y) < 0, for all 0 < y < y¯A.
The largest and smallest solution to (3.53) uniquely define the functions β∗ and β∗. For
0 < y < y +4 < y¯A and x ∈ [z¯, 0), we calculate that
d
dx
[
Γ(x; y +4)− Γ(x; y)
]
= −
(
κA(y +4)− κA(y)
)
h′(x)
h2(x)
+
κ′A(y +4)− κ′A(y)
h(x)
< 0,
(3.61)
since κA is convex and κ
′
A(u) > 0, for u > 0. We want to show that β
∗ and β∗ are decreasing
functions. In order to get a contradiction, suppose that there exists y ∈ (0, y¯A) and 4 > 0
such that β∗(y +4) > β∗(y). With reference to (3.61), we obtain
Γ
(
β∗(y +4); y +4)− Γ(β∗(y +4); y) < Γ(β∗(y); y +4)− Γ(β∗(y); y).
However, this contradicts the definitions of β∗ and β∗ which imply that
Γ
(
β∗(y +4); y +4) ≥ Γ(β∗(y); y +4) and Γ(β∗(y); y) ≥ Γ(β∗(y +4); y).
Therefore, for all 0 < y < y¯A,
β∗(y +4) ≤ β∗(y +4) ≤ β∗(y) ≤ β∗(y), (3.62)
and from which it follows that β∗ and β∗ are decreasing. By (3.52), we know that for z¯ ≤ x < 0,
Γ(x; y) is continuous in y. Then for y ∈ (0, y¯A), we have
Γ
(
β∗(y+); y+
)
= Γ
(
β∗(y+); y
) ≤ Γ(β∗(y); y) = Γ(β∗(y); y+)
Γ
(
β∗(y−); y) = Γ(β∗(y−); y−) ≥ Γ(β∗(y); y−) = Γ(β∗(y); y).
Since β∗ and β∗ are defined as the largest and smallest maximiser to (3.53) respectively, also
because β∗ and β∗ are decreasing, it follows that β∗(y+) = β∗(y) and β∗(y−) = β∗(y). By
monotonicity, right limit of β∗ and left limit of β∗ exist. Hence, we have proved that β∗ is
ca`gla`d and β∗ is ca`dla`g . The claim that β∗ is the ca`gla`d version of β∗ and that β∗ is the
ca`dla`g version of β∗ follows from (3.62).
Proof of Lemma 3.11. If y > y¯A, then by the definition of β
∗, it is certainly true that if
limx→y− κA(x) = ∞ or limx→y− κ′A(x) = ∞, then limx→y− β∗(x) = z¯. The rest case is for
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y = y¯A. We proof by contradiction and suppose β
∗(y¯A) > z¯. For any x ∈
(
z¯, β∗(y¯A)
)
and
y ∈ (0, y¯A) such that β∗(y) ≥ β∗(y¯A), we have
Aψ(x) ≤ A
(
ψ(x)− ψ(β∗(y)))
≤ κA(y)
(
1
h
(
β∗(y)
) − 1
h(x)
)
+ κ′A(y)
(
H
(
β∗(y)
)−H(x))
≤ κA(y)
(
1
h
(
β∗(y¯A)
) − 1
h(x)
)
+ κ′A(y)
(
H
(
β∗(y¯A)
)−H(x)).
Taking y to be arbitrarily close to y¯A implies ψ(x) = −∞. This means x < z¯ which contradicts
with x > z¯. Hence, we conclude that β∗(y¯A) = −∞.
Now we prove for (3.54). Note that if β∗(0+) < 0, then (3.54) is obviously true. However,
if β∗(0+) = 0, then
κA(y)
h
(
β∗(y)
) ≥ Γ(x; y)−Aψ(β∗(y))− κ′A(y)H(β∗(y)) ≥ Γ(x; y)− κ′A(y)H(β∗(y)),
from which it follows that for any x ∈ (z¯, 0),
0 ≥ lim inf
y→0+
κA(y)
h
(
β∗(y)
) ≥ Aψ(x)− lim sup
y→0+
κ′A(y)H
(
β∗(y)
)
, (3.63)
0 ≥ lim sup
y→0+
κA(y)
h
(
β∗(y)
) ≥ Aψ(x)− lim inf
y→0+
κ′A(y)H
(
β∗(y)
)
. (3.64)
Therefore,
0 ≥ lim sup
y→0+
κ′A(y)H
(
β∗(y)
) ≥ Aψ(x),
0 ≥ lim inf
y→0+
κ′A(y)H
(
β∗(y)
) ≥ Aψ(x).
Taking x to 0 and by (3.4), we get limy→0+ κ′A(y)H
(
β∗(y)
)
= 0. Also, by sending x to 0 in
(3.63) and (3.64), limy→0+
κA(y)
h(β∗(y)) = 0 therefore follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.12. To show v is continuous, we first prove it is finite. But with
reference to (3.47)-(3.51), it suffices to show that the function Jβ given by (3.46) is finite with
β defined by Lemma 3.10. By the continuity of Y β and ZY
β
after time 0 and condition (3.5),
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we have that there exists some s > 0 such that∫ s
0
(
κA
(
Y βt
)
+Ah
(
ZY
β
t
)
ψ
(
ZY
β
t
))
dt <∞ (3.65)
and Y βs < y¯A. According to the condition given by Lemma 3.11 that
lim
y→0+
κA(y)
h
(
β(y)
) = 0,
it follows that there exists C1 > 0 and 0 <  < y¯A such that
κA(y) ≤ −C1h
(
β(y)
)
, for all y ∈ [0, ].
Since ψ
(
ZY
β
t
)
is bounded for all t ≥ s (it increases to 0), this together with the above
inequality implies that∫ ∞
s
(
κA
(
Y βt
)
+Ah
(
ZY
β
t
)
ψ
(
ZY
β
t
))
dt ≤
∫ ∞
s
(
− C1h
(
β(Y βt )
)− C2h(ZY βt )) dt
≤
∫ ∞
s
(
− C1h
(
ZY
β
t
)− C2h(ZY βt )) dt
≤ (C1 + C2)
(
Y βs − ZY
β
s
)
<∞, (3.66)
where C2 > 0 is some constant. Therefore, (3.65) and (3.66) together show that v is finite.
Note that each expression given by (3.55) or (3.56) is continuous in y and z. It is therefore
sufficient to prove that v is continuous across Gβ. Write Ju(y, z) to be the expression of v(y, z)
given by (3.55), and let Jl(y, z) be the expression in (3.56). Suppose (y, z) is a point on the
graph of β, i.e, z = β(y). Consider a sequence of points (yn, zn)
∞
n=1 contained in Sβ \ Gβ,
converging to (y, z). With reference to (3.50) and(3.51), we calculate that
lim
n→∞ v(yn, zn) = Ju
(
y, β(y)
)
= Jl
(
y, β(y)
)
= v
(
y, β(y)
)
. (3.67)
If (y, z) lies on the graph of β−1, i.e, y = β−1(z), then using the property that β−1(u) =
β−1(z), for u ∈ (z, β(β−1(z))), direct calculation results (3.67). It therefore can be concluded
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that v is a continuous function. Differentiating v gives out
D−y v(y, z) = −
κA
(
γ−1β (z − y)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (z − y)
) −Aψ(ρ−1β (z − y)), z > β(y); (3.68)
vz(y, z) =
κA
(
γ−1β (z − y)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (z − y)
) +Aψ(ρ−1β (z − y)), z > β(y); (3.69)
D−y v(y, z) = κ
′
A(y)H(z)−
κA(y)
h
(
β(y)
) −Aψ(β(y))− κ′A(y)H(β(y)), z ≤ β(y); (3.70)
vz(y, z) =
κA(y)
h(z)
+Aψ(z), z ≤ β(y). (3.71)
These expressions are left-continuous with right limit in y and continuous in z (all of these
expressions are continuous at (0, 0), this is guaranteed by (3.54)). Also, it can be checked
that for any (yn, zn)
∞
n=1 ⊆ Sβ, (y, z) ∈ Gβ and limn→∞(yn, zn) = (y, z), we have vz(yn, zn)→
vz(y, z), as n → ∞. Further, limz→β(y)+D−y v(y, z) = D−y v
(
y, β(y)
)
. Therefore, we conclude
that vz(y, z) is continuous, and D
−
y v(y, z) is ca`gla`d in y but continuous in z.
Standard calculations show that v satisfies (3.20) and (3.22). When z = 0, (3.21) is clearly
true. For z 6= 0, in order to verify (3.21), we compute that when z > β(y),
h(z)vz(y, z)− κA(y)−Ah(z)ψ(z)
=h(z)
{
κA
(
γ−1β (s)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (s)
) − κA(z − s)
h(z)
+A
{
ψ
(
ρ−1β (s)
)− ψ(z)}}, (3.72)
where s = z − y. Observe that h(ρ−1β (s)) = 0 implies y = 0, but (3.20)–(3.23) are under
the condition of y > 0. So h
(
ρ−1β (s)
)
is non-zero. By the definition of γ−1β , we must have
γ−1β (s) ∈ (0, y¯A) if β(y¯A) = z¯, or γ−1β (s) ∈ (0, y¯A] if β(y¯A) > z¯. Then according to the limiting
behaviour of β in Lemma 3.11, κA
(
γ−1β (s)
)
must be finite, so is κ′A
(
γ−1β (s)
)
. However, κA(z−s)
may be infinite, but then it follows that (3.72) is negative. Otherwise, if κA(y) <∞, write
G(s; z) =
κA
(
γ−1β (s)
)
h
(
ρ−1β (s)
) − κA(z − s)
h(z)
+A
{
ψ
(
ρ−1β (s)
)− ψ(z)}.
Then in order to verify (3.21), it suffices to show G(s; z) ≥ 0, for all ρ−1β (s) < z < 0. G(s; y)
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can be rewritten as
G(s; z) =
[
Γ
(
ρ−1β (s); γ
−1
β (s)
)− Γ(z; γ−1β (s))]
− κ′A
(
γ−1β (s)
)[
H
(
ρ−1β (s)
))−H(z)]+ 1
h(z)
[
κA
(
γ−1β (s)
)− κA(z − s)], (3.73)
where Lemma 3.10 verifies
Γ
(
ρ−1β (s); γ
−1
β (s)
)− Γ(z; γ−1β (s)) ≥ 0. (3.74)
We calculate that
1
h(z)
[
κA
(
γ−1β (s)
)− κA(z − s)]− κ′A(γ−1β (s))[H(ρ−1β (s))−H(z)]
=
∫ z
ρ−1β (s)
([
κA(u− s)− κA
(
ρ−1β (s)− s
)]
h′(u)
h2(u)
+
κ′A
(
ρ−1β (s)− s
)− κ′A(u− s)
h(u)
)
du
≥ 0. (3.75)
Therefore, combining (3.73)–(3.75), (3.21) is verified. Furthermore, the definition of β yields
D−y v(y, z) + vz(y, z) = κ
′
A(y)H(z)−
κA(y)
h
(
β(y)
) +Aψ(z − y)−Aψ(β(y))
− κ′A(y)H
(
β(y)
)
+
κA(y)
h(z)
+Aψ(z)−Aψ(z − y)
= Γ(z; y)− Γ(β(y); y)
≤ 0.
This verifies that (3.23) is true.
Finally, the boundary condition is satisfied by (3.55), because for any u ∈ [β(0+), z], we
have γ−1β (u) = 0 and ρ
−1
β (u) = u; and it is trivially satisfied by (3.56).
Proof of Theorem 3.13. Let δ be a positive-valued C∞(R) function with support on [0, 1]
satisfying
∫ 1
0 δ(x) dx = 1, and define a sequence of functions {δn}∞n=1 by
δn(s) = n δ(ns), s ≥ 0.
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We mollify v to obtain a sequence of functions {v(n)}∞n=1 which are given by
v(n)(y, z) =
∫ 1
0
v(y − s, z) δn(s) ds.
(One may extend the lower bound of the domain of v(·, z) properly so that v(n) is well-defined
at y = 0.) Then v(n) ∈ C1,1(D), for all n ∈ N, and
v(y, z) = lim
n→∞ v
(n)(y, z),
vz(y, z) = lim
n→∞ v
(n)
z (y, z),
D−y v(y, z) = limn→∞ v
(n)
y (y, z),
where the last equality is due to D−y v(y, z) being ca`gla`d in y. Moreover, for every (y0, z0) ∈ D
there exists a K > 0 such that on the set
{
(y, z) ∈ D ∣∣ z ≥ y + z0 − y0 },v(n)(y, z) ≤ K, n ∈ N, (3.76)v(n)y (y, z) ≤ K, n ∈ N, (3.77)v(n)z (y, z) ≤ K, n ∈ N. (3.78)
(If Y is admissible and (Y0−, ZY0−) = (y0, z0), then (Yt, ZYt ) ∈
{
(y, z) ∈ D ∣∣ z ≥ y + z0 − y0 },
for all t ≥ 0.) By Itoˆ’s formula, we compute that
v(n)
(
YT , Z
Y
T
)
+
∫ T
0
(
κA
(
Yt−
)
+Ah
(
ZYt−
)
ψ
(
ZYt−
))
dt
= v(n)(y, z) +
∫ T
0
(
v(n)y (Yt−, Z
Y
t−) + v
(n)
z (Yt−, Z
Y
t−)
)
dY ct
+
∫ T
0
(
κA
(
Yt−
)
+Ah
(
ZYt−
)
ψ
(
ZYt−
)− v(n)z (Yt−, ZYt−)h(ZYt−)) dt
+
∑
0≤t≤T
{
v(n)
(
Yt− +4Yt, ZYt− +4Yt
)− v(n)(Yt−, ZYt−)}, (3.79)
for all Y ∈ AD(y). Observe that for t ≥ 0,
0 ≤ −
∫ t
0
h
(
ZYu
)
du = ZYt − Yt − ZY0 + Y0 ≤ y − z.
108
Then, with reference to (3.76)–(3.78), we have∫ ∞
0
sup
n∈N
v(n)z (Yt−, ZYt−)h(ZYt−) dt ≤ K(y − z).
Similarly, ∫ ∞
0
sup
n∈N
v(n)y (Yt−, ZYt−)+ v(n)z (Yt−, ZYt−) d(−Y ct ) ≤ 2Ky
and ∑
0≤t
sup
n∈N
v(n)(Yt− +4Yt, ZYt− +4Yt)− v(n)(Yt−, ZYt−) ≤ 2Ky.
Hence, by (3.79) and the boundary condition v(0, z) = A
∫ z
0 ψ(u) du, the dominated conver-
gence theorem gives out that for any Y ∈ AD(y),∫ ∞
0
(
κA
(
Yt−
)
+Ah
(
ZYt−
)
ψ
(
ZYt−
))
dt
= v(y, z) +
∫ ∞
0
(
D−y v
(
Yt−, ZYt−
)
+ vz
(
Yt−, ZYt−
))
dY ct
+
∫ ∞
0
(
κA
(
Yt−
)
+Ah
(
ZYt−
)
ψ
(
ZYt−
)− vz(Yt−, ZYt−)h(ZYt−)) dt
+
∑
t≥0
{
v
(
Yt− +4Yt, ZYt− +4Yt
)− v(Yt−, ZYt−)}, (3.80)
as n→∞ and T →∞. According to Proposition 3.12, v satisfies (3.20)–(3.23), and therefore,∫ ∞
0
(
κA
(
Yt−
)
+Ah
(
ZYt−
)
ψ
(
ZYt−
))
dt ≥ v(y, z). (3.81)
Hence, V ≥ v.
From from (3.65)-(3.66), we know that with β being the largest solution to (3.53) and Y β
being the strategy described in Lemma 3.8 corresponding to β, Y β is admissible, in particular
(3.3) is satisfied. Therefore, with reference to (3.81), in order to complete the proof, we need
to show that (3.81) holds with equality for Y β. Observe that 4Y β < 0 only if t = 0 and
z > β(y). But by (3.20) and Proposition 3.12, we have that D−y v(y, z) + vz(y, z) = 0, for
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z > β(y). Therefore,
∑
t≥0
{
v
(
Y βt− +4Y βt , ZY
β
t− +4Y βt
)− v(Y βt−, ZY βt− )} = 0.
For any z ≤ 0, if 0 ≤ t ≤ tw, where tw is defined by (3.35), then d
(
Y βt
)c
= 0, hence∫ tw
0
(
D−y v
(
Y βt−, Z
Y β
t−
)
+ vz
(
Y βt−, Z
Y β
t−
))
d
(
Y βt
)c
= 0;
if t > tw, then
(
Y βt , Z
Y β
t
) ∈ Gβ, which implies∫ ∞
tw
(
D−y v
(
Y βt−, Z
Y β
t−
)
+ vz
(
Y βt−, Z
Y β
t−
))
d(Y βt )
c = 0.
Finally we have∫ ∞
0
(
κA
(
Y βt−
)
+Ah
(
ZY
β
t−
)
ψ
(
ZY
β
t−
)− vz(Y βt−, ZY βt− )h(ZY βt− )) dt = 0,
since the integrand is equal to 0, for all
(
Y βt , Z
Y β
t
) ∈ Wβ, and the Lebesgue measure of
time taken when
(
Y βt , Z
Y β
t
) ∈ Sβs \ Gβ is 0. With reference to (3.80), we therefore conclude
that v = V and that Y ∗ = Y β ∈ AD(y) is an admissible optimal liquidation strategy for
the optimization problem (3.19), and the result follows from (3.17) as well the analysis after
(1.11).
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Part II
Contracted Liquidation
This part is based on a joint work with Prof. Mihail Zervos.
Chapter 4
Optimal liquidation with a
contractual agreement
4.1 Contracted liquidation model
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space which supports a one dimensional, standard
Brownian motion B. Let F = (Ft)t≥0 be the filtration generated by this Brownian motion,
and we assume that F satisfies the usual conditions.
We study a market with a single stock, and this market terminates at some finite time T .
We consider an investor who aims to sell a large amount of shares of this stock within a given
finite time. Denote by Y the investor’s stock position process, i.e. Yt is the number of shares
held by this investor at time t, and by ξ the associated trading speed process which will be
referred to as the liquidation strategy in the sequel. Define the set of admissible liquidation
strategies as follows.
Definition 4.1. Given an initial stock position y > 0 and a terminal time of liquidation
T ∈ (0, T ], let ξ be an F-adapted, ca`dla`g and positive-valued liquidation speed process with
finite variation such that the associated stock position process Y satisfies
Yt = y −
∫ t
0
ξt dt ≥ 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
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and
YT = 0.
Write A(T, y) as the set of all admissible liquidation strategies ξ satisfying the above condi-
tions. Denote the set of all deterministic admissible liquidation strategies by AD(T, y).
It follows from the above definition that for any ξ ∈ A(T, y), the associated stock position
process Y is F-adapted, positive and decreasing, and we have the constraint that∫ T
0
ξs ds = y.
Note that it might be the case that there exists some s ∈ (0, T ) such that Yt = 0, for all
t ∈ [s, T ].
If the investor doesn’t trade, we suppose the stock price is described by
s+ σBt, t ≥ 0,
where s, σ > 0 are the initial stock price and the volatility parameter, respectively. Since the
trading volume from this investor is large, due to a lack of enough liquidity in the market,
the stock price drops down during the investor’s sale. Throughout this chapter, we adopt an
Almgren-Chriss type of liquidation model (Almgren and Chriss, 1999, 2000) with absence of
the permanent price impact and a general temporary impact being concerned. Precisely, we
assume that the affected stock price process S is given by
St = s+ σBt − F (ξt), t ≥ 0,
where the function F : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) describes the price impact in response to the investor’s
trading speed (i.e. the temporary price impact). Conditions on F will be specified at the end
of this section.
In our model interest rate is negligible. This a usual convention for a liquidation model,
since in practice liquidation can usually complete in a very short time period. Therefore, if
the investor is liquidating shares following some ξ ∈ A(T, y), the proceeds she receives up to
time t is given by∫ t
0
Suξu du = s(y − Yt)− σBtYt + σ
∫ t
0
Yu dBu −
∫ t
0
ξuF (ξu) du.
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In particular, at the final time of liquidation she receives totally∫ T
0
Suξu du = sy + σ
∫ T
0
Yt dBt −
∫ T
0
ξtF (ξt) dt. (4.1)
The constant sy is the marked-to-market total wealth of the investor at the beginning of
liquidation. The stochastic integral
∫ T
0 Yt dBt represents the volatility risk encountered by
the investor. The total price impact cost is given by the term
∫ T
0 ξtF (ξt) dt.
Now let’s suppose the investor is not able to access to the market, and therefore a broker is
hired to sell shares. In order to study the interaction between the investor and the broker, we
consider a principal-agent problem based on the liquidation problem. From now on, we shall
call this investor as the principal (she) and this broker as the agent (he). The agent liquidates
shares on behalf of the principal under some contractual agreement. The contract specifies
the initial liquidation position, the required terminal time of liquidation and the liquidation
strategy that the agent is expected to follow; moreover, manners of paying liquidation proceeds
and compensation to each other are also written in the contract. The principal may not be
able to observe the actual strategy that the agent implements, and hence the agent may have
opportunity to generate some private benefit. We try to find the optimal contract offered
by the principal as well as the associated liquidation strategy implemented by the agent.
Mathematically, we consider the following agent’s problem
sup
ξ
E
[
UA
(
compensation + private benefit − cost ) ] ≥ A¯,
where UA is the agent’s utility function, ξ is the implemented liquidation strategy, the term
cost indicates any implementation cost which is in addition to the price impact cost, and
A¯ is some constant denoting the agent’s participation constraint. The implementation cost
is described by some function H : [0,∞) → [0,∞). This function takes liquidation speeds
as inputs. Assumptions on H will be specified at the end of this section. We assume that
A¯ ≥ UA(0) so that the agent only takes any work which can bring him more benefits than
doing nothing. The principal’s problem is
sup
ξ˜, compensation
E
[
UP
(
proceeds − compensation ) ],
where UP is the her utility function and ξ˜ is the liquidation strategy recommended by her.
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Throughout this chapter, the principal is assumed to have a constant absolutely risk aversion
(CARA), and the agent is risk-neutral, i.e. we take
UP (x) = − exp(−γx) and UA(x) = x,
where γ > 0 denotes the principal’s risk aversion.
We list some conditions on the price impact function F : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) and the imple-
mentation cost function H : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) as follows.
Condition
(I) The function x 7→ xF (x) is strictly convex with F (0) = 0; if H is non-zero, then it is
strictly convex with H(0) = 0.
(II) F ′ is decreasing.
(III) The function (H ′+F )/F ′ has linear growth, i.e. there exists some constant K > 0 such
that (H ′(x) + F (x))/F ′(x) ≤ K(1 + x), for all x ≥ 0.
(IV) There exists some constant K > 0 such that (H ′(x) +F (x))/F ′(x) = Kx, for all x ≥ 0.
For future references, notice that Condition (I) implies that F is strictly increasing and
limx→0 xF ′(x) = limx→0 x2F ′(x) = 0; Condition (I) and (IV) together imply that x 7→ x2F ′(x)
is strictly increasing and limx→∞ x2F ′(x) = ∞. We group these conditions into different as-
sumptions which will be used in the sequel.
Assumption
(I) F,H ∈ C1((0,∞)), and they satisfy Condition (I).
(II) F and H satisfy Condition (I), (II) and (III).
(II) F,H ∈ C2((0,∞)), and they satisfy Condition (I), (II) and (IV).
These assumptions are satisfied by a large class of functions. For example,
F (x) = β1x
β2 and H(x) = β3x
β4 ,
with β1 > 0 and β3 ≥ 0, and Assumption (I) is satisfied if β2 > 0 and β4 > 1; Assumption
(II) is satisfied if β4 − β2 ≤ 1; and Assumption (III) is satisfied if β4 − β2 = 1. We refer to
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Almgren (2003) for a theoretical study when F takes the above form, and refer to Almgren
et al. (2005) and Lillo et al. (2003) for some empirical studies about the price impact function
with the above form.
4.2 First-best contract
In this section, we impose Assumption (I) and assume that the principal and the agent share
the same information. The agent has to follow any liquidation strategy recommended by the
principal. At the terminal time of liquidation, the agent delivers the total proceeds received
from the sale to the principal, and he receives a compensation paid by the principal 11 .
For a general approach to contimuous-time first-best contracts with lump-sum payments, see
Cvitanic´ et al. (2006). Let CT be an FT -measurable random variable which denotes the
compensation paid at some terminal time of liquidation T ≤ T . We formulate the principal’s
problem as
sup
ξ∈A(T,y), CT
E
[
− exp
{
− γ
(∫ T
0
Stξt dt− CT
)}]
, (4.2)
subject to
E
[
CT −
∫ T
0
H(ξt) dt
]
≥ A¯, (4.3)
where A¯ ≥ 0.
Proposition 4.2. The optimal liquidation strategy for problem (4.2)-(4.3) is given by
ξ∗t =
y
T
, t ∈ [0, T ],
and the optimal compensation is
C∗T = A¯+ TH(y/T ) + σy
∫ T
0
(1− t/T ) dBt.
We see that although the principal is risk averse, the optimal liquidation strategy is a
trivial strategy which takes no care about the market volatility risk. This kind of strategy is
11A stream form of compensation may also be considered, but in the absence of interest rate, a stream of
compensation is equivalent to a compensation in a lump-sum form.
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usually optimal for a risk-neutral investor (see e.g. Almgren and Chriss, 2000). The principal
optimally choices a trivial strategy which is because that she can transfer all market volatility
risk to the risk-neutral agent via the term σ
∫ T
0 y(1− t/T ) dBt in the optimal compensation.
The principal also pays the agent a fixed amount of money A¯ which ensures the agent’s
minimal requirement is satisfied. The agent’s implementation cost TH(y/T ) is completely
covered by the principal. As a result, the principal is guaranteed to receive
sy − A¯− F (y/T )y − TH(y/T ),
which corresponds to the initial mark-to-market wealth minus the agent’s commission charge,
the price impact cost as well as the agent’s implementation cost; and the agent receives
A¯+ σy
∫ T
0
(1− t/T ) dBt,
which corresponds to the commission fee and the market volatility cost.
4.3 Second-best contract
In practice, the principal may only observe the affected stock price but not the actual strategy
implemented by the agent. The agent may also have his private time horizon for completing
the liquidation. Throughout this section, we suppose that the principal observes the affected
stock price until the terminal time of liquidation required by her, and we denote this time
by T ≤ T . We also suppose that the principal asks for a liquidation proceeds calculated
according to some strategy recommended by her against the affected stock price she observes.
She requires to receive this proceeds at time T , and at the same time she pays the agent
amount of compensation denoted by CT . We refer to Cvitanic´ et al. (2009) for a general
approach to continuous-time second-best contracts with lump-sum payments. Due to the
unobservable implemented strategy for the principal and in order to generate some private
benefit, the agent can actually follow any strategy which is different from the recommended
one and cannot be detected by the principal. However, we assume that even without any
supervision, the principal expects the agent to follow her recommendation. Therefore, she
has to select an optimal contract which induces the agent to implement the recommended
strategy as his optimal choice.
116
Definition 4.3. Any contract is incentive compatible, if with this contract the agent’s optimal
implemented strategy, if it exists, is identical to the principal’s recommendation.
To design an incentive compatible contract, write ξ˜ to be the principal’s recommended
liquidation strategy, ξ to be the agent’s implemented liquidation strategy and Y˜ and Y to
be the corresponding stock position processes. The stock price is affected by ξ, and we recall
that it satisfies
St = s+ σBt − F (ξt), t ≥ 0.
Note that if ξ0 is different from 0, then the affected price process has a jump at the beginning
of liquidation. Also, S has jumps whenever ξ has. Therefore, for any given ξ˜, in order to avoid
the principal’s perceiving of cheating, the agent can only take ξ to be such that ξ0 = ξ˜0 and
ξ has the same jumps as ξ˜. Denote by FS = (FSt )t≥0 the filtration generated by S, and we
assume it satisfies the usual conditions. This filtration captures all of the information accessed
by the principal, while the Brownian filtration F = (F)t≥0 contains all of the information
available to the agent. We have that for any t ≥ 0, FSt ⊆ Ft, which indicates that the agent
is more knowledgeable than the principal, because of his private liquidation strategy ξ. The
next definition defines formally the recommended and implemented strategies.
Definition 4.4.
(i) The set of all principal’s recommended liquidation strategies, denoted by AR(T, y),
consists of all ξ˜ ∈ A(T, y) such that ξ˜ is FS-adapted.
(ii) Given any ξ˜ ∈ AR(T, y), the set of all agent’s implemented liquidation strategies, de-
noted by AI(T , y; ξ˜), consists of all ξ ∈ A(T , y) such that ξ0 = ξ˜0 and ξ has the same
jumps as ξ˜.
Remark 4.5. Denote by TA ≤ T the agent’s private time horizon for completing the liqui-
dation. Then his actual set of admissible strategy should be AI(TA, y; ξ˜) which is a subset
of AI(T , y; ξ˜). For any incentive compatible contract with a recommended strategy ξ˜ satis-
fying ξ˜t > 0, for some t > T
A, the agent is not able to implement such ξ˜ and hence will
not sign such contract. The principal therefore does not need to concern about this case.
Otherwise, ξ˜ should be the agent’s optimal choice among the set AI(TA, y; ξ˜). But since
AI(TA, y; ξ˜) ⊆ AI(T , y; ξ˜), it is sufficient for the principal to concern that the agent chooses
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ξ˜ as his optimal implemented strategy over the set AI(T , y; ξ˜). Consequently, the principal
does not need to concern about TA at all.
For any ξ˜ ∈ AR(T, y) and ξ ∈ AI(T , y; ξ˜), the agent’s expected private benefit at time T
can be expressed as
∫ T
0
Stξt dt−
∫ T
0
Stξ˜t dt+ E
[ ∫ T
T
Stξt dt−
∫ T
T
H(ξt) dt
∣∣∣∣FT],
which corresponds to the difference between the proceeds got from the sale and the money
delivered to the principal at time T , plus the expected money received (taking away the
implemented cost) by liquidating the amount of shares left at time T (if YT > 0). The above
expression can be rewritten as
σ
∫ T
0
(
Yt − Y˜t
)
dBt +
∫ T
0
F (ξt)(ξ˜t − ξt) dt− Γ(YT ), (4.4)
where
Γ(YT ) = E
[ ∫ T
T
(
ξtF (ξt) +H(ξt)
)
dt
∣∣∣∣FT],
which is FT -measurable and it satisfies Γ(YT ) ≥ 0 and Γ(0) = 0.
4.3.1 Agent’s problem
In this subsection, we impose Assumtion (II). Base on the assumption that the principal looks
for an optimal incentive compatible contract, we first derive heuristically an admissible form
of compensation. According to this, we state a formal definition of admissible contracts. Then
we study sufficient condition for an admissible contract to be incentive compatible. Finally
the set of admissible incentive compatible contracts will be defined.
Given any ξ˜ ∈ AR(T, y) and some FST -measurable compensation CT , with reference to
Remark 4.5 and the expression of private benefit in (4.4), the agent’s problem is
sup
ξ∈AI(T ,y;ξ˜)
E
[
CT +
(
σ
∫ T
0
(
Yt − Y˜t
)
dBt +
∫ T
0
F (ξt)(ξ˜t − ξt)dt− Γ(YT )
)
−
∫ T
0
H(ξt)dt
]
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= sup
ξ∈AI(T ,y;ξ˜)
E
[
CT +
∫ T
0
{
F (ξt)(ξ˜t − ξt)−H(ξt)
}
dt− Γ(YT )
]
≥ A¯,
(4.5)
where A¯ ≥ 0. Suppose
E
[ ∣∣∣∣CT + ∫ T
0
{
F (ξt)(ξ˜t − ξt)−H(ξt)
}
dt− Γ(YT )
∣∣∣∣ ] <∞,
and write
Ut = E
[
CT +
∫ T
0
{
F (ξt)(ξ˜t − ξt)−H(ξt)
}
dt− Γ(YT )
∣∣∣∣Ft].
By a martingale representation theorem, we have that
CT = U0 −
∫ T
0
{
F (ξt)(ξ˜t − ξt)−H(ξt)
}
dt+
∫ T
0
σZˆt dBt + Γ(YT )
= U0 −
∫ T
0
{
F (ξt)(ξ˜t − ξt)−H(ξt)
}
dt+
∫ T
0
Zˆt d
(
St + F (ξt)
)
+ Γ(YT ),
where Zˆ is an F-progressively measurable process satisfying
∫ T
0 Zˆ
2
t dt < ∞ a.s. Since the
principal expects the agent to implement ξ˜ ∈ AR(T, y), motivated by the above expression,
we consider any compensation with the form
CT = c+
∫ T
0
H(ξ˜t) dt+
∫ T
0
Zt d
(
St + F (ξ˜t)
)
, (4.6)
where c ∈ R, ξ˜ ∈ AR(T, y), and Z satisfies ∫ T0 Z2t dt <∞ a.s. and is F-adapted. Note that CT
in (4.6) is FST -measurable, and for any given c, ξ˜ and Z, CT can be considered as a random
function of ξ. Now we are in the position of defining admissible contracts.
Definition 4.6. Any admissible contract is the multiplet
(
T, y, c, ξ˜, Z
)
, where
(i) T ∈ (0, T ] is the principal’s time horizon;
(ii) y > 0 is the initial liquidation position;
(iii) c ∈ R is some reservation compensation;
(iv) ξ˜ ∈ AR(T, y) is the recommended liquidation strategy;
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(v) Z is the sensitivity of the compensation with respect to the affected stock price’s ran-
domness, it is F-adapted and satisfies
∫ T
0 Z
2
t dt <∞ a.s.
Therefore, the associated compensation CT is given by (4.6).
The following result gives out a motivation for the definition of admissible incentive com-
patible contracts.
Proposition 4.7. Let
(
T, y, c, ξ˜, Z
)
be an admissible contract such that
c ≥ A¯ and ξ˜T = 0,
and the process Z admits the dynamic
dZt =
1
F ′(ξ˜t)
[
F (ξ˜t) +H
′(ξ˜t)
]
dt, t ∈ (0, T ], (4.7)
with
Z0 = z ∈ R and ZT ≥ 0.
Such Z is increasing and bounded. It follows that the agent’s unique optimal implemented
liquidation strategy for problem (4.5) is ξ˜, and his optimal expected payoff is c.
Definition 4.8. Any admissible incentive compatible contract is an admissible contract(
T, y, A¯, ξ˜, Z
)
satisfying the condition of Proposition 4.7.
One can check that with the above definition and in view of Remark 4.5,
(
T, y, A¯, ξ˜, Z
)
is indeed incentive compatible. In particular, if ξ˜t > 0 for some t > T
A, then the agent is not
able to implement the unique optimal strategy ξ˜. Therefore his optimal expected payoff with
respect to the set AI(TA, y; ξ˜) is strictly less than A¯, and hence he will not sign this contract.
Otherwise the incentive compatibility is guaranteed by Proposition 4.7 and ξ˜ is indeed in
AI(TA, y; ξ˜).
4.3.2 Principal’s problem
We formulate the principal’s problem under Assumption (II) which guarantees Definition 4.8
to be well-defined. Having the set of admissible incentive compatible contracts, the principal
tries to solve
sup
ξ˜,CT
E
[
− exp
{
−γ
(∫ T
0
S˜tξ˜t dt− CT
)}]
, (4.8)
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where γ > 0 is the parameter of risk aversion and S˜ is the stock price affected by ξ˜, which
admits the expression
S˜t = s+ σBt − F (ξ˜t), t ≥ 0. (4.9)
Note that it suffices to solve problem (4.8) without the constraint ξ˜T = 0 for any admissible
incentive compatible contract. This is because that this constraint is only at time T which is
of Lebesgue measure 0. Then using the expressions in (4.1), (4.4), (4.6) and (4.9), we consider
inf
z∈R, ξ˜∈A(T ;y)
E
[
exp
(
−γ
∫ T
0
S˜tξ˜t dt+ γA¯+ γ
∫ T
0
H(ξ˜t) dt+ γσ
∫ T
0
Zt dBt
)]
= inf
z∈R, ξ˜∈A(T ;y)
E
[
exp
{
γ
(
A¯− sy)+ γσ ∫ T
0
(
Zt − Y˜t
)
dBt + γ
∫ T
0
(
H(ξ˜t) + ξ˜tF (ξ˜t)
)
dt
}]
.
Then, it is sufficient to look at
inf
z∈R, ξ˜∈A(T ;y)
E
[
exp
{
γσ
∫ T
0
(
Zt − Y˜t
)
dBt + γ
∫ T
0
(
H(ξ˜t) + ξ˜tF (ξ˜t)
)
dt
}]
,
with dynamics
dZt =
1
F ′(ξ˜t)
[
F (ξ˜t) +H
′(ξ˜t)
]
dt, Z0 = z, ZT ≥ 0,
dY˜t = −ξ˜t dt, Y˜0 = y.
Write X = Z − Y˜ . Then this problem is equivalent to
inf
x∈R, ξ˜∈A(T ;y)
E
[
exp
{
γσ
∫ T
0
Xt dBt + γ
∫ T
0
(
H(ξ˜t) + ξ˜tF (ξ˜t)
)
dt
}]
(4.10)
with
dXt =
(
1
F ′(ξ˜t)
[
F (ξ˜t) +H
′(ξ˜t)
]
+ ξ˜t
)
dt, X0 = x, XT ≥ 0,
where x = z − y.
We next show that problem (4.10) can be reduced to be a deterministic optimisation
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problem. A similar reduction is in Schied et al. (2010). To this end, for t ∈ [0, T ], write
MXt = γσ
∫ t
0
Xs dBs
and
E(MX)t = exp
(
MXt −
1
2
[MX ,MX ]t
)
,
where [MX ,MX ] is the quadratic variation process of MX . Since X is bounded, Novikov’s
condition is satisfied by MX . As a result, we can define a probability measure PX , which is
equivalent to P, via
dPX
dP
= E(MX)T . (4.11)
Then following (4.10), we compute that
inf
x∈R, ξ˜∈A(T ;y)
E
[
exp
{
γσ
∫ T
0
Xt dBt + γ
∫ T
0
(
H(ξ˜t) + ξ˜tF (ξ˜t)
)
dt
}]
= inf
x∈R, ξ˜∈A(T ;y)
E
[
exp
{
γσ
∫ T
0
Xt dBt − 1
2
∫ T
0
γ2σ2X2t dt
}
×
× exp
{
1
2
∫ T
0
γ2σ2X2t dt+ γ
∫ T
0
(
H(ξ˜t) + ξ˜tF (ξ˜t)
)
dt
}]
= inf
x∈R, ξ˜∈A(T ;y)
EX
[
exp
{∫ T
0
(
1
2
γ2σ2X2t + γH(ξ˜t) + γξ˜tF (ξ˜t)
)
dt
}]
≤ inf
x∈R, ξ˜∈AD(T ;y)
exp
{∫ T
0
(
1
2
γ2σ2X2t + γH(ξ˜t) + γξ˜tF (ξ˜t)
)
dt
}
, (4.12)
where the last expectation is with respect to the probability measure defined by (4.11). Then
with reference to the analysis after (1.11), it suffices to solve
inf
x∈R
V (T, x; y) (4.13)
with
V (T, x; y) = inf
ξ˜∈AD(T,y)
∫ T
0
(
1
2
γ2σ2X2t + γH(ξ˜t) + γξ˜tF (ξ˜t)
)
dt, (4.14)
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where T ∈ (0, T ], y > 0 and X satisfies
dXt =
(
1
F ′(ξ˜t)
[
F (ξ˜t) +H
′(ξ˜t)
]
+ ξ˜t
)
dt, X0 = x, XT ≥ 0. (4.15)
4.3.3 Solution to principal’s problem
In order to solve the principal’s problem, we impose Assumption (III) under which we can
write
1
F ′(ξ)
[
F (ξ) +H ′(ξ)
]
+ ξ = ηξ,
for some constant η > 1. By writing θt = ηξ˜t, problem (4.14)-(4.15) is equivalent to
V (T, x; y) = inf
θ
η
∈AD(T,y)
∫ T
0
(
1
2
γ2σ2X2t + γH(θt/η) + γF (θt/η)θt/η
)
dt (4.16)
with
dXt = θt dt, X0 = x, (4.17)
where the constraints y =
∫ T
0 ξ˜t dt and XT ≥ 0 are equivalent to
XT = x+ ηy ≥ 0.
Proposition 4.9. V (T, x; y) is convex in x, and it attains a global minimum at x = −ηy/2
for all T ∈ (0, T ] and y > 0.
According to Proposition 4.9, it suffices to take
x = −ηy/2,
therefore,
XT = ηy/2 > 0.
Note that these values are independent of the time horizon for liquidation.
Observe that (4.16)-(4.17) is a standard problem of calculus of variations, where the
objective functional is time-homogeneous. Therefore, according to the theory of calculus of
variations, one natural way to solve this problem is by considering the Beltrami identity
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which is a first order ordinary differential equation characterising the optimiser under certain
conditions (see, e.g, Gelfand and Fomin, 2000). Let θ∗ and X∗ be respectively the candidate
of the optimiser and its associated state process. Then, the Beltrami identity associated with
problem (4.16)-(4.17) is
1
2
γ2σ2(X∗t )
2 + γH(θ∗t /η)− γH ′(θ∗t /η)θ∗t /η − γF ′(θ∗t /η)(θ∗t /η)2 ≡ −KT,x, t ∈ [0, T ],
where KT,x is some constant determined by T and x. After rearranging terms, we get
1
γ
(1
2
γ2σ2(X∗t )
2 +KT,x
)
= Φ(θ∗t /η),
where Φ : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) is given by
Φ(u) = H ′(u)u−H(u) + F ′(u)u2.
With reference to Condition (I) and (IV), it can be checked that Φ is a strictly increasing
function with Φ(0) = 0. Define Ψ : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) to be the inverse of Φ, then Ψ is a strictly
increasing function with Ψ(0) = 0. It follows therefore
θ∗t = ηΨ
(
γ2σ2(X∗t )2 + 2KT,x
2γ
)
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.18)
Note that it must hold that
KT,x ≥ − min
t∈[0,T ]
1
2
γ2σ2(X∗t )
2,
and with x = −ηy/2 and X∗T = ηy/2, we must have KT,x ≥ 0. Then integrating (4.18) yields∫ X∗t
−ηy/2
1
ηΨ
(
γ2σ2u2+2KT,x
2γ
) du = t. (4.19)
Sending t to T , we get ∫ ηy/2
−ηy/2
1
ηΨ
(
γ2σ2u2+2KT,x
2γ
) du = T. (4.20)
124
For any fixed y, consider the function T y(·) defined by
T y(K) =
∫ ηy/2
−ηy/2
1
ηΨ
(
γ2σ2u2+2K
2γ
) du, K ≥ 0. (4.21)
Since Ψ is a continuous strictly increasing function, by the monotone convergence theorem,
T y(·) is a strictly decreasing function, hence invertible. As a result, for any finite T such that
T ≤ supK T y(K), there is a unique KT,y satisfying (4.20). However if supK T y(K) < T <∞,
then one may let θ∗t = 0 over a period of time, and in this case, KT,x = arg maxK T y(K) = 0.
The next definition defines formally the candidate of the optimal state process for (4.16)-
(4.17).
Definition 4.10. For any y > 0 and T ∈ (0, T ], take x = −αy/2, and let T y(·) be defined by
(4.21). If T y(0) < T , then take KT,x = 0; otherwise, let KT,x be the unique constant satisfying
(4.20). We define the candidate of the optimal state process, X∗, for problem (4.16)-(4.17) to
be that
(i) for t ∈ [0, τ ], X∗t satisfies (4.19), where τ = inf{ t ≥ 0 |X∗t = 0 };
(ii) for t ∈ (τ , τ + T − T y(0)], X∗t = 0;
(iii) for t ∈ (τ + T − T y(0) , T ],
∫ X∗t
0
1
ηΨ
(
γ2σ2u2+2KT,x
2γ
) du = t− τ.
Theorem 4.11. Let X∗ be defined by Definition 4.10 with the corresponding time derivative
θ∗ given by (4.18) for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Then θ∗ is the unique admissible optimiser for problem
(4.16)-(4.17). As a result, the principal’s optimal admissible incentive compatible contract is(
T, y, A¯, ξ˜∗, Z∗
)
, where for all t ∈ [0, T ],
ξ˜∗t =
θ∗t
η
1[0,T )(t),
Z∗t = (1− η/2)y +
∫ t
0
(η − 1)ξ˜∗u du,
C∗T = A¯+
∫ T
0
H(ξ˜∗u) du+
∫ T
0
Z∗u d
(
S˜∗u + F (ξ˜
∗
u)
)
,
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with S˜∗ being the stock price process affected by ξ˜∗.
4.3.4 Example
For some constants β1 > 0 and β2 ≥ 0, take F (x) = β1x and H(x) = β2x2. Then in view of
(4.16)-(4.17), we solve
V (T, x; y) = inf
θ
η
∈AD(T,y)
∫ T
0
(
1
2
γ2σ2X2t +
γβ1
2η
θ2t
)
dt
with
dXt = θt dt = ηξ˜t dt, X0 = x = −ηy/2,
where η = 2(β1 + β2)/β1. Then Ψ(u) =
√
u/
√
β1 + β2, and (4.19) is equivalent to√
γβ1
2η
∫ X∗t
−ηy/2
1√
γ2σ2u2
2 +K
T,x
du = t.
Write Q = γσ/
√
2KT,x and R =
√
ηγσ2/
√
β1. After integrating and rearranging terms of the
above expression we obtain
X∗t =
1
Q
sinh
[
Rt+ arsinh(−Qηy/2)] = √1 +Q2(ηy/2)2
Q
sinh(Rt)− cosh(Rt)ηy/2.
Therefore, by taking t = T , it follows that√
1 +Q2(ηy/2)2
Q
=
(
1 + cosh(RT )
)
ηy/2
sinh(RT )
,
and then
X∗t =
ηy
2 sinh(RT )
[
sinh(Rt)− sinh(R(T − t))] = −ηy sinh (R(T − 2t)/2)
2 sinh(RT/2)
.
Differentiating with respect to t gives out
θ∗t = −
Rηy cosh
(
R(T − 2t)/2)
2 sinh(RT/2)
.
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Substituting X∗ and θ∗ back into the expression of V (T, x; y), we get
V
(
T,−ηy/2; y) = γ2σ2η2y2
4R
coth(RT/2). (4.22)
Now we verify the constant KT,x ≥ 0. To this end, we consider (4.18), and it is equivalent to
KT,x =
R2γβ1
4η sinh2(RT )
[
cosh(RT ) + 1
]
η2y2 > 0.
Therefore, according to the above solution to the principal’s problem, her optimal admissible
incentive compatible contract is
(
T, y, A¯, ξ˜∗, Z∗
)
, where for all t ∈ [0, T ],
ξ˜∗t =
Ry cosh
(
R(T − 2t)/2)
2 sinh(RT/2)
1[0,T )(t),
Z∗t =
(1− η)y sinh(R(T − 2t)/2)
2 sinh(RT/2)
+
y
2
,
C∗T = A¯+
β22R
2y2
8 sinh(RT/2)
(
sinh(RT )
R
+ T
)
+
∫ T
0
(
σ(1− η)y sinh(R(T − 2t)/2)
2 sinh(RT/2)
+
σy
2
)
dB,
and the optimal stock position process satisfies
Y˜ ∗t =
y sinh
(
R(T − 2t)/2)
2 sinh(RT/2)
+
y
2
, t ∈ [0, T ].
We compare our solution to the solution for the corresponding liquidation model without
any contract. Using the notations in our model, with reference to Schied et al. (2010), the
optimal liquidation speed process and the associated stock position process in an Almgren-
Chriss type of liquidation model with a CARA investor are
ξ¯t =
R¯y cosh
(
R¯(T − t)/2)
2 sinh(R¯T/2)
and Y¯t =
y sinh
(
R¯(T − t)/2)
sinh(R¯T/2)
,
where t ∈ [0, T ] and R¯ =
√
2γσ2/
√
β1 + β2. Figure 4.1 compares the solution for the second-
best contract and the solution for no contract. In the case of second-best contract, the
liquidation speed is small at the beginning, which corresponds to a strategy takes less care of
the market volatility risk. This is because that the principal transfers some volatility to the
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agent via the compensation. At the end of liquidation, the speed in the case with contract
becomes big, this is due to that the liquidation has to finish by time T .
Figure 4.1: These two graphs are for y = 105, T = 3, γ = 10−4, σ = 0.01, β1 = 10−8, β2 = 10−9, A¯ = −1 and
s = 50. The upper graph plots the optimal stock positions, and the lower graph plots the optimal liquidation
speeds. The thick curves are for the case with the second-best contract, and the thin curves are for the case
with out any contract.
4.4 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.2. We first prove that
ξ∗t =
y
T
, t ∈ [0, T ],
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is a solution to problem
inf
ξ∈A(T,y)
E
[ ∫ T
0
(
ξtF (ξt) +H(ξt)
)
dt
]
.
To this end, with λ = F (y/T ) + F ′(y/T )y/T +H ′(y/T ), consider
inf
ξ∈A(T,y)
E
[ ∫ T
0
(
ξtF (ξt) +H(ξt)
)
dt
]
= inf
ξ∈A(T,y)
E
[ ∫ T
0
(
ξtF (ξt) +H(ξt)− λξt
)
dt
]
+ λy,
where the equality is because of the constraint y =
∫ T
0 ξt dt. Using first order condition and
convexity of the integrand in the above expression, we obtain that ξ∗ is the solution.
To solve problem (4.2)-(4.3), by taking
ρ = γ exp
{
γ
(
A¯− sy + F (y/T )y + TH(y/T )]
)}
,
we make the observation that
sup
ξ∈A(T,y), CT
E
[
− exp
(
−γ
∫ T
0
Stξt dt+ γCT
)]
≤ sup
ξ∈A(T,y), CT
E
[
− exp
(
−γ
∫ T
0
Stξt dt+ γCT
)
+ ρ
(
CT −
∫ T
0
H(ξt) dt
)]
− ρA¯ (4.23)
= sup
ξ∈A(T,y)
E
[
− exp
(
−γ
∫ T
0
Stξt dt+ γC
∗
T (ξ)
)
+ ρ
(
C∗T (ξ)−
∫ T
0
H(ξt) dt
)]
− ρA¯
= sup
ξ∈A(T,y)
E
[
−ρ
γ
+
ρ
γ
log
(ρ
γ
)
+ ρsy + ρσ
∫ T
0
Yt dBt − ρ
∫ T
0
(
ξtF (ξt) +H(ξt)
)
dt
]
− ρA¯
= − ρ
γ
+
ρ
γ
log
(ρ
γ
)
+ ρsy − ρ inf
ξ∈A(T,y)
E
[∫ T
0
(
ξtF (ξt) +H(ξt)
)
dt
]
− ρA¯
= − ρ
γ
+
ρ
γ
log
(ρ
γ
)
+ ρsy − ρ
∫ T
0
(
ξtF (ξ
∗
t ) +H(ξ
∗
t )
)
dt− ρA¯,
where
C∗T (ξ) =
1
γ
log
(ρ
γ
)
+ sy + σ
∫ T
0
Yt dBt −
∫ T
0
ξtF (ξt) dt.
In the above computation, the inequality is because of (4.3), the first equality is due to the first
order condition as well as the convexity of x 7→ − exp (−γ ∫ T0 Stξt dt+γx)+ρ(x−∫ T0 H(ξt) dt),
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the second equality is a direct computation and the last equality uses the result from the first
part of this proof. It can be checked that
C∗T (ξ
∗)−
∫ T
0
H(ξ∗t ) dt = A¯.
Therefore, with ξ = ξ∗ and CT = C∗T (ξ
∗), (4.23) attains an equality, which yields the result.
Proof of Proposition 4.7. The process Z is increasing follows the positivity of its time
derivative. To show Z is bounded, it suffices to have the observation that for all t ∈ [0, T ],
|Zt| ≤ |z|+
∫ t
0
∣∣∣∣ 1F ′(ξ˜s)
[
F (ξ˜s) +H
′(ξ˜s)
] ∣∣∣∣ ds ≤ K +K ∫ t
0
ξ˜s ds ≤ K +Ky,
where K > 0 is some constant, and we used the assumptions that x 7→ (F (x) +H ′(x))/F ′(x)
has linear growth, ξ˜ ≥ 0 and that ∫ T0 ξ˜t dt = y.
For any contract
(
T, y, c, ξ˜, Z
)
satisfying the condition of this proposition, by writing
Z˙t = dZt/dt, we maximise
E
[
CT +
∫ T
0
{
F (ξt)(ξ˜t − ξt)−H(ξt)
}
dt− Γ(YT )
]
= c+ E
[∫ T
0
{
F (ξt)(ξ˜t − ξt) +H(ξ˜t)−H(ξt)
}
dt+
∫ T
0
Zt d
(
F (ξ˜t)− F (ξt)
)− Γ(YT )]
= c+ E
[∫ T
0
{
F (ξt)(ξ˜t − ξt) +H(ξ˜t)−H(ξt)−
(
F (ξ˜t)− F (ξt)
)
Z˙t
}
dt
− ZTF (ξT )− Γ(YT )
]
= c+ E
[∫ T
0
{∫ ξt
ξ˜t
(
F ′(u)ξ˜t − F ′(u)u− F (u)−H ′(u) + F ′(u)Z˙t
)
du
}
dt
−
(
ZTF (ξT ) + Γ(YT )
)]
, (4.24)
where the term
∫ T
0 Ztσ dBt vanishes in expectation. Since the functions x 7→ xF (x) and H
are strictly convex, F ′ is decreasing, as well as the fact that Z˙ + ξ˜ ≥ 0, it follows that
F ′(x)ξ˜t − F ′(x)x− F (x)−H ′(x) + F ′(x)Z˙t
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is strictly decreasing in x, and it is equal to 0 when x = ξ˜t. Therefore, the time integral in
(4.24) is less than or equal to 0, and it is equal to 0 only if ξt = ξ˜t, for t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover,
we have ZTF (ξT ) + Γ(YT ) ≥ 0, and it is equal to 0 if ξt = ξ˜t, for t ∈ [0, T ]. As a result,
the expression in (4.24) not greater than c, and it attains c uniquely when ξt = ξ˜t, for all
0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Proof of Proposition 4.9. For any x(1), x(2) ∈ R and θ(1)η , θ
(2)
η ∈ AD(T, x(1)), consider the
state processes X(1) and X(2) satisfying
dX
(1)
t = θ
(1)
t dt, X
(1)
0 = x
(1),
dX
(2)
t = θ
(2)
t dt, X
(2)
0 = x
(2).
Let λ ∈ (0, 1), and write x = λx(1) + (1 − λ)x(2), X = λX(1) + (1 − λ)X(2) and θ = λθ(1) +
(1− λ)θ(2). Then,
dXt = θt dt, X0 = x,
and θη ∈ AD(T, y). By the convexity of H and x 7→ xF (x), we compute that
V (T, x; y) ≤
∫ T
0
(
1
2
γ2σ2X2t + γH(θt/α) + γF (θt/α)θt/α
)
dt
≤ λ
∫ T
0
(
1
2
γ2σ2
(
X
(1)
t
)2
+ γH
(
θ
(1)
t /η
)
+ γF
(
θ
(1)
t /η
)
θ
(1)
t /η
)
dt
+ (1− λ)
∫ T
0
(
1
2
γ2σ2
(
X
(2)
t
)2
+ γH
(
θ
(2)
t /η
)
+ γF
(
θ
(2)
t /η
)
θ
(2)
t /η
)
dt.
Since θ(1) and θ(2) are arbitrary, it follows that
V (T, x; y) ≤ λV (T, x(1); y)+ (1− λ)V (T, x(2); y).
Then the arbitrariness of x(1) and x(2) implies the convexity of x 7→ V (T, x; y).
To show the remaining result, suppose x < −ηy/2. Let θ be any admissible process for
problem (4.16)-(4.17) with the corresponding state process denoted by X. Let
τ = inf{t ≥ 0 |Xt ≥ −ηy/2}.
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If τ = ∞, consider the state process X˜ starting from −ηy/2 with time derivative process
being equal to θ. Then, ∫ T
0
(
1
2
γ2σ2X2t + γH(θt/η) + γF (θt/η)θt/η
)
dt
>
∫ T
0
(
1
2
γ2σ2X˜2t + γH(θt/η) + γF (θt/η)θt/η
)
dt
≥ V (T,−ηy/2; y), (4.25)
since |Xt| > |X˜t|, for all t. If τ < ∞, consider the process θ˜ such that θ˜t = θτ+t, for
t ∈ [0, T − τ); θ˜T−τ+t = θt, for t ∈ [0, τ); and θ˜t = θt, for all t ≥ T . Denote by X˜ the state
process associated with θ˜, starting from −αy/2. Clearly θ˜/η ∈ AD(T,−ηy/2). Then we have∫ T
0
(
γH(θt/η) + γF (θt/η)θt/η
)
dt =
∫ T
0
(
γH(θ˜t/η) + γF (θ˜t/η)θ˜t/η
)
dt,∫ T
τ
1
2
γ2σ2X2t dt =
∫ T−τ
0
1
2
γ2σ2X˜2t dt,∫ τ
0
1
2
γ2σ2X2t dt >
∫ T
T−τ
1
2
γ2σ2X˜2t dt,
where the last inequality is due to thatX2t > αy/2, for t < τ , andX
2
t < αy/2, for t ∈ [T−τ, T ).
These three equations give out the same inequalities as in (4.25). Taking infimum of (4.25)
over all admissible processes yields
V (T, x; y) ≥ V (T,−ηy/2; y). (4.26)
A similar argument with taking consideration about τ = inf{t ≥ 0 |Xt ≥ ηy/2} applies
to the case of x > −ηy/2. Thus, the required result follows.
Proof of Theorem 4.11. The admissibility is a direct consequence of the construction of
X∗. Define the function φ by
φ(x, θ) =
1
2
γ2σ2x2 + γH(θ/η) + γF (θ/η)θ/η.
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We claim that the Euler-Lagrange equation
d
dt
φθ(X
∗
t , θ
∗
t ) = φx(X
∗
t , θ
∗
t ), a.e. t ∈ [0, T ]
holds, which requires to show that
d
dt
φθ(X
∗
t , θ
∗
t ) = γ
2σ2X∗t , a.e. t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.27)
For θ∗t 6= 0, we calculate that
φθ(X
∗
t , θ
∗
t ) =
γ
η
(
H ′(θ∗t /η) + F (θ
∗
t /η) + F
′(θ∗t /η)θ
∗
t /η
)
=
γ
θ∗t
(
Φ(θ∗t /η) +H(θ
∗
t /η) + F (θ
∗
t /η)θ
∗
t /η
)
=
γ
θ∗t
(γ2σ2(X∗t )2 + 2KT,x
2γ
+H(θ∗t /η) + F (θ
∗
t /η)θ
∗
t /η
)
,
and a direct differentiation verifies (4.27). Consider some interval on which θ∗t = 0 a.e. Then
on this interval, φθ(X
∗
t , θ
∗
t ) is a constant, and according to Definition 4.10, X
∗
t = 0. As a
result, (4.27) holds true on this interval. For any process θ 6= θ∗ with θ/η ∈ AD(T, y) and X
being the associated state process, we compute by the strict convexity of H and x 7→ xF (x)
that ∫ T
0
φ(Xt, θt) dt−
∫ T
0
φ(X∗t , θ
∗
t ) dt
>
∫ T
0
(
φx(X
∗
t , θ
∗
t )(Xt −X∗t ) + φθ(X∗t , θ∗t )(θt − θ∗t )
)
dt
=
∫ T
0
(
d
dt
[
φθ(X
∗
t , θ
∗
t )
]
(Xt −X∗t ) + φθ(X∗t , θ∗t )(θt − θ∗t )
)
dt
=
∫ T
0
d
dt
[
φθ(X
∗
t , θ
∗
t )(Xt −X∗t )
]
dt
= 0,
where the last equality is because that X and X∗ have the same starting values as well as the
same ending values. This shows that θ∗ is the unique optimiser.
Then the rest results follow directly from the analysis of the simplification of the principal’s
problem.
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Part III
Contract with Outside Options
This part is based on a joint work with Dr. Hao Xing.
Chapter 5
Optimal contract under reputation
concern
5.1 Model setting
Let (Ω,P,F ,F) be a filtered probability space, where the filtration F = (Ft)t≥0 is generated
by a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion B, and it satisfies the usual conditions of
completeness and right-continuous. For any two stopping times τ ≤ σ, ∫ στ stands for the
integral on the interval [τ, σ]. All processes are of right-continuous with left-limit. For any
process X and stopping time τ , denote ∆Xτ = Xτ −Xτ−. Write Et[·] = E[·|Ft], t ≥ 0 and
E[·] = E[·|F0].
We consider a Principal who hires an Agent to manage a project. Both of them are risk
neutral. Given Agent’s effort α, this project generates a cash flow whose accumulated value
Xα follows the dynamic
dXαt = (µ+ αt)dt+ σdBt, X
α
0 = 0, (5.1)
where µ ∈ R, σ > 0 are constants. We assume that Agent’s effort α is a real-valued process
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taking values in some compact interval
A = [α, α]
with 0 ∈ A. Agent’s effort is costly. The cost of effort αt at time t is g(αt), for some cost
function g which is continuously differentiable, strictly convex and satisfies g(0) = 0.
Any contract offered by Principal can be identified by a non-decreasing process C with
C0− = 0, which denotes the cumulative compensation received by Agent. While working for
Principal, Agent explores some outside employment opportunity whose expected value may
depend on his past performance. Given a contract C, Agent applies certain effort and also
determines when to stop working for Principal, in order to maximise his expected discounted
payoff received from both Principal and his outside option. Agent’s optimal value is
U0− = sup
(τ,α)
E
[∫ τ
0
e−γt
(
dCt − g(αt) dt
)
+ e−γτR(τ,Xα· )
]
,
where γ > 0 is Agent’s discount rate, R(t,Xα· ) denotes the value of Agent’s outside option
(or reputation) at time t. In this chapter, we consider
R(t,Xα· ) = βX˜
α
t , (5.2)
where X˜αt = e
γt
∫ t
0 e
−γsdXαs describes the present value of the accumulated cash flow generated
from Principal’s project, and β > 0 is a constant multiplication factor. Therefore, Agent’s
outside option is an increasing function of X˜αt . The special form of outside option in (5.2)
allows us to incorporate the value of the outside option into the running cost, therefore, his
optimal value can be rewritten as
U0− = sup
(τ,α)
E
[∫ τ
0
e−γt
(
dCt +
(
βµ+ βαt − g(αt)
)
dt
)]
, (5.3)
where βµ + βα − g(α) can be regarded as Agent’s net running cost of his effort α. We can
see from the above expression that even when C ≡ 0, it is optimal for Agent to employ some
positive effort, if g′(0) < β. The outside option motivates Agent to work for Principal even if
Principal does not pay Agent, since Agent’s effort can improve the value of the project, hence
enhances the value of his outside option. Agent works for Principal only when U0− ≥ A¯, for
some constant A¯ > 0 describing Agent’s reservation utility.
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We assume that Principal only observes the cash flow Xα. Let FX = (FXt )t≥0 be the
filtration generated by Xα and satisfy the usual conditions. Denote by r Principal’s discount
rate, and suppose that
r ∈ (0, γ)
which indicates that Agent is more impatient than Principal. Principal chooses some FX -
adapted compensation process C to maximise her expected discounted payoff
sup
C
E
[ ∫ τ∗
0
e−rt
(
dα∗t − dCt
)
+
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
dXα
∗
t − dα∗t
)]
= sup
C
E
[ ∫ τ∗
0
e−rt
(
dα∗t − dCt
)]
+
µ
r
, (5.4)
where (τ∗, α∗) is Agent’s optimal strategy associated with a contract C, µ/r represents the
expected value of the project without hiring Agent, and the first term in (5.4) represents the
additional expected value provided by Agent’s contribution.
5.2 Agent and Principal’s optimisation problems
Agent’s problem (5.3) is an optimal control-stopping problem, and for any given contract C,
his optimal strategy can be characterised by his optimal value process. To see this, we first
specify the set of Agent’s admissible strategies as follows.
Definition 5.1. For any given contract C, we call (τ, α) admissible if α is an F-progressively
measurable process taking values in A, and τ is an F-stopping time satisfying
E
[ ∫ τ
0
e−γtdCt
]
<∞.
The class of admissible strategies is denoted by A(C).
We define Agent’s optimal value process as
Ut = ess sup(τ,α)∈At(C)U
τ,α
t ,
where At(C) is the class of admissible strategies (τ, α) such that τ ≥ t, αs = α˜s for some
admissible effort α˜ ∈ A(C) and any s ∈ [0, T ], and
U τ,αt = U
τ,α
t− −∆Ct
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= E
[∫ τ
t
e−γ(s−t)
(
dCs +
(
βµ+ βαs − g(αs)
)
ds
) ∣∣∣∣Ft]−∆Ct.
Since E
[ ∫ τ
0 e
−γsdCs
]
<∞ and α is bounded, we have Ut <∞.
The next result derives the dynamic of Agent’s optimal value process. Let us first recall
the martingale principle: the process U˜t = e
−γtUt +
∫ t
0 e
−γs(dCs + (βµ+ βαs− g(αs))ds) is a
supermartingale on [0, τ ] for arbitrary admissible effort α, and is a martingale for the optimal
effort. Meanwhile, we expect from the optimal stopping theory that Agent’s optimal stopping
time is the first time that U drops below zero. Introduce
g∗(p) = min
α∈A
{g(α)− pα}
αˆ(z) = arg min
α∈A
{g(α)− (z/σ + β)α} =

(g′)−1(z/σ + β), z/σ + β ∈ [g′(α), g′(α)]
α, z/σ + β < g′(α)
α, z/σ + β > g′(α)
.
Lemma 5.2. For a given contract C and any admissible effort α, suppose that there exists
an FX-progressively measurable process Z, satisfying
∫ t
0 Z
2
sds < ∞ for any t > 0, such that
the process Uˆα defined via
dUˆαt = [γUˆ
α
t + g
∗(Zt/σ + β)− βµ− µZt/σ] dt+ Zt/σ dXαt − dCt, (5.5)
together with the stopping time τα0 = inf{t ≥ 0 : Uˆαt ≤ 0}, satisfies that Uˆα·∧τα0 is of class D
and the transversality condition
lim
t→∞E
[
e−γtUˆ αˆ(Z)t 1{t≤τ αˆ(Z)0 }
]
= 0. (5.6)
Moreover, ∆Cτα0 ≤ Uˆατα0 − when τ
α
0 <∞. Then
Ut = Uˆ
αˆ(Z)
t , for any t ≤ τ αˆ(Z)0 ,
and (τ
αˆ(Z)
0 , αˆ(Z)) is Agent’s optimal strategy.
Denote τ0 = τ
αˆ(Z)
0 as Agent’s optimal stopping time for a given contract satisfying the
above Lemma.
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Remark 5.3. The assumption ∆Cτα0 ≤ Uˆατα0 − in Lemma 5.2 implies that Uτ0 = 0, whenever
τ0 < ∞. In other words, the compensation Agent receives at τ0 cannot drop Agent’s opti-
mal value process below zero. This restriction of the compensation process does not reduce
Principal’s value. Indeed, for any C such that ∆Cτ0 > Uτ0− and τ0 < ∞, Agent stops at τ0.
But the contract which agrees with C up to τ0− and pays Agent Uτ0− at τ0 gives Principal a
larger value than C does.
In order to solve Principal’s problem, motivated by Lemma 5.2, we consider the following
set of admissible contracts.
Definition 5.4. Define Principal’s admissible contract (Z,C) to be such that
(i) Z is an FX -progressively measurable process satisfying
∫ t
0 Z
2
t dt <∞, for all t ≥ 0;
(ii) C is an FX -adapted, non-decreasing, ca`dla`g process with C0− = 0 and satisfies
E
[∫ τα0
0 e
−rt dCt
]
<∞, and ∆Cτα0 ≤ Uˆατα0 − when τ
α
0 <∞;
(iii) Uˆα is given by
dUˆαt = [γUˆ
α
t + g
∗(Zt/σ + β)− βµ− µZt/σ] dt+ Zt/σ dXαt − dCt, Uˆα0− = u ∈ R,
and Uˆα·∧τα0 is of class D satisfying limt→∞ E
[
e−rtUˆ αˆ(Z)t 1{t≤τ αˆ(Z)0 }
]
= 0,
where τα0 = inf{t ≥ 0 : Uˆαt ≤ 0} and α is any admissible effort of Agent. Denote the set of
all admissible contracts by P(u;FX).
It can be checked that the condition of Lemma 5.2 is satisfied by any admissible contract.
With (Z,C) ∈ P(u;FX), Agent is induced to apply the FX -adapted effort αˆ(Z). This makes
F = FX , and at the same time Agent’s value process satisfies the following dynamic
dUt = [γUt +G(Zt)] dt+ Zt dB − dCt, U0− = u, (5.7)
where
G(z) = g(αˆ(z))− βαˆ(z)− βµ.
Similar to Sannikov (2008), Agent’s optimal value process will be used as the state process
for Principal’s problem. With reference to Lemma 5.2, Principal’s optimisation problem (5.4)
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is reduced to
sup
u≥A¯
V (u) +
µ
r
, (5.8)
where the value function V : [0,∞)→ R is given by
V (u) = sup
(C,Z)∈P(u;F)
E
[ ∫ τ0
0
e−rs
(
αˆ(Zs) ds− dCs
)]
(5.9)
with the state process U satisfying (5.7).
5.3 Main results
In this section we present our main results. Under parameter restrictions, we first show
that the value function V in (5.9) is a unique continuous viscosity solution to the associated
Hamilton-Jabobi-Bellman variational inequalities (HJBVI). Then with an additional condition
on Agent effort set A, we show further that V is twice-continuously differentiable. Finally, we
obtain Principal’s optimal contract. For future references, we list all further assumptions on
functions αˆ(·), G(·) and g(·) as follows.
Assumption
(I) maxz∈R{αˆ(z)−G(z)} ≥ 0,
(II) g′(α) > β,
(III) g ∈ C3(R), g′′′ is positive and z/g′′((g′)−1(z/σ + β)) is strictly increasing.
From the theory of optimal control, it is expected that V in (5.9) satisfies the following
corresponding HJBVI
min
{
rv(u)−max
z∈R
{
αˆ(z) +
(
γu+G(z)
)
v′(u) +
1
2
z2v′′(u)
}
, v′(u) + 1
}
= 0, u > 0, (5.10)
with associated boundary condition v(0) = 0. For future development, let’s impose Assump-
tion (I). Then the following proposition provides an upper bound and a lower bound to V .
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Proposition 5.5. Let functions ψ,ψ : [0,∞)→ R defined by
ψ(u) = −u+ 1
r
max
z∈R
{αˆ(z)−G(z)},
ψ(u) = −u.
Then we have
ψ(u) ≤ V (u) ≤ ψ(u), for u ≥ 0. (5.11)
When maxz{α(z) − G(z)} = 0, then V (u) = −u. In this case, Principal is optimal to
pay Agent at the beginning with a size of compensation making Agent to stop immediately,
which can be seen by substituting C0 = u into the expression in (5.9).
The following result characterises V as a viscosity solution to (5.10).
Theorem 5.6. The value function V is a unique continuous viscosity solution to (5.10)
satisfying the growth constraint (5.11).
Remark 5.7. The result that V is a (discontinuous) viscosity solution is standard, and it fol-
lows from the dynamic programming principle. The novelty in Theorem 5.6 is the uniqueness.
When the control variable Z is unbound, the uniqueness requires some careful treatment, and
is proved only when the Hamiltonian satisfies certain specific structural condition (see e.g.
Lio and Ley, 2011, Assumption (A)(iii)). To prove the uniqueness here, we first prove that V
is a viscosity solution to
min
{
rv(u)−max
z∈I
{αˆ(z) + (γu+G(z))v′(u) + 12z2v
′′
(u)},−v′′(u), v′(u) + 1
}
= 0, (5.12)
where I = [(g′(α) − β)σ, (g′(α) − β)σ]. Here the concavity of v reduces the control Z to a
compact interval. Then using a similar argument to Lio and Ley (2006), we prove that V is
a unique viscosity solution of (5.12) satisfying (5.11).
In order to describe V further, let us define ψ˜ : [0,∞)→ R via
ψ˜(x) = −γ
r
x+
1
r
max
z∈R
{αˆ(z)−G(z)},
and write
ub = inf
{
u ≥ 0 : V (u) ≥ ψ˜(u)}.
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To prove some smoothness of V , we need to impose Assumption (II). Under this condition,
the interval I in (5.12) avoids 0, therefore (5.12) is uniformly elliptic.
Proposition 5.8. V is a C2([0,∞)) solution to
rV (u)−max
z∈R
{
αˆ(z) +
(
γu+G(z)
)
V ′(u) +
1
2
z2V ′′(u)
}
> 0, u ∈ (ub,∞),
V ′(u) + 1 = 0, u ∈ [ub,∞),
rV (u)−max
z∈R
{
αˆ(z) +
(
γu+G(z)
)
V ′(u) +
1
2
z2V ′′(u)
}
= 0, u ∈ (0, ub],
V ′(u) + 1 > 0, u ∈ (0, ub),
with boundary condition V (0) = 0.
In general, applying Itoˆ’s formula and making the verification argument work only requires
V to be smooth enough in the interior of its domain. In the above theorem, the result that
the C2 property of V is extended to the boundary is used to show the property of Lipschitz
continuity for the function Z∗(·) defined by the following lemma.
Lemma 5.9. Write I = [(g′(α)− β)σ, (g′(α)− β)σ]. For x ∈ [0, ub], take
Z∗(x) = arg max
z∈I
{
αˆ(z) +G(z)V ′(x) +
1
2
z2V ′′(x)
}
.
Then under the condition of Assumption (III), for any admissible effort α of Agent, there
exists a unique FX-adapted process Uˆα,∗ with Uˆα,∗0− = u ∈ R, and a unique non-decreasing,
ca`dla`g, FX-adapted process C∗ with C∗0− = 0 such that
dUˆα,∗t = [γUˆ
α,∗
t + g
∗(Z∗t /σ + β)− βµ− µZ∗t /σ] dt+ Z∗t /σ dXαt − dC∗t ,∫ τα,∗0
0
1{Uˆα,∗t <ub}dC
∗
t = 0,
Uˆα,∗t ∈ [0, ub] for all 0 ≤ t ≤ τα,∗0 ,
where τα,∗0 = inf{t ≥ 0 : Uˆα,∗t ≤ 0} and Z∗ = Z∗(Uˆα,∗). If u > ub, then C∗0 = u − ub and
Uˆα,∗0 = ub; if u ≤ ub, then C∗ is continuous.
With reference to the above lemma, the next theorem identifies Principal’s optimal con-
tract.
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Theorem 5.10. Under Assumption (III), let Z∗, C∗, Uˆα,∗ and τα,∗0 be given by Lemma 5.9.
Then (Z∗, C∗) belongs to P(u;FX). This contract is optimal for Principal’s problem (5.9),
and it induces Agent to apply the effort αˆ(Z∗) and to stop at τ αˆ(Z
∗),∗
0 . Principal’s optimal
contract is completely characterised by
Uˆα,∗t = u
∗ +
∫ t
0
[γUˆα,∗s + g
∗(Z∗s/σ + β)− βµ− µZ∗s/σ] ds
+
∫ t
0
Z∗s/σ dX
α
s −
∫ t
0
dC∗t , t ≤ τα,∗0 ,
where the starting value u∗ ≥ A¯ is solved from the problem (5.8). The existence of u∗ is
guaranteed, and in particular, u∗ = A¯, if A¯ ≥ ub.
5.4 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 5.2. For any admissible effort process α, consider
U˜t :=
∫ t
0
e−γs
(
dCs +
[
βµ+ βαs − g(αs)
]
ds
)
+ e−γ(t∧τ
α
0 )Uˆαt∧τα0 , t ≥ 0.
Then,
dU˜t = e
−γt dCt + e−γt
[
βµ+ βαt − g(αt)
]
dt− γe−γtUˆαt dt+ e−γt dUˆαt
= e−γt dCt + e−γt
[
βµ+ βαt − g(αt)
]
dt− γe−γtUˆαt dt
+ e−γt
[
γUˆαt + g
∗(Zt/σ + β)− βµ− µZt/σ] dt+ e−γtZt(µ+ αt)/σ dt
+ e−γtZt dBt − e−γt dCt
= e−γt
{
g∗
(
Zt/σ + β
)− [g(αt)− (Zt/σ + β)αt]} dt+ e−γtZt dBt
≤ e−γtZt dBt. (5.13)
For any fixed t ≥ 0, let α be the effort process given by αs = αˆ(Zs) for s ∈ [0, t), and
αs = α˜s for s ≥ t, where α˜ an arbitrary effort. Consider some (τ, α) ∈ At(C) and some
localising sequence of finite stopping times {τn}∞n=1 such that each process
∫ τn∧·
0 e
−γsZs dBs
is a martingale. Then we have for t ≤ τα0 ,
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Uˆαt
= eγtU˜t −
∫ t
0
e−γ(s−t)
(
dCs +
[
βµ+ βαs − g(αs)
]
ds
)
≥ lim
n→∞Et
[
eγtU˜τ∧τn −
∫ τ∧τn
t
e−γ(s−t)Zs dBs −
∫ t
0
e−γ(s−t)
(
dCs +
[
βµ+ βαs − g(αs)
]
ds
)]
= lim
n→∞Et
[∫ τ∧τn
t
e−γ(s−t)
(
dCs +
[
βµ+ βαs − g(αs)
]
ds
)
+ e−γ(τ∧τn∧τ
α
0 −t)Uˆατ∧τn∧τα0
]
−∆Ct
= Et
[∫ τ
t
e−γ(s−t)
(
dCs +
[
βµ+ βαs − g(αs)
]
ds
)
+ e−γ(τ∧τ
α
0 −t)Uˆατ∧τα0
]
−∆Ct, (5.14)
where we applied the dominated convergence theorem in the last equality, this is valid since
Uˆα·∧τα0 hence e
−γ(·∧τα0 )Uˆα·∧τα0 is of class D, and that
Et
[ ∣∣∣∣ ∫ τ∧τn
t
e−γ(s−t)
(
dCs +
[
βµ+ βαs − g(αs)
]
ds
) ∣∣∣∣ ]
≤Et
[∫ τ
t
e−γ(s−t) dCs
]
+ Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−γ(s−t)
∣∣∣βµ+ βαs − g(αs) ∣∣∣ ds] <∞.
Observe that according to the definition of τα0 and the condition ∆Cτα0 ≤ Uˆατα0 −, we have
Uˆατ∧τα0 ≥ 0. Then it follows from (5.14) that
Uˆαt ≥ Et
[∫ τ
t
e−γ(s−t)
(
dCs +
[
βµ+ βαs − g(αs)
]
ds
)]
−∆Ct. (5.15)
On the other hand, equality is uniquely attained in (5.13) if α = αˆ(Zˆ). Write τ0 = τ
αˆ(Z)
0 .
Then,
Uˆ
αˆ(Z)
t = e
γtU˜t −
∫ t
0
e−γ(s−t)
(
dCs +
[
βµ+ βαˆ(Zs)− g(αˆ(Zs))
]
ds
)
= lim
m→∞ limn→∞Et
[
eγtU˜τ0∧τn∧m −
∫ τ0∧τn∧m
t
e−γ(s−t)Zs dBs
−
∫ t
0
e−γ(s−t)
(
dCs +
[
βµ+ βαˆ(Zs)− g(αˆ(Zs))
]
ds
)]
= lim
m→∞Et
[∫ τ0∧m
t
e−γ(s−t)
(
dCs +
[
βµ+ βαˆ(Zs)− g(αˆ(Zs))
]
ds
)
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+ e−γ(τ0∧m−t)Uˆ αˆ(Z)τ0∧m
]
−∆Ct
= Et
[∫ τ0
t
e−γ(s−t)
(
dCs +
[
βµ+ βαˆ(Zs)− g(αˆ(Zs))
]
ds
)]
−∆Ct, (5.16)
where the last equality is because of the dominated convergence theorem, the definition of τ0
and the transversality condition (5.6). This equality also shows E[
∫ τ0
0 e
−γt dCs] < ∞ which
implies (τ0, αˆ(Z)) is admissible. Combining (5.15) and (5.16), we get
Ut = ess supτ,αU
τ,α
t = U
τ0,αˆ(Z)
t = Uˆ
αˆ(Z)
t .
Proof of Proposition 5.5. Since γ > r, a direct calculation verifies that ψ is a supersolu-
tion to (5.10). This implies that for any z ∈ R,
rψ − αˆ(z)− (γu+G(z))ψ′ − 1
2
z2ψ
′′ ≥ 0.
Let (Z,C) be an admissible control with U being the corresponding controlled state process
starting from u ≥ 0. By Itoˆ’s formula and the above inequality, it follows that
e−r(τ0∧T ) ψ(Uτ0∧T )
=ψ(u) +
∫ τ0∧T
0
e−rt
(
−rψ(Ut) +
(
γUt +G(Zt)
)
ψ
′
(Ut) +
1
2
Z2t ψ
′′
(Ut)
)
dt
−
∫ τ0∧T
0
e−rtψ′(Ut) dCct +
∑
0≤t≤τ0∧T
e−rt∆ψ(Ut)
+
∫ τ0∧T
0
e−rtψ′(Ut)Zt dBt
≤ψ(u)−
∫ τ0∧T
0
e−rtαˆ(Zt) dt+
∫ τ0∧T
0
e−rt dCt −
∫ τ0∧T
0
e−rtZt dBt,
and then
E
[∫ τ0∧T
0
e−rt
(
αˆ(Zt) dt− dCt
)
+ e−r(τ0∧T ) ψ(Uτ0∧T )
]
≤ ψ(u),
where the stochastic integral vanishes in expectation by a localisation sequence argument.
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Sending T to infinity, due to the dominated convergence theorem, the transversality condition
and the fact that ψ is linear and ψ(0) ≥ 0 we have therefore,
E
[∫ τ0
0
e−rt
(
αˆ(Zt) dt− dCt
)]
≤ ψ(u).
Hence it follows that V ≤ ψ, since (Z,C) is arbitrary.
To prove the lower bound, for any given u ∈ [0,∞), take C to be such that C0 = u and
dCt = 0, for all t > 0. Let Z be any admissible control. Denote by U the corresponding
controlled state process starting from u. Then, τ0 = 0 and
V (u) ≥ E
[∫ τ0
0
e−rt
(
αˆ(Zt) dt− dCt
)]
= −u = ψ(u).
The local boundedness of V guarantees that the upper semi-continuous (u.s.c.) and the
lower semi-continuous (l.s.c.) envelops of the principal’s value function V are well-defined.
The following two lemmas show that V is both a viscosity supersolution and a viscosity
subsolution to (5.10). Hence, it is a viscosity solution to (5.10). The proofs of these two
lemmas follow a standard approach (see e.g. Pham, 2009, etc).
Lemma 5.11. The function V : [0,∞) → R is a (discontinuous) viscosity supersolution to
(5.10).
Proof. Write V∗ to be the l.s.c. envelop of V , i.e., V∗(u) = lim infx→u V (x), for all u ≥ 0. Let
u¯ > 0 and φ ∈ C2((0,∞)) be such that
0 = min(V∗ − φ)(u) = (V∗ − φ)(u¯),
so we have V ≥ V∗ ≥ φ, and there exists a sequence of numbers (un)∞n=1 contained in [0,∞)
such that as n → ∞, un → u¯ and V (un) → V∗(u¯). Let ξn = (V − φ)(un), so ξn ≥ 0 and
ξn → 0, as n→∞. Denote
ρn =
√
ξn +
1
n
1{ξn=0}.
Let (Z,C) be an admissible control with Z being equal to some constant z. Write Uun,Z,C as
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the corresponding controlled state process starting from un. Define
τn = inf
{
t ≥ 0 : |Uun,Z,Ct − un| ≥ K
}
and θn = ρn ∧ τn ∧ τ0
. Then it follows from the dynamic programming principle that
φ(un) + ξn = V (un)
≥ E
[∫ θn
0
e−rt
(
αˆ(z) dt− dCt
)
+ e−rθnV
(
Uun,Z,Cθn
)]
≥ E
[∫ θn
0
e−rt
(
αˆ(z) dt− dCt
)
+ e−rθnφ
(
Uun,Z,Cθn
)]
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to e−rθnφ
(
Uun,Z,Cθn
)
, together with the above inequality, we obtain that
ξn
ρn
≥ E
[
1
ρn
∫ θn
0
e−rt
(
−rφ(Uun,Z,Ct )+ αˆ(z)
+
(
γUun,Z,Ct +G(z)
)
φ′
(
Uun,Z,Ct
)
+
1
2
z2φ′′
(
Uun,Z,Ct
))
dt
− 1
ρn
∫ θn
0
e−rt
(
φ′
(
Uun,Z,Ct
)
+ 1
)
dCct +
1
ρn
∑
0≤t≤θn
e−rt
(
∆φ
(
Uun,Z,Ct
)−∆Ct)],(5.17)
where
∫ θn
0 e
−rtφ′
(
Uun,Z,Ct
)
z dBt vanishes in expectation, since
∫ θn∧·
0 e
−rsφ′
(
Uun,Z,Cs
)
z dBs is
a uniformly integrable martingale. Now suppose φ′(u¯) + 1 < 0. Note that if we assume in
addition that C has a jump at time 0, then (5.17) still holds, and it follows therefore,
1
ρn
∑
0≤t≤θn
e−rt
(
∆φ
(
Uun,Z,Ct
)−∆Ct) n→∞−−−→∞.
As a consequence, (5.17) gives out a contradiction, because ξnρn → 0, as n→∞. We therefore
conclude that φ′(u¯) + 1 ≥ 0. On the other hand, if we assume in addition that Ct = 0, for
0 ≤ t ≤ θn, then (5.17) still holds for such C. By the continuity of paths of Uun,Z,C , for
0 ≤ t ≤ θn, the mean value theorem, the dominated convergence theorem and (5.17), we have
rφ(u¯)− αˆ(z)− (γu¯+G(z))φ′(u¯)− 1
2
z2φ′′(u¯) ≥ 0,
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where z is arbitrary. Hence,
rφ(u¯)−max
z∈R
{
αˆ(z) +
(
γu¯+G(z)
)
φ′(u¯) +
1
2
z2φ′′(u¯)
}
≥ 0.
Lemma 5.12. The function V : [0,∞) → R is a (discontinuous) viscosity subsolution to
(5.10).
Proof. Write V ∗ to be the u.s.c. envelop of V , i.e., V ∗(u) = lim supx→u V (x), for all u ≥ 0.
Let u¯ > 0 and φ ∈ C2((0,∞)) be such that
0 = max(V ∗ − φ)(u) = (V ∗ − φ)(u¯).
So we have V ≤ V ∗ ≤ φ. Let’s suppose the contrary that
h1(u¯) := rφ(u¯)−max
z∈R
{
αˆ(z) +
(
γu¯+G(z)
)
φ′(u¯) +
1
2
z2φ′′(u¯)
}
> 0
and
h2(u¯) := φ
′(u¯) + 1 > 0.
Then we must have φ′′(u¯) ≤ 0, otherwise h1(u¯) = −∞. Consequently,
h1(u¯) := rφ(u¯)−max
z∈I
{
αˆ(z) +
(
γu¯+G(z)
)
φ′(u¯) +
1
2
z2φ′′(u¯)
}
> 0,
where I := [(g′(α)− β)σ, (g′(α)− β)σ], since both αˆ and G are bounded functions. It follows
from the maximum theorem (see, e.g. Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Theorem 17.31) that
u¯ 7→ maxz∈I
{
αˆ(z) +
(
γu¯ + G(z)
)
φ′(u¯) + 12z
2φ′′(u¯)
}
is a continuous function. Hence, there
exists an interval I(u¯;K) =
{
u ≥ 0 : |u − u¯| < K} on which h1 >  and h2 > , where
K,  > 0 are some constants. Let (un)
∞
n=1 be a sequence of numbers contained in I(u¯;K) such
that as n → ∞, un → u¯ and V (un) → V ∗(u¯). Write ξn = φ(un) − V (un), so ξn → 0, as
n→∞. Denote
ρn =
√
ξn +
1
n
1{ξn=0}.
Now for each un, consider an ρn/2 + m(ρn)-optimal admissible control (Z
n, Cn) such that
147
∆Cnt = 0, for t < ρn, where m(·) is some positive strictly decreasing function satisfying
m(0) = 0. 12 Write Uun,Z
n,Cn as the corresponding controlled state process starting from un.
Let
τn = inf
{
t ≥ 0 : Uun,Zn,Cnt /∈ I(u¯;K)
}
and θn = ρn ∧ τn ∧ τ0.
Then we compute that
φ(un)− ξn = V (un)
≤ E
[∫ τ0
0
e−rt
(
αˆ(Znt ) dt− dCnt
)]
+
ρn
2
+m(ρn)
≤ E
[∫ θn
0
e−rt
(
αˆ(Znt ) dt− dCnt
)
+ e−rθnV
(
Uun,Z
n,Cn
θn
)]
+
ρn
2
+m(ρn)
≤ E
[∫ θn
0
e−rt
(
αˆ(Znt ) dt− dCnt
)
+ e−rθnφ
(
Uun,Z
n,Cn
θn
)]
+
ρn
2
+m(ρn)
= E
[∫ θn
0
e−rt
(
−rφ(Uun,Zn,Cnt )+ αˆ(Znt )
+
(
γUun,Z
n,Cn
t +G(Z
n
t )
)
φ′
(
Uun,Z
n,Cn
t
)
+
1
2
z2φ′′
(
Uun,Z
n,Cn
t
))
dt
−
∫ θn
0
e−rt
(
φ′
(
Uun,Z
n,Cn
t
)
+ 1
)
d(Cn)ct
+
∑
0≤t≤θn
e−rt
(
∆φ
(
Uun,Z
n,Cn
t
)−∆Cnt )]+ φ(un) + ρn2 +m(ρn)
< φ(un) +
ρn
2
+m(ρn) + E
[∫ θn
0
e−rt
(
−rφ(Uun,Zn,Cnt )+ αˆ(Znt )
+
(
γUun,Z,Ct +G(Z
n
t )
)
φ′
(
Uun,Z
n,Cn
t
)
+
1
2
z2φ′′
(
Uun,Z
n,Cn
t
))
dt
]
< φ(un) +
ρn
2
+m(ρn)− E
[∫ θn
0
e−rt dt
]
= φ(un) +
ρn
2
+m(ρn)− E
[
1
r
(
1− e−rθn)],
where the term
∫ θn
0 e
−rtφ′
(
Uun,Z
n,Cn
t
)
Znt dBt vanishes in expectation, the strict inequalities
12Let (Zn, C˜n) be an ρn/2-optimal admissible control. Take C
n
t = 0 for t < ρn, ∆C
n
ρn = e
γρn
∫ ρn
0
e−γt dC˜nt
and dCnt = dC˜
n
t for t > ρn. Then it can be shown that (Z
n, Cn) is an ρn/2 + ρn(e
γρn − 1)2K-optimal
admissible control, i.e., m(x) = x(eγx − 1)2K.
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follow from that h1, h2 >  on I(u¯;K). Therefore,
− ξn
ρn
<

2
− E
[
1
rρn
(
1− e−rθn)].
Sending n→∞, by the dominated convergence theorem, we obtain
0 ≤ 
2
−  lim
n→∞
E[θn]
ρn
. (5.18)
Observe that for large n and δ = (u¯ ∧K)/2,
P[τn ∧ τ0 ≤ ρn] ≤ P
[
sup
0≤t<ρn
∣∣Uun,Zn,Cnt − un∣∣ ≥ δ] ≤ 1δ2E
[
sup
0≤t<ρn
∣∣Uun,Zn,Cnt − un∣∣2],
where the upper bound tends to 0, as n→∞ (see, e.g. Pham, 2009, Theorem 1.3.16). Also,
we have that E[θn] ≥ ρnP[τn ∧ τ0 > ρn], so
P[τn ∧ τ0 > ρn] ≤ E[θn]
ρn
≤ 1,
Therefore, limn→∞
E[θn]
ρn
= 1, and (5.18) results in a contradiction.
The following lemma shows that any viscosity solution to (5.10) is also a viscoity solution
to (5.19). The main purpose of this result is to reduce values of the control Z to be on the
compact interval I = [(g′(α) − β)σ, (g′(α) − β)σ]. This reduction serves for the proof of the
comparison principle given by Lemma 5.14.
Lemma 5.13. Any viscosity supersolution (resp. subsolution) to (5.10) is also a viscosity
supersolution (resp. subsolution) to
min
{
rv(u)−max
z∈I
{αˆ(z) + (γu+G(z))v′(u) + 12z2v
′′
(u)},−v′′(u), v′(u) + 1
}
= 0, (5.19)
where I = [(g′(α)− β)σ, (g′(α)− β)σ].
Proof. Supersolution: Let V be a viscosity supersolution to (5.10) and write V∗ as its l.s.c.
envelop. Then Lemma 5.11 gives out that for any u¯ > 0 and φ ∈ C2((0,∞)) such that
0 = min(V∗ − φ)(u) = (V∗ − φ)(u¯), we have
rφ(u¯)−max
z∈R
{
αˆ(z) +
(
γu¯+G(z)
)
φ′(u¯) +
1
2
z2φ′′(u¯)
}
≥ 0 and φ′(u¯) + 1 ≥ 0.
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It must hold that φ′′(u¯) ≤ 0, otherwise, rV (u¯) − maxz∈R
{
αˆ(z) +
(
γu¯ + G(z)
)
φ′(u¯) +
1
2z
2φ′′(u¯)
}
= −∞. Therefore,
min
{
rφ(u¯)−max
z∈R
{αˆ(z) + (γu¯+G(z))φ′(u¯) + 12z2φ
′′
(u¯)},−φ′′(u¯), φ′(u¯) + 1
}
≥ 0,
and then
min
{
rφ(u¯)−max
z∈I
{αˆ(z) + (γu¯+G(z))φ′(u¯) + 12z2φ
′′
(u¯)},−φ′′(u¯), φ′(u¯) + 1
}
≥ 0.
Subsolution: Let V ∗ be the u.s.c. envelop of V . For any u¯ > 0, let φ ∈ C2((0,∞)) such
that 0 = max(V ∗ − φ)(u) = (V ∗ − φ)(u¯). If φ′′(u¯) ≥ 0, we already have
min
{
rφ(u¯)−max
z∈I
{αˆ(z) + (γu¯+G(z))φ′(u¯) + 12z2φ
′′
(u¯)},−φ′′(u¯), φ′(u¯) + 1
}
≤ 0.
If φ
′′
(u¯) < 0, we have
max
z∈R
{αˆ(z) + (γu¯+G(z))φ′(u¯) + 12z2φ
′′
(u¯)} = max
z∈I
{αˆ(z) + (γu¯+G(z))φ′(u¯) + 12z2φ
′′
(u¯)}.
Therefore
min
{
rφ(u¯)−max
z∈R
{αˆ(z) + (γu¯+G(z))φ′(u¯) + 12z2φ
′′
(u¯)}, φ′(u¯) + 1
}
≤ 0
implies
min
{
rφ(u¯)−max
z∈I
{αˆ(z) + (γu¯+G(z))φ′(u¯) + 12z2φ
′′
(u¯)},−φ′′(u¯), φ′(u¯) + 1
}
≤ 0.
The following comparison principle is proved using a similar argument to Lio and Ley
(2006).
Lemma 5.14. Let u : [0,∞) → R (resp. v : [0,∞) → R) be an u.s.c viscosity subsolution
(resp. l.s.c. viscosity supersolution) to (5.10). Suppose u(x) + x and v(x) + x are bounded
functions. Suppose further that (u− v)(0) ≤ 0, then (u− v)(x) ≤ 0, for all x ≥ 0.
Proof. Write w1(x) = u(x) + x and w2(x) = v(x) + x. With reference to Lemma 5.13, it can
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be shown that w1 and w2 are respectively viscosity subsolution and viscosity supersolution to
min
{
rw(x)− γxw′(x) + (γ − r)x−max
z∈I
{αˆ(z) +G(z)(w′(x)− 1) + 12z2w
′′
(x)},
−w′′(x), w′(x)
}
= 0,
where I = [(g′(α)−β)σ, (g′(α)−β)σ]. Let x¯ > 0 and φ ∈ C2((0,∞)) be such that w1−w2−φ
achieves a unique maximum value at x¯ over some closed ball
B¯(x¯;R) := {x ≥ 0 | |x− x¯| ≤ R, R > 0}.
Consider Θn(x, y) = φ(x) + n
2|x− y|2 and
Mn := max
x,y∈B¯(x¯;R)
{
w1(x)− w2(y)−Θn(x, y)
}
=w1(xn)− w2(yn)−Θn(xn, yn),
for some xn, yn ∈ B¯(x¯;R). As n→∞, (xn, yn) converges up to a subsequence to some (xˆ, yˆ).
Since for all n, Mn is lower bounded by w1(x¯)−w2(x¯)−φ(x¯), we must have xˆ = yˆ. Moreover,
we have
w1(xn)− w2(yn)− φ(xn)− n2|xn − yn|2 ≥ w1(xˆ)− w2(xˆ)− φ(xˆ),
and then
lim
n→∞n
2|xn − yn|2 ≤ lim
n→∞w1(xn)− w2(yn)− φ(xn)− w1(xˆ) + w2(xˆ) + φ(xˆ) ≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from the upper semi-continuity of w1 − w2. Thus,
lim
n→∞n
2|xn − yn|2 = 0.
It follows therefore,
w1(xˆ)− w2(xˆ)− φ(xˆ) ≥ lim
n→∞w1(xn)− w2(yn)− φ(xn)− n
2|xn − yn|2
≥ w1(x¯)− w2(x¯)− φ(x¯)
≥ w1(xˆ)− w2(xˆ)− φ(xˆ).
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This together with x¯ being the unique maximiser implies xˆ = x¯ and also that Mn → w1(x¯)−
w2(x¯)− φ(x¯), as n→∞.
Observe that DxΘ(xn, yn) = 2n
2(xn − yn) + φ′(xn) and −DyΘ(xn, yn) = 2n2(xn − yn).
Using Θn as the test function, in view of Ishii’s lemma (see, e.g. Pham, 2009), we have for all
ρ > 0,
(
2n2(xn − yn) + φ′(xn) , An
) ∈ J¯ 2+w1(xn),(
2n2(xn − yn) , Bn
) ∈ J¯ 2−w2(yn),
and (
An 0
0 −Bn
)
≤M + ρM2,
where
M = D2Θ(xn, yn) =
(
φ′′(xn) + 2n2 −2n2
−2n2 2n2
)
,
An, Bn ∈ R, and J¯ 2+w1(xn) (resp. J¯ 2−w2(xn)) is the second order limiting superjet for w1
(resp. limiting subjet for w2) at point xn. Then,
An −Bn = tr
((1 1
1 1
)(
An 0
0 −Bn
)) ≤ φ′′(xn) +m(ρn4), (5.20)
where m is some positive strictly decreasing function with m(0) = 0.
According to the characterisation of viscosity supersolution (resp. viscosity subsolution)
in terms of subjet (resp. superjet) (see, e.g. Pham, 2009), it follows that
min
{
rw1(xn)− γxn
(
2n2(xn − yn) + φ′(xn)
)
+ (γ − r)xn
−max
z∈I
{
αˆ(z) +G(z)
(
2n2(xn − yn) + φ(xn)− 1
)
+
1
2
z2An
}
,
−An , 2n2(xn − yn) + φ′(xn)
}
≤ 0,
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and
min
{
rw2(xn)− γyn2n2(xn − yn) + (γ − r)yn
−max
z∈I
{
αˆ(z) +G(z)
(
2n2(xn − yn)− 1
)
+
1
2
z2Bn
}
,
−Bn , 2n2(xn − yn)
}
≥ 0,
Taking the difference between these two inequalities gives out
0 ≥ min
{
r
(
w1(xn)− w2(yn)
)− 2γn2(xn − yn)2 − γxnφ′(xn) + (γ − r)(xn − yn)
−max
z∈I
{
G(z)φ′(xn) +
1
2
z2(An −Bn)
}
, −(An −Bn) , φ′(xn)
}
≥ min
{
r
(
w1(xn)− w2(yn)
)− 2γn2(xn − yn)2 − γxnφ′(xn) + (γ − r)(xn − yn)
−max
z∈I
{
G(z)φ′(xn) +
1
2
z2
(
φ′′(xn) +m(ρn4)
)}
, −(φ′′(xn) +m(ρn4)) , φ′(xn)},
where the second inequality follows from (5.20). First sending ρ to 0 then taking n → ∞
results in
0 ≥ min
{
r
(
w1(x¯)− w2(x¯)
)− γx¯φ′(x¯)−max
z∈I
{
G(z)φ′(x¯) +
1
2
z2φ′′(x¯)
}
, −φ′′(x¯) , φ′(x¯)
}
.
where we have used the fact that (xn, ρ) → maxz∈I
{
G(z)φ′(xn) + 12z
2
(
φ′′(xn) + m(ρn4)
)}
is continuous according to the maximum theorem (see, e.g. Aliprantis and Border, 2006,
Theorem 17.31). Therefore, for x > 0, (w1 − w2)(x) is a viscosity subsolution to
min
{
rw(x)− γxw′(x)−max
z∈I
{
G(z)w′(x) +
1
2
z2w′′(x)
}
, −w′′(x) , w′(x)
}
= 0. (5.21)
Now we construct an unbounded viscosity supersolution to (5.21). To this end, we look
at the function Φ(x) = η(x + C)r/γ with x ≥ 0, C > ‖G‖∞γ and η > 0. Denote ζ =
‖w1‖∞ + ‖w2‖∞ − (w1 − w2 − Φ)(0), so Φ
(
(ζ/η)γ/r − C) = ζ. It can be checked that for
x ∈ [0, (ζ/η)γ/r − C],
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Φ′(x) ≥ r
γ
ζ1−γ/rηγ/r,
−Φ′′(x) ≥ r(γ − r)
γ2
ζ1−2γ/rη2γ/r,
rΦ(x)− γxΦ′(x)−max
z∈I
{
G(z)Φ′(x) +
1
2
z2Φ′′(x)
} ≥ r(C − ‖G‖∞
γ
)
ζ1−γ/rηγ/r.
Therefore, Φ on x ∈ [0, (ζ/η)γ/r − C] is a strict supersolution to (5.21).
For any x > (ζ/η)γ/r − C,
(w1 − w2 − Φ)(x) < ‖w1‖∞ + ‖w2‖∞ − ζ = (w1 − w2 − Φ)(0).
Hence, the function w1 − w2 − Φ attains a maximum on [0, (ζ/η)γ/r − C]. Suppose this
maximum value is attained at x˜ and that x˜ > 0. Then the viscosity subsolution property of
w1 − w2 to (5.21) implies that
min
{
rΦ(x˜)− γxΦ′(x˜)−max
z∈I
{
G(z)Φ′(x˜) +
1
2
z2Φ′′(x˜)
}
, −Φ′′(x˜) , Φ′(x˜)
}
≤ 0,
which contradicts with it being a strict supersolution. We conclude consequently that x˜ = 0.
It follows then
(w1 − w2 − Φ)(x) ≤ (w1 − w2 − Φ)(0) ≤ 0, x ≥ 0.
Sending η to 0 results in (w1 − w2)(x) ≤ 0, for all x ≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 5.6. The value function V being a viscosity solution to (5.10) follow
directly from Lemma 5.11 and Lemma 5.12. Suppose v is another viscosity solution to (5.10)
satisfying the growth condition (5.11). Denote by v∗ (resp. v∗) the u.s.c. (resp. l.s.c.) envelop
of v, and write V ∗ (resp. V∗) to be the u.s.c. (resp. l.s.c.) envelop of V . Then according
to Lemma 5.14, we have that V ∗ ≤ v∗ ≤ v∗ ≤ V∗ ≤ V ∗, which shows that v = V and V is
continuous.
Proof of Proposition 5.8. Lemma 5.13 implies that V is a viscosity supersolution to−v′′ ≥
0, and hence it is a concave function, by Touzi (2012) Lemma 5.24. It follows therefore there
exists some uˆ ∈ [0,∞] such that V ′+ > −1 on (0, uˆ) and V ′+ = −1 on (uˆ,∞), since V is a
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viscosity solution to (5.10), where V ′+ denotes the right derivative of V . Now suppose uˆ < ub,
then for u ∈ (uˆ, ub), V ′(u) = −1. As a result, for all u ∈ (uˆ, ub),
rV (u)−max
z∈R
{
αˆ(z) +
(
γu+G(z)
)
V ′(u) +
1
2
z2V ′′(u)
}
<rψ˜(u) + γu−max
z∈R
{αˆ(z)−G(z)}
= 0.
However, this contradicts with V being a supersolution to (5.10), and we therefore conclude
that for all u ∈ (0, ub), V ′+(u) > −1. This implies that V satisfies V ′ + 1 > 0 on (0, ub) in
viscosity sense, and hence rV (u)−maxz∈R
{
αˆ(z) +
(
γu+G(z)
)
V ′(u) + 12z
2V ′′(u)
}
= 0 on the
same interval.
Define v : R+ → R by
v(u) :=
V (u), for u ∈ [0, ub),−u+ ub + ψ˜(ub), for u ∈ [ub,∞).
Let’s first try to show v ≤ V . But it suffices to prove v(u) ≤ V (u), for u ∈ (ub,∞). Since
V is a viscosity supersolution to the equation v′ + 1 ≥ 0 and by Touzi (2012) Lemma 5.23,
u 7→ V (u)+u is non-decreasing. Therefore, the result follows from that v(u)+u is constant, for
u ≥ ub. Secondly, we show v ≥ V . It can be checked that v restricted on (ub,∞) is a viscosity
supersolution to (5.10) with v(ub) = ψ˜(ub). Thus, v ≥ V on (ub,∞) can be verified by the same
argument as in the proof of Proposition 5.5 showing ψ is an upper bound of V . We therefore
have v = V on [0,∞). Then, rV (u) − maxz∈R
{
αˆ(z) +
(
γu + G(z)
)
V ′(u) + 12z
2V ′′(u)
}
> 0
and V ′(u) + 1 = 0 on (ub,∞) follow by a direct computation.
We proceed to prove the C2 property of V . But it suffices to prove V is twice-continuously
differentiable on [0, ub) as well as at the single point {ub}. According to Theorem 1 and
Footnote 21 in Strulovici and Szydlowski (2015), the differential equation
rv(u)−max
z∈I
{
αˆ(z) +
(
γu+G(z)
)
v′(u) +
1
2
z2v′′(u)
}
= 0,
with boundary condition v(0) = 0 and v(ub) = ψ˜(ub) has a unique twice-continuously differ-
entiable solution on [0, ub), where I = [(g
′(α) − β)σ, (g′(α) − β)σ]. Let’s denote the solution
by W . Moreover, by Lemma 7 and the proof of Proposition 1 in Strulovici and Szydlowski
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(2015), W is continuously differentiable on [0, ub). Now observe that
−1
2
W ′′(u) ≥ −rW (u) + αˆ(z) +
(
γu+G(z)
)
W ′(u)
z2
, for all z ∈ I, u ∈ (0, ub).
But given any u ∈ (0, ub), there exists zu ∈ I such that
−1
2
W ′′(u) =
−rW (u) + αˆ(zu) +
(
γu+G(zu)
)
W ′(u)
z2u
.
Thus, for u ∈ (0, ub),
−1
2
W ′′(u) = max
z∈I
−rW (u) + αˆ(z) + (γu+G(z))W ′(u)
z2
.
Since {−rW (u) + αˆ(z) + (γu + G(z))W ′(u)}/z2, as a function of (z, u), is continuous on
I × [0, ub), by the maximum theorem (see, e.g. Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Theorem 17.31),
W ′′ is continuous on [0, ub). On the other hand, Lemma 5.13 indicates that V is a viscosity
supersolution to
rv(u)−max
z∈I
{
αˆ(z) +
(
γu+G(z)
)
v′(u) +
1
2
z2v′′(u)
}
= 0
with boundary condition v(0) = 0 and v(ub) = ψ˜(ub). Therefore by a comparison theorem
(see, e.g. Touzi, 2012, Theorem 5.18), V = W on [0, ub].
The concavity of V ensures the existence of left and right derivatives of V (ub), denoted by
V ′−(ub) and V ′+(ub) respectively. Moreover, V ′−(ub) ≥ V ′+(ub) = −1. To get the C1 property of
V at ub, we prove by contradiction and assume the contrary that V
′−(ub) > V ′+(ub). Consider
the test function φn ∈ C2((0,∞)) defined by
φn(u) = V (ub) + η(u− ub)− n
2
(u− ub)2, (5.22)
where η ∈ (V ′+(ub), V ′−(ub)). Then, φ′n(ub) = η > −1, φ′′n(ub) = −n, and ub is a local maximum
of V − φn with (V − φn)(ub) = 0. According to Lemma 5.13, the viscosity subsolution of V
to (5.19) implies that
rV (ub)−max
z∈I
{
αˆ(z) +
(
γub +G(z)
)
η − 1
2
z2n
}
≤ 0, (5.23)
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where I = [(g′(α) − β)σ, (g′(α) − β)σ]. Since g′(α) > β, I is a compact interval bounded
away from 0. Therefore, taking n to be sufficiently large in the above expression results in a
contradiction, and we conclude that V is continuously differentiable at ub.
It now remains to show V is twice-continuously differentiable at ub. Observe that for
u ∈ (0, ub), with zu ∈ I being the optimiser of maxz∈R
{
αˆ(z)+
(
γu+G(z)
)
V ′(u)+ 12z
2V ′′(u)
}
,
we have
0 ≥ 1
2
z2uV
′′(u) = rV (u)− αˆ(zu)− (γu+G(zu))V ′(u).
Sending u to ub and taking a convergent subsequence of zu result in
0 ≥ 1
2
z2ubV
′′(ub−) = rV (ub) + γub − αˆ(zub) +G(zub)
≥ rψ˜(ub) + γub −max
z∈R
{αˆ(z)−G(z)} = 0,
where z2u > 0. Hence, V
′′(ub−) = V ′′(ub+) = 0.
The next lemma shows the Lipschitz continuity of the function Z∗(·) defined by Lemma
5.9. The proof follows a similar argument to Proposition 6 in Strulovici and Szydlowski (2015).
Lemma 5.15. Under the condition of Lemma 5.9, Z∗(·) is Lipschitz continuous on [0, ub].
Proof. Let’s first prove Z∗(·) is a continuous function. To this end, write
h(z, u) = αˆ(z) +G(z)V ′(u) +
1
2
z2V ′′(u), z ∈ I, u ∈ [0, ub].
We calculate that for all z ∈ I,
αˆ′(z) =
1
σg′′(αˆ(z))
> 0, αˆ′′(z) = −g
′′′(αˆ(z))αˆ′(z)
σ
(
g′′(αˆ(z))
)2 ≤ 0,
G′(z) =
zαˆ′(z)
σ
> 0, G′′(z) =
αˆ′(z)
σ
− G
′(z)g′′′(αˆ(z))
σ
(
g′′(αˆ(z))
)2 > 0,
and
hz(z, u) = αˆ
′(z) +G′(z)V ′(u) + zV ′′(u),
where G′′(z) > 0 is due to the assumption that z/g′′
(
(g′)−1(z/σ + β)
)
is strictly increasing.
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Then,
hzz(z, u) = αˆ
′′(z) +G′′(z)V ′(u) + V ′′(u)
= αˆ′′(z) +
αˆ′(z)V ′(u)
σ
− G
′(z)g′′′(αˆ(z))V ′(u)
σ
(
g′′(αˆ(z))
)2 + V ′′(u)
= αˆ′′(z) +
hz(z, u)− αˆ′(z)
z
− G
′(z)g′′′(αˆ(z))V ′(u)
σ
(
g′′(αˆ(z))
)2
= αˆ′′(z) +
hz(z, u)− αˆ′(z)
z
− g
′′′(αˆ(z))
σ
(
g′′(αˆ(z))
)2(hz(z, u)− αˆ′(z)− zV ′′(u))
= αˆ′′(z) +
(
hz(z, u)− αˆ′(z)
)(1
z
− g
′′′(αˆ(z))
σ
(
g′′(αˆ(z))
)2)+ g′′′(αˆ(z))zV ′′(u)
σ
(
g′′(αˆ(z))
)2
= αˆ′′(z) +
(
hz(z, u)− αˆ′(z)
)G′′(z)
G′(z)
+
g′′′(αˆ(z))zV ′′(u)
σ
(
g′′(αˆ(z))
)2 .
Therefore, for hz(z, u) ≤ 0,
hzz(z, u) ≤ −αˆ′(z)G
′′(z)
G′(z)
< 0.
This implies that for any fixed u ∈ [0, ub], there is at most one z ∈ I such that hz(z, u) = 0.
Consequently, for any u ∈ [0, ub], Z∗(u) is an I-valued number, and hence Z∗(·) is a function.
According to Theorem 17.31 and Theorem 17.11 in Aliprantis and Border (2006), the function
Z∗(·) has compact range and closed graph. Hence, it is continuous.
Following a similar argument in the proof of Proposition 5.8 gives out that
−1
2
V ′′(u) = max
z∈I
−rV (u) + αˆ(z) + (γu+G(z))V ′(u)
z2
, u ∈ [0, ub].
Then by Madan and Seneta (1990) Corollary 4, V ′′′ exists on (0, ub) and
V ′′′(u) =
2rV ′(u)− 2αˆ(Z∗(u))− 2γ(V ′(u) + uV ′′(u))−G(Z∗(u))V ′′(u)(
Z∗(u)
)2 , u ∈ (0, ub),
which is continuous. The above expression of V ′′′ clearly can be continuously extended onto
the interval [0, ub]. Therefore, the function hzu(Z
∗(u), u) is continuous hence bounded on
[0, ub]. For the Lipschitz property of Z
∗(·), it is sufficient to show that the restriction of Z∗(·)
to the union of non-empty open intervals on which the values of Z∗(·) are in the interior of I
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has bounded derivative. According to the previous part of this proof, along this restriction, we
have hz(Z
∗(u), u) = 0, hzz(Z∗(u), u) and hzu(Z∗(u), u) are both continuous, hzu(Z∗(u), u) is
bounded and hzz(Z
∗(u), u) is bounded away from 0. Therefore, applying the implicit function
theorem, we have that along this restriction,
(Z∗)′(u) = −hzu(Z
∗(u), u)
hzz(Z∗(u), u)
,
which is continuous and bounded.
Proof of Lemma 5.9. Note that
dUˆα,∗t = [γUˆ
α,∗
t + g
∗(Z∗t /σ + β)− βµ− µZ∗t /σ] dt+ Z∗t /σ dXαt − dC∗t
can be rewritten as
dUˆα,∗t = [γUˆ
α,∗
t +G
(
Z∗(Uˆα,∗t )
)− αˆ(Z∗(Uˆα,∗t ))Z∗(Uˆα,∗t )/σ + αtZ∗(Uˆα,∗t )/σ] dt
+ Z∗(Uˆα,∗t ) dBt − dC∗t . (5.24)
We first show this stochastic differential equation with reflection has a unique F-adapted strong
solution. According to Theorem 4.1 in Tanaka (1979), it suffices to show that the coefficients
are Lipschitz continuous functions with linear growth. But since Z∗(·), G(·), G′(·), αˆ(·), αˆ′(·)
and α are all bounded, it suffices to prove Z∗(·) is Lipschitz continuous, which is demonstrated
by Lemma 5.15.
Now it remains to show Uˆα,∗ and C∗ are also FX -adapted. By exactly the same proof of
Theorem 4.1 in Tanaka (1979), one can find two sequences of processes {Uˆn}∞n=0 and {Cn}∞n=1
such that for all n ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ t ≤ τˆn0 ,
Uˆ0t = Uˆ
α,∗
0 ,
Uˆnt = Uˆ
α,∗
0 +
∫ t
0
[
γUˆn−1s + g
∗(Z∗(Uˆn−1s )/σ + β)− βµ− µZ∗(Uˆn−1s )/σ] ds
+
∫ t
0
Z∗(Uˆn−1s )/σ dX
α
s −
∫ t
0
dCns ,∫ τˆn0
0
1{Uˆnt <ub}dC
n
t = 0,
Uˆnt ∈ [0, ub],
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where τˆn0 = inf{t ≥ 0 : Uˆnt ≤ 0}, Cn is non-decreasing ca`dla`g starting from 0, and Uˆn
(resp. Cn) converges uniformly on compact intervals to Uˆα,∗ (resp. C∗) a.s. as n tends to
infinity. Therefore, for all n ≥ 1, Uˆn and Cn both adapt to FX , this is essentially because∫ ·
0 Z
∗(Uˆn−1s )/σ dXαs is FX -adapted and Cn is given by
Cnt = X
n
t − max
0≤s≤t
(Xns ∧ ub), 0 ≤ t ≤ τˆn0 ,
where
Xnt = Uˆ
α,∗
0 +
∫ t
0
[
γUˆn−1s + g
∗(Z∗(Uˆn−1s )/σ + β)− βµ− µZ∗(Uˆn−1s )/σ] ds
+
∫ t
0
Z∗(Uˆn−1s )/σ dX
α
s .
Thus, both Uˆα,∗ and C∗ are FX -adapted.
Proof of Theorem 5.10. In the context of Lemma 5.9, write Uˆ∗ = Uˆ αˆ(Z∗),∗ and τ∗0 =
τ αˆ(Z
∗),∗. This proof is based on the result of Lemma 5.2 that for (Z∗, C∗) ∈ P(u;FX), Agent
applies effort αˆ(Z∗). Therefore, F = FX and Uˆ∗ satisfies
dUˆ∗t = [γUˆ
∗
t +G(Z
∗
t )] dt+ Z
∗
t dB − dC∗t .
Then the classical argument of verification goes through.
We first show (Z∗, C∗) ∈ P(u;FX). By the proof of Lemma 5.15 we know Z∗(·) is
continuous. This together with the adaptedness of Uˆα,∗ implies that the process Z∗ is FX -
progressively measurable. The boundedness of Z∗ implies
∫ t
0 e
−2rt(Z∗s )2 ds <∞, for all t ≥ 0.
Since the state process Uα,∗·∧τα,∗0
is bounded, it is of class D and the associated transversality
condition is satisfied. Following the dynamic in (5.24),
E
[ ∫ τα,∗0
0
e−rs dC∗s
]
=u+ E
[ ∫ τα,∗0
0
(γ − r)e−rsUα,∗s ds+
∫ τα,∗0
0
e−rs
(
G
(
Z∗s
)− αˆ(Z∗s )Z∗s/σ + αtZ∗s/σ) ds] <∞,
where the first equality is because e−rτ
α,∗
0 Uα,∗
τα,∗0
= 0 and
∫ ·∧τα,∗0
0 e
−rsZ∗s dBs is a uniformly inte-
grable martingale, and the finiteness follows from the boundedness of integrands. Therefore,
combining with the result in Lemma 5.9, we have (Z∗, C∗) ∈ P(u;FX).
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Using the condition that r < γ, it can be checked that any (Z,C) ∈ P(u;FX) also satisfies
Lemma 5.2. Hence Agent applies effort αˆ(Z). Write Uˆ = Uˆ αˆ(Z), then it satisfies
dUˆt = [γUˆt +G(Zt)] dt+ Zt dB − dCt.
Consider any (Z,C) ∈ P(u;FX). Let {τn}∞n=1 be a localisation sequence of stopping times
such that each
∫ τn∧·
0 e
−rtV ′(Ut)Zt dBt is a martingale. Then,
e−r(τ0∧T∧τn) V (Uˆτ0∧T∧τn)
=V (u) +
∫ τ0∧T∧τn
0
e−rt
(
−rV (Uˆt) +
(
γUˆt +G(Zt)
)
V ′(Uˆt) +
1
2
Z2t V
′′(Uˆt)
)
dt
−
∫ τ0∧T∧τn
0
e−rtV ′(Uˆt) dCct +
∑
0≤t≤τ0∧T∧τn
e−rt∆V (Uˆt)
+
∫ τ0∧T∧τn
0
e−rtV ′(Uˆt)Zt dBt
≤V (u)−
∫ τ0∧T∧τn
0
e−rtαˆ(Zt) dt+
∫ τ0∧T∧τn
0
e−rt dCt −
∫ τ0∧T∧τn
0
e−rtZt dBt.
It follows that
V (u) ≥ lim
T→∞
lim
n→∞E
[∫ τ0∧T∧τn
0
e−rt
(
αˆ(Zt) dt− dCt
)
+ e−r(τ0∧T∧τn) V (Uˆτ0∧T∧τn)
]
= E
[∫ τ0
0
e−rt
(
αˆ(Zt) dt− dCt
)]
, (5.25)
where the equality is due to the dominated convergence theorem, the transversality condition
on Uˆ , and the fact that V is bounded by two linear functions going through 0.
On the other hand, consider (Z∗, C∗) ∈ P(u;FX). It follows from Proposition 5.8 and a
similar computation as above that
E
[∫ τ∗0
0
e−rt
(
αˆ(Z∗t ) dt− dC∗t
)]
= V (u).
This together with (5.25) implies that (Z∗, C∗) is optimal.
With the optimal choice of (Z∗, C∗) ∈ P(u;FX) Principal chooses an optimal starting
point u∗ by solving the problem (5.8). The existence of u∗ is guaranteed by the concavity of
V on [A¯,∞). Since V is strictly decreasing on (ub,∞), we have u∗ = A¯, if A¯ ≥ ub.
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